MICHAEL J. MCCOY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Florida appellate court affirmed McCoy's cocaine possession conviction based on sufficient evidence of constructive possession, but struck certain improper costs and probation conditions.
The State presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could lawfully infer McCoy's actual knowledge of the cocaine, supporting the conviction for possession.
[1] Certain costs and probation conditions imposed by a trial court may be struck on appeal when they lack statutory authority or were not properly announced at sentencing.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMcCoy was convicted of cocaine possession; the record contained independent evidence of circumstances from which the jury could infer his actual knowl…
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BLUE, Judge.
Michael J. McCoy appeals his conviction and sentence for possession of cocaine, arguing that the State failed to prove constructive possession. The record contains independent evidence of circumstances from which the jury could lawfully infer McCoy’s actual knowledge of the cocaine. See Moffatt v. State, 583 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Because the evidence was sufficient to present a question for the jury, we affirm McCoy’s conviction. See Parker v. State, 641 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).
. However, we agree with McCoy that the trial court improperly imposed certain costs and probation conditions. Accordingly, we strike the portions of conditions 8 and 20 that require McCoy to pay for random testing, drug/aleohol evaluation, and treatment. See Luby v. State, 648 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). We affirm the remaining conditions because Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986(e) provides notice sufficient to obviate the need for oral pronouncement. See State v. Hart, 668 So. 2d 589 (Fla.1996). We also strike the $2 assessed per section 943.25(13), Florida Statutes (1993), because it is a discretionary cost that was not announced; we strike the $33 “cost/fine” because no statutory authority was provided. See Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (en banc).
Conviction affirmed; certain costs and probation conditions struck.
RYDER, A.C.J., and PATTERSON, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Norton v. State, 681 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…grees that the portions of conditions 8 and 20 requiring Norton to pay for random drug testing and to pay for an evaluation for alcohol abuse must be stricken as they are special [*1187] conditions of probation not orally pronounced. McCoy v. State, 675 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Additionally, we strike condition 24, requiring an evaluation to determine the need for inpatient drug treatment; it is a special condition of probation which was not orally pronounced. State v. Hart, 668 So. 2d 589 (Fla.1996).…
Authorities Cited
- Abel Oliveros Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- State v. Hart, 668 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1996)
- Luby v. State, 648 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Moffatt v. State, 583 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Parker v. State, 641 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)