STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
SANDRA K. HISCOX, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1996-02-16
No. 95-01931
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and FRANK and PARKER, JJ., concur.
677 So. 2d 862 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1996) Positive Treatment
Cited by 19 cases

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Synopsis

Florida appeals a trial court order denying restitution in a grand theft case. The court reverses, holding that while a trial court must impose a restitution order within 60 days of sentencing under Rule 3.800(b), it may determine the amount of restitution beyond that period if the order was timely entered as a condition of probation.


Holding

A trial court loses jurisdiction to impose a restitution order under Rule 3.800(b) only if not done within 60 days of sentencing; however, if the restitution order is timely imposed within 60 days, the court retains jurisdiction to determine the amount of restitution at a later date. Because restitution was made an original condition of the probation order filed within 15 days of sentencing, the trial court could properly determine the amount beyond the 60-day period.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court retains jurisdiction to determine the amount of restitution beyond the sixty-day period if an order of restitution was timely entered as a condition of prob…

[2] A trial court must provide adequate notice and an opportunity to defend before holding a restitution hearing.

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Key Quotes

“it is the order of restitution which must be imposed at the time of sentencing or within sixty days thereafter and if that order has been entered in a timely manner, a court can determine the amount of restitution beyond the sixty day period”

Establishes the critical distinction between the deadline for imposing a restitution order versus determining its amount

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Facts & Procedural History

Hiscox pled no contest to grand theft pursuant to a plea bargain. At sentencing on February 13, 1995, the court reserved jurisdiction on restitution f…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The state appeals the trial court’s order which denied its request for the imposition of restitution against the appellee, Sandra K. Hiscox. We reverse.

Pursuant to a plea bargain, the appellee pled no contest to a charge of grand theft, in violation of section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1993). At the sentencing hearing which was held on February 13, 1995, the appellee’s counsel indicated that a parameter of the no contest plea would be that the court would reserve jurisdiction on the issue of restitution. The court minutes from the sentencing hearing also provided that the court was reserving jurisdiction for sixty days to determine the amount of restitution if any was due and owing. On February 28, 1995, an order which withheld adjudication of guilt and placed the appellee on one year probation was filed. The order also provided that the court was reserving jurisdiction on the issue of restitution for sixty days.

On April 24, 1995, without adequate notice to the appellee, a restitution hearing was held where the appellee’s counsel moved to dismiss on the grounds that the trial court no longer had jurisdiction since the restitution hearing was held more than sixty days from the time of the sentencing hearing. The trial court agreed and granted the appellee’s motion to dismiss and from that order the state timely filed a notice of appeal.

The state contends that the trial court erred in refusing to impose restitution. We agree.

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b) provides that a legal sentence may be reduced or modified within sixty days after that sentence is imposed. Several district courts have read rule 3.800(b) to mean that the trial court must determine the amount of restitution within sixty days of imposing sentence or it will lose jurisdiction. State v. Sanderson, 625 So. 2d 471 (Fla.1993). However, it is the order of restitution which must be imposed at the time of sentencing or within sixty days thereafter and if that order has been entered in a timely manner, a court can determine the amount of restitution beyond the sixty day period. See Sanderson, 625 So. 2d at 473. See also Gladfelter v. State, 618 So. 2d 1364 (Fla.1993).

In the instant case, because restitution was made an original condition of the probation order which was filed fifteen days after the sentencing hearing, the trial court could properly determine the amount of restitution at a later date. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent herewith. Upon remand, as apparently was not done in the trial court below, the appellee shall be given adequate notice of the restitution hearing and an opportunity to defend.

Reversed and remanded with instructions.

SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and FRANK and PARKER, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Bunch v. State, 745 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
    …5 So. 2d 471 (Fla.1993); see also § 960.292(2) (“The court shall retain continuing jurisdiction over the convicted offender for the sole purpose of entering civil restitution lien orders.”); L.O. v. State, 718 So. 2d 155 (Fla.1998); State v. Hiscox, 677 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). In the instant case, the trial court properly exercised its jurisdiction in entering an order of restitution only three days after the date on which appellant was sentenced, well within the sixty day time period of Rule 3.800. Cf…
  • Strayer v. State, 676 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
    …rred on January 29,1992. He also states that he was not given adequate notice of the hearing and an opportunity to defend. Strayer’s allegations, if true, may entitle him to relief. See State v. Sanderson, 625 So. 2d 471 (Fla.1993); State v. Hiscox, 677 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). The trial court summarily denied the motion without attachments from the record that conclusively refute Strayer’s allegations. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent herewith. On remand, should t…
  • Scipio G. Ridley v. State, 890 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)
    …anderson, 625 So. 2d 471 (Fla.1993). Had the court ordered restitution at sentencing or within sixty days thereafter, the court could have reserved jurisdiction to determine the amount of restitution beyond the sixty-day period. See State v. Hiscox, 677 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). However, that did not occur here. As a result, we conclude that the trial court did have jurisdiction to consider the imposition of restitution at the hearing conducted less than sixty days after Ridley’s sentencing, but not on t…

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