SHARON PETREL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Fourth District affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress evidence from a traffic stop, holding that under Whren v. United States, a stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the officer had probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred, regardless of the officer's subjective intent.
A traffic stop is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment if the officer had probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred, regardless of whether the stop was pretextual.
[1] A traffic stop is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment if the officer had probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred, regardless of the officer's subject…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the test adopted by the United States Supreme Court is whether an officer could have stopped the vehicle for a traffic infraction”
The court explained the proper Fourth Amendment analysis for traffic stops following Whren v. United States.
Appellant was stopped for a traffic violation, which led to her arrest for driving with a suspended license and seizure of evidence.…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant challenges the trial court’s order denying her motion to suppress evidence. She claims that the stop of her vehicle, which ultimately led to the seizure of evidence, was a pretextual stop.1 Recently in State v. Daniel, 665 So. 2d 1040 (Fla.1995), our supreme court held that in determining whether a stop for a minor traffic violation which results in the seizure of evidence was impermissible under the Fourth Amendment, the proper analysis was whether a reasonable officer following usual police practices would have stopped the vehicle for the traffic infraction. However, more recently, the United States Supreme Court has held that under the Fourth Amendment an officer’s reasons for a stop are immaterial and that stop is reasonable when the officer had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred. Thus, the test adopted by the United States Supreme Court is whether an officer could have stopped the vehicle for a traffic infraction. See Whren v. United States, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). As we are constitutionally directed to construe the Fourth Amendment consistent with United States Supreme Court rulings, see Article I, Section 12, Florida Constitution, we affirm appellant’s conviction and sentence.
Affirmed.
WARNER, FARMER and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur. . After appellant was stopped, she was arrested for driving with a suspended license.
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Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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Saturnino-Boudet v. State, 682 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…n has been committed). Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const.; State v. Holland, 680 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); State v. Corvin, 677 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Indialantic Police Dep’t v. Zimmerman, 677 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Petrel v. State, 675 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Whren does not control Boudet's case, however, because he was not detained as a result of a traffic infraction. Clark v. State, 677 So. 2d 903, 904 n. 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). . See Ornelas v. United States, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 16…
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Hurd v. State, 958 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…h and seizure law, the stopping of a motorist is reasonable where a police officer has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); Petrel v. State, 675 So. 2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). The test is whether a police officer could have stopped the vehicle for a traffic violation. Id. The constitutional validity of a traffic stop depends on purely objective criteria. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769.…
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State v. Hernandez, 718 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…on. 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops under the Fourth Amendment does not depend on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved); see also Anderson, 692 So. 2d at 241; Petrel v. State, 675 So. 2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Further, once the detectives had probable cause for the temporary stop and detention of this vehicle, they were also lawfully entitled under Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 884, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997), to o…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1996)
- State v. Daniel, 665 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 1995)