GLEN NASH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Glen Nash appeals the denial of his motion for postconviction relief challenging his 21-year sentence for murder as exceeding the statutory maximum. The court affirmed the sentence as valid under the plea agreement but remanded to correct erroneous statutory references in the judgment forms.
The sentence is legal because it was imposed pursuant to a valid plea agreement for second-degree murder, which carries life imprisonment as its maximum penalty. The incorrect statutory reference in the judgment forms does not invalidate the sentence, but the trial court must correct these references on remand.
[1] A sentence imposed pursuant to a valid plea agreement is not subject to challenge as illegal.
[2] A trial court may correct erroneous statutory references in a judgment and sentence form on remand, even when affirming the underlying sentence.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Where a sentence is imposed pursuant to a valid plea agreement, no error has occurred.”
Establishes the legal principle that valid plea agreements cure potential sentencing errors.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGlen Nash pleaded guilty to second-degree murder under Florida Statutes section 782.04(3), a first-degree felony punishable by life imprisonment, and …
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WOLF, Judge.
Glen Nash appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for postconviction relief made pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a).
In his motion, appellant alleged one error: That his sentence for 21 years for third-degree murder under section 782.04(4), Florida Statutes, was illegal as beyond the statutory maximum of 15 years. In the order denying appellant’s motion, the trial court pointed out that “defendant pled guilty to murder in the second degree under section 782.04, Fla.Stat.,” and further stated that “defendant has not stated a legal basis for relief in light of the plea agreement he signed....” The appellant’s judgment and sentence forms and signed plea agreement were attached to the order. Although it seems apparent from the record that the appellant agreed to 21 years’ imprisonment for second-degree murder (a first-degree felony punishable by life) under section 782.04(3), the judgment form refers to section 782.04(4), which is the statute addressing third-degree murder (a second-degree felony).
A 21-year sentence for third-degree murder would be illegal as beyond the statutory maximum. The judgment, sentence and plea forms, however, all refer to second-degree murder and the degree of crime references life imprisonment. It, therefore, appears from the record that the appellant was actually sentenced to 21 years for a first-degree felony punishable by life pursuant to a valid plea agreement. Where a sentence is imposed pursuant to a valid plea agreement, no error has occurred. See Sellers v. State, 578 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1st DCA), aff'd, 586 So. 2d 340 (Fla.1991).
Accordingly, we affirm the sentence imposed, but remand for the trial court to change the incorrect references to section 782.04(4) in the judgment and sentence forms.
BOOTH and BENTON, JJ., concur.
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Cordero v. State, 686 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…ile” on the misdemeanor charge of DUI and that he was not returned to custody — through no fault of his own — until he was rearrested on the felony DUI charge 8 months later is immaterial to the running of the speedy trial time. Dedolchow v. State, 675 So. 2d 955, 956 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). The reason for this rule makes perfect sense. To accept the state’s argument in this case would promote the same evils the Supreme Court warned against in Genden and Agee. An individual could be arrested and the state, for…
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State v. Gantt, 688 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…l period, sufficient grounds for discharge exist because the defendant did not receive notice until he was rearrested, well after the expiration of the speedy trial period. See Cordero v. State, 686 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Dedolchow v. State, 675 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Clinton v. State, 451 So. 2d 893 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). To allow the state an additional fifteen days in which to bring the defendant to trial, in view of the State’s inaction, would impermissibly prejudice the defendant’s speedy t…
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Wells v. State, 881 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…ified that the charges were filed, preventing the defendant from being able to move for discharge when the period expired: Cordero v. State, 686 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); State v. Morris, 662 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Dedol-chow v. State, 675 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); State v. Gantt, 688 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Wills v. Wilson, 586 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). We reject the State’s argument that Wells waived any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to assert his sp…
Authorities Cited
- Carter v. State, 586 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1991)
- Louie Anthony Sellers v. State, 578 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Fernandez v. Efigenia Nancy Fernandez, 578 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)