MICHAEL KEVIN CRABB, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1996-07-09
Nos. 95-4277, 95-4278
ALLEN and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.
676 So. 2d 505 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1996) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

Juvenile Michael Kevin Crabb appeals his adult sentence for battery on a law enforcement officer, armed burglary, and petit theft. The court affirms the imposition of adult sanctions but reverses in part, remanding for entry of a written sentencing order as required by statute.


Holding

The court affirms that the trial judge properly considered and intentionally rejected juvenile sanctions in favor of adult sanctions. The court also holds that while the statute does not require specific findings or enumeration of criteria, the trial judge was required to enter a written sentencing order, and remands for entry of a written order conforming to the oral pronouncement of sentence.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court's oral pronouncement of adult sanctions for a juvenile is sufficient to impose those sanctions, even without a written order.

[2] A juvenile's significant prior record, including escape and offenses committed while in a juvenile facility, may support the imposition of adult sanctions.

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Key Quotes

“Any decision to impose adult sanctions must be in writing, but is presumed appropriate, and the court is not required to set forth specific findings or enumerate the criteria in this subsection as any basis for its decision to impose adult sanctions.”

Establishes the statutory requirement that adult sanctions be in writing while clarifying that specific findings are not mandatory

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Facts & Procedural History

Crabb, a juvenile, committed battery on a law enforcement officer, armed burglary of a structure, and petit theft on May 23, 1995, at the Pensacola Bo…

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Opinion of the Court
LAWRENCE, Judge.

LAWRENCE, Judge.

Michael Kevin Crabb (Crabb), a juvenile,1 appeals his adult sentence, entered without a written order addressing the reasons for imposing adult sanctions. We affirm in part, and reverse in part.

Crabb pleaded no contest, in ease 95-2886, to battery on a law enforcement officer, and in case 95^1110, to armed burglary of a structure and to petit theft. Crabb committed these crimes on May 23 1995, at the Pensacola Boys Base, in Escambia County. The trial judge sentenced Crabb to 17.5 months in prison on the felonies, and concurrently to jail for sixty days for the petit theft, without entering a written order imposing adult sanctions.

Crabb argues that the judge failed to consider juvenile sanctions. The record however shows otherwise. The record discloses that the judge, although juvenile sentencing was recommended, intentionally rejected this option. The judge orally stated:

The court has his prior record before it. It is a significant prior juvenile record. One charge also includes an escape March 17 of ’95, and these charges arise out of an incident that occurred while he was in a juvenile facility. I believe the facts indi cate that he struck.... As I was saying, he struck an officer, an intake counselor at Boys Base, and then, while still in a juvenile facility, apparently either sold or gave to another inmate some drug that was not prescribed for that individual. The court considers that a guideline sentence is appropriate.

We therefore affirm the imposition of adult sanctions.

Crabb also argues that the judge erred by failing to enter a written order imposing adult sanctions; this point has merit. Section 39.059(7)(d), Florida Statutes (1995), provides: “Any decision to impose adult sanctions must be in writing, but is presumed appropriate, and the court is not required to set forth specific findings or enumerate the criteria in this subsection as any basis for its decision to impose adult sanctions.” (Emphasis added.) This court moreover states:

[T]he trial court d[oes] not err in failing either to set forth specific findings or to enumerate the statutory criteria for its decision to impose adult sanctions. Nevertheless, we hold, and the state concedes, that the ease must be remanded for entry of a written order.... A written nunc pro tunc sentencing order will satisfy the requirements of the statute. Therefore, no new sentencing hearing is required, nor need the appellant be physically present in court for the merely clerical or ministerial function of entering a written order conforming to the oral pronouncement of the court.

Nation v. State, 668 So. 2d 284, 286 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (emphasis added). We therefore remand for entry of a written order conforming to the oral pronouncement of the court; Crabb need not be present in court for this ministerial function.

We thus affirm Crabb’s convictions, and his adult sentence. We nevertheless remand with instructions that a written sentencing order be entered.

ALLEN and WEBSTER, JJ., concur. . Crabb was born on January 26, 1980.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Williams v. State, 697 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
    …ut remand to the trial court for the ministerial function of entering a written order at which defendant need not be present. Nation v. State, 668 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Mulligan v. State, 688 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1997); Crabb v. State, 676 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); McBride v. State, 695 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). We do strike the $2 Criminal Justice Education Fee, however, for lack of prior notice. Tarrant v. State, 668 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). WARNER and FARMER, JJ., and DON…
  • Dontae Brown v. State, 692 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)
    …n most cases most likely will rest upon one or some of the criteria set forth in the statute. This may be accomplished on remand. Smith v. State, 684 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Oliver v. State, 681 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Crabb v. State, 676 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Roberts v. State, 677 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Sentence VACATED; REMANDED. DAUKSCH and GOSHORN, JJ., concur. . § 812.13, Fla.Stat. . § 39.059(7)(c), Fla.Stat. (1993); Walker v. State, 656 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995);…
  • Kevirent Brundage v. State, 688 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
    …the proper disposition of this case. § 39.059(7), Fla. Stat. (1995). Upon re-sentencing, the trial court will, if it decides to impose adult sanctions, enter a written order as required by section 39.059(7), Florida Statutes See also Crabb v. State, 676 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.…

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