WINN DIXIE STORES, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
SARAH JANE WHITE, APPELLEE
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Winn Dixie Stores appealed a jury verdict in a slip-and-fall negligence case, arguing that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a directed verdict. The appellate court agreed, finding that the evidence was insufficient to support the inference of negligence and reversed the judgment.
The trial court erred in denying Winn Dixie's motion for a directed verdict because the evidence was inadequate to establish the necessary inferences that a dangerous condition existed and that Winn Dixie had actual or constructive knowledge of it.
[1] A directed verdict should be granted when the evidence, construed most strictly in favor of the non-moving party, is insufficient to support a verdict for that party.
[2] Negligence cannot be inferred solely from the mere happening of an accident.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Negligence, however, may not be inferred from the mere happening of an accident alone.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that a slip-and-fall accident does not automatically create liability for negligence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellee slipped and fell in a Winn Dixie store and sustained personal injuries. A man with a buffer was observed near the location of the fall, b…
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GUNTHER, Chief Judge.
Appellant, Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., defendant below, seeks review of the jury verdict rendered in a slip-and-fall ease. On appeal, Winn Dixie asserts that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a directed verdict. We agree.
The evidence adduced at trial reveals that the appellee slipped and fell in Winn Dixie, sustaining personal injuries. A man with a buffer was observed near the location of appellee’s fall; however, no witness had seen the man buff the particular area where appellee fell. Although the floor surface was shiny, appellee found no wetness or other cause for her accident when she looked after falling. Moreover, a witness who noticed appellee’s fall experienced no slipperiness oh the floor. Winn Dixie’s store manager testified that the buffing takes place regularly and does not leave the floor surface slippery or wet. Furthermore, an examination of the area shortly after the accident revealed nothing on the floor. At the close of the evidence, the trial court denied Winn Dixie’s motion for directed verdict.
In considering a motion for directed verdict, all inferences of fact should be construed most strictly in favor of the non-moving party. Cooper Hotel Servs., Inc. v. MacFarland, 662 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), rev. denied, 670 So. 2d 939(Fla.l996). Negligence, however, may not be inferred from the mere happening of an accident alone. Id. at 712; Belden v. Lynch, 126 So. 2d 578, 581(Fla. 2d DCA 1961). Circumstantial evidence “will not support a jury inference if the evidence is purely speculative and, therefore, inadequate to produce an inference that outweighs all contrary or opposing inferences.” Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Trusell, 131 So. 2d 730, 733 (Fla.1961). In order to find Winn Dixie liable in the instant case, the jury would have to necessarily infer that there was a dangerous condition at the situs of the fall and that Winn Dixie had actual or constructive knowledge thereof. Such inferences could not be properly drawn from the evidence adduced. Rather, they could only be drawn from speculation and conjecture.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Winn Dixie’s motion for a directed verdict. As such, the instant case is reversed and remanded with directions to the trial court to enter a verdict in favor of Winn Dixie.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
FARMER and KLEIN, JJ., concur.
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Justa Patricia Delgado v. Laundromax, Inc., 65 So. 3d 1087 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)…(Fla. 3d DCA 1989), the record must contain additional facts in support of liability, to create a permissible inference upon which Delgado could rely in defense against Laundro-max’s motion for summary judgment. See Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. White, 675 So. 2d 702, 703 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). There were, however, no additional facts presented that would support constructive notice. In fact, all the facts regarding the spill suggest that it was not on the floor for a long period of time prior to Delgado’s slip a…
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Gonzalez v. B & B Cash Grocery Stores, Inc., 692 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…Neither has plaintiff argued an independent basis for holding defendant liable for the negligence of its independent contractor. See generally McCall v. Alabama Bruno’s, Inc., 647 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). . Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. White, 675 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), and Publix Super Markets, Inc. v. Schmidt, 509 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), relied on by defendant, were cases decided either by directed verdict or after a jury verdict and not at the summary judgment stage of the proceeding…
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Justo Nunez v. G.F. CAR Ctr., Inc., 877 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)…testimony, the majority concludes that there exists a “reasonable inference that Nunez [fell] as a result of grease accumulating in that area.” I disagree. Negligence may not be inferred from the mere happening of an accident. Winn Dixie v. White, 675 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Circumstantial evidence “will not support a jury inference if the evidence is purely speculative and, therefore, inadequate to produce an inference that outweighs all contrary inferences.” Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Trusell, 131…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Phoebe C. Trusell et vir, 131 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1961)
- Beldem v. Lynch, 126 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)
- Cooper Hotel Servs., Inc. v. Tobie MacFARLAND, 662 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)