ABRAHAM TROY BROOKS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1996-06-27
No. 94-2423
WEBSTER, MICKLE and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.
676 So. 2d 48 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1996) Caution
Cited by 18 cases

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Synopsis

Abraham Troy Brooks appealed his sentences as a habitual felony offender and challenged various court-imposed costs. The appellate court affirmed the habitual felony offender sentences and mandatory costs, but struck a discretionary $2.00 cost and vacated $200.00 in unidentified court costs, remanding for clarification.


Holding

The court affirmed the habitual felony offender sentences and the mandatory statutory costs of $50.00 and $3.00, but struck the $2.00 discretionary cost for lack of notice and opportunity to be heard, and vacated the $200.00 in unidentified court costs pending clarification on remand.


Headnotes

[1] A state attorney's decision to seek habitual felony offender treatment is not subject to challenge on grounds of racial motivation.

[2] Statutorily mandated costs imposed pursuant to sections 960.20 and 943.25(3), Florida Statutes, do not require a specific opportunity for the defendant to be heard.

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Key Quotes

“both are statutorily mandated”

Court's rationale for affirming the $50.00 and $3.00 mandatory costs without requiring a hearing

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Facts & Procedural History

Brooks was convicted and sentenced as a habitual felony offender. The trial court imposed various costs totaling $255.00, including $50.00 for the Cri…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

In this direct criminal appeal, appellant complains about his sentences as an habitual felony offender, and about the costs he was ordered to pay. As to the former, he asserts that he is entitled to have his sentences set aside, and to be sentenced pursuant to the guidelines, because the state attorney’s decision to request habitual offender treatment was racially motivated; and as to the latter, he asserts that the costs imposed should be stricken because he was not afforded “a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”

We affirm appellant’s habitual felony offender sentences on the authority of Jones v. State, 676 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). We affirm also the imposition of $50.00 in costs pursuant to section 960.20, Florida Statutes (for the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund), and $3.00 pursuant to section 943.25(3), Florida Statutes (for the Additional Court Cost Clearing Trust Fund), as both are statutorily mandated. Ivey v. State, 586 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). However, we strike the imposition of $2.00 pursuant to section 943.25(13), Florida Statutes (for criminal justice education by municipalities and counties), because such a cost is discretionary and, therefore, cannot be imposed without affording a defendant notice and an opportunity to be heard. Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (en banc). In addition, we vacate the imposition of $200.00 in “court costs.” However, as it appears that this sum may merely represent unidentified mandatory costs, on remand, the trial court may reimpose same, provided that it specifies the statute mandating imposition.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; and REMANDED, with directions.

WEBSTER, MICKLE and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • NIX v. State, 84 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)
    …, discretionary costs must be orally pronounced at sentencing because such costs may not be imposed without affording the defendant notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Smiley v. State, 704 So. 2d 191, 195 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Brooks v. State, 676 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (citing Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)). Here, the trial court orally pronounced a lump sum of $1,522.50 of costs and fines. The oral pronouncement did not delineate the specific costs and fines included in th…
  • Mitchell v. State, 678 So. 2d 1362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)
    …ty in the written order, and 3) may be an unidentified mandatory cost or a merely discretionary cost, we are constrained to strike the $100.00 for failure to provide the appellant with adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. Brooks v. State, 676 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Pollock v. State, 666 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); McCray v. State, 665 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). On remand, the state may seek reimposition of appropriate costs in accordance with the procedures set forth in Reyes, 65…
  • Terry v. State, 791 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
    …DCA 1995); § 938.27(1), Fla. Stat. The $2 discretionary cost imposed pursuant to section 938.15, Florida Statutes, is also stricken because it cannot be imposed without Appellant receiving notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Brooks v. State, 676 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 683 So. 2d 482 (Fla.1996); Bryant v. State, 661 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). On remand, the trial court may reimpose these costs after complying with the “procedural safeguards” set forth in Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2…

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