STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, BY AND ON BEHALF OF THERESA A. YOUNG, APPELLANT,
v.
JIMMY L. SUMBLIN, APPELLEE
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The Florida Department of Revenue appealed the trial court's denial of a child support modification, arguing the court erred by relying solely on the custodial parent's voluntary underemployment without considering statutory guidelines and whether income imputation was appropriate. The court reversed and remanded, holding that child support guidelines apply to modification proceedings and require detailed factual findings.
The trial court erred by simply denying modification based on underemployment. Child support guidelines apply to modification proceedings and are presumptively the amount to be ordered. Rather than denying modification, the court must determine whether to impute income while considering whether the custodial parent's presence at home is necessary, and make detailed findings explaining any deviation from guidelines.
[1] Child support guidelines are applicable to modification proceedings.
[2] The guidelines amount for child support is presumptively the amount the trier of fact shall order in either an initial or modification proceeding.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The child support guidelines are applicable to modification proceedings.”
Establishes that statutory guidelines, not just prior agreements, govern modification cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceYoung and Sumblin's marriage was dissolved in 1987 when their daughter was two years old, with child support set at $200 per month by agreement. At mo…
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PER CURIAM.
In this appeal from an order denying modification of child support, appellant contends the trial court erred in basing its ruling on the sole finding that Young was voluntarily underemployed. We agree and reverse.
The marriage of Young and Sumblin was dissolved in 1987 when the minor daughter was two years old. At that time, the parties agreed upon child support in the amount of $200 per month. At the time of the petition for modification, the child was eleven years old, and Young testified to some increased expenses on her behalf. Appellee had experienced an increase in his income. Appellant also asserted that by virtue of sections 61.30(l)(a) and 61.30(l)(b), Florida Statutes, there had been a substantial change in circumstances, in that the guidelines amount of child support represented more than a fifteen percent or $50 increase over the amount originally ordered.
The evidence also indicated that at the time of the dissolution, appellant earned about $200 per week working two jobs, as a waitress and bartender, and that at the time of modification, she was earning only $400 to $480 per month. She testified that she worked around her daughter’s school schedule and tried to be home when the school bus arrived in the afternoon.
The trial court simply denied modification due to her underemployment. This was error. The child support guidelines are applicable to modification proceedings. See State, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Norman, 646 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Jones v. Jones, 636 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
The guidelines may provide the basis for finding a substantial change in circumstances, and the guidelines amount is presumptively the amount the trier of fact shall order in either an initial or modification proceeding. See §§ 61.30(1)(a), 61.30(1)(b), Fla.Stat.; Matthews v. Matthews, 677 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 1st DCA, 1996).
The existence of a settlement agreement does not result in the placement of a heavier burden of proof on the party moving for modification, at least not when an increase is sought. See Section 61.14(7), Fla. Stat.; Matthews.
Rather than simply denying modification, the trial court should have determined whether it was appropriate to impute income to Young. In doing so, the trial court should have considered whether it was necessary for Young, as the primary residential parent, to be at home with the child, see section 61.30(2)(b). Apparently the trial court did not do so, as there are no specific findings on that issue. See Harrison v. Harrison, 573 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). If the court finds it appropriate to impute income, it should then calculate the respective guidelines obligations based on the imputed income.
According to our informal calculations, whether or not income is imputed, there is a difference between support currently being paid and the guidelines amount for the parties’ incomes of more than fifteen percent or $50, which may justify a finding of a substantial change in circumstances. While the statute does not mandate a conclusion that there has been a substantial change in circumstances, the statute does require the trial court to consider the appropriate statutory criteria, and to make appropriate findings of fact to support its rulings. Such findings include an explanation of “ ‘why ordering payment of such guideline amount would be unjust or inappropriate,’ ” and “why variance from the guidelines did not demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances.” Matthews, citing Ballantyne v. Ballantyne, 666 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Jones v. Jones, 636 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); and Whight v. Whight, 635 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BOOTH, JOANOS and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.
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Swanston v. Swanston, 746 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…8). [*569] A child support guideline amount which has been properly calculated under section 61.30 presumptively establishes the amount of child support to be ordered. See § 61.30(1)(a); State, Dept. of Revenue, By and On Behalf of Young v. Sumblin, 675 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Assuming that the gross income amounts and deductions stated on the January 1999 child support worksheet are correct, we find that the worksheet correctly calculates the parties’ combined net monthly income under section 61.30(5…
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Thyrre v. Thyrre, 963 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…g on a petition to modify child support, the statute “require[s] the trial court to consider the appropriate statutory criteria, and to make appropriate findings of fact to support its rulings.” State, Dept. of Revenue on Behalf of Young v. Sumblin, 675 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Fisher v. Fisher, 722 So. 2d 243, 245 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (alteration in original); see also Cooper v. Cooper, 760 So. 2d 1048, 1048 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (“In a child support case such as this, a final judgment is deficient ‘…
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Grisselle T. Harbin v. Harbin, 762 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…lower court ordered the former husband to pay. See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 668 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Hice v. Pace, 675 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Eisner v. Eisner, 513 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); State, Dept. of Revenue v. Sumblin, 675 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). The trial court also erred when it failed to rule on the former wife’s entitlement to attorney’s fees. In the former wife’s pleadings and in her pretrial statement she requested attorney’s fees. At the conclusion of the modific…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ballantyne v. Ballantyne, 666 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- Jones v. Jones, 636 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Yola Harrison v. Harrison, 573 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Whight v. Tymme Douglas Whight, 635 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Matthews v. Matthews, 677 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
- State v. Norman, 646 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- CED Cap. Holdings, III, Ltd. v. Fla. Dep't OF Cmty. Affairs, 646 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)