LUTHER D. POTTER, PETITIONER,
v.
S.A.K. DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., RESPONDENTS
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Potter sought certiorari review of a discovery order requiring production of tax returns and financial statements to support a punitive damages claim. The court held that the lower court failed to follow the statutory procedure under Florida Statutes § 768.72, which requires a plaintiff to establish a reasonable evidentiary basis for punitive damages before discovery of a defendant's financial worth is permitted.
The court held that the statutory procedure under § 768.72 must be followed exactly as written: a plaintiff claiming punitive damages must first offer a reasonable evidentiary basis and obtain a court order authorizing the punitive damage claim before discovering the defendant's financial worth. Denial of summary judgment on a fraud claim does not satisfy this requirement.
[1] A plaintiff seeking discovery of a defendant's financial worth to support a punitive damage claim must first establish a reasonable evidentiary basis for punitive damages…
[2] A partial denial of a motion for summary judgment on a fraud claim does not, by itself, establish a reasonable evidentiary basis for punitive damages.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Before a defendant may be subjected to financial worth discovery and required to defend a punitive damage claim, the statute requires that the plaintiff provide the court with a reasonable evidentiary basis for punitive damages.”
States the core legal requirement under § 768.72 that the lower court failed to enforce
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePotter was sued for fraud by Tucker/S.A.K. Home Partnership, which included a claim for punitive damages. The lower court previously entered a partial…
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GRIFFIN, Judge.
Petitioner, Luther D. Potter [“Potter”], seeks certiorari review of a discovery order of the lower court requiring Potter to produce tax returns and financial statements in support of a punitive damage claim contained in a complaint filed by respondent Tucker/S.A.K. Home Partnership. We agree with Potter that the required procedure was not followed in order to obtain discovery in support of the punitive damage claim and, accordingly, grant the petition for certiorari.
It is not necessary to recount the underlying factual basis for the respondents’ claim of fraud, which is the basis of the punitive damage claim. The issue here is principally procedural. Contained within the complaint is a claim for fraud that apparently1 has survived a partial summary judgment previously entered by the lower court in favor of Potter. After the summary judgment hearing, respondents moved for discovery of Potter’s financial worth. Potter objected, saying that the respondents had not complied with the procedural requirements of section 768.72, Florida Statutes (1995), which has recently been explained by the Florida Supreme Court in Simeon, Inc. v. Cox, 671 So. 2d 158 (Fla.1996). In essence, what the statute requires is that a plaintiff who has pleaded punitive damages must offer a reasonable evidentiary basis for punitive damages and obtain an order authorizing the maintenance of the punitive damage claim as a predicate to conducting discovery of a defendant’s financial worth.
Respondents urge that the lower court’s partial denial of Potter’s motion for summary judgment on the claim for fraud is the functional equivalent of a determination by the court that there is a reasonable evidentiary basis for punitive damages contained in the record. This, in turn, presumably is bottomed on the notion that because a judgment for the tort of fraud will always support a judgment for punitive damages, if the court has determined that there is a material issue of fact concerning a defendant’s fraud, then, ipso facto, a reasonable evidentiary basis for punitive damages has also been shown. We cannot agree that a finding by the trial court that a defendant has failed to establish that there is no material issue of fact concerning whether he perpetrated a fraud is the equivalent of the plaintiff establishing a reasonable evidentiary basis for punitive damages.
This case illustrates the sort of confusion that can result when the statutory procedure is not complied with. Before a defendant may be subjected to financial worth discovery and required to defend a punitive damage claim, the statute requires that the plaintiff provide the court with a reasonable evidentiary basis for punitive damages. This procedure needs to be followed exactly as required by statute, using the standards set forth in the statute. Accordingly, we quash the order compelling discovery of the petitioner’s financial worth because it is not predicated on an appropriate motion filed, evidentiary basis established, and order entered.2
WRIT GRANTED.
W. SHARP, and ANTOON, JJ„ concur. . The lower court's April 17, 1996 order is unclear. . Although the limited record we have in connection with this petition for writ of certiorari does not allow us confidently to evaluate the existence vel non of a sustainable claim of fraud in this case, we observe that the fraud claim in this case is unusual in several respects and we urge the lower court and the litigants to air this issue on remand, rather than simply attempting to fill a procedural gap. The purpose of the statutory procedure is to avoid waste of limited judicial resources as well as the litigants' resources.
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AIR Ambulance Prof'ls, Inc. v. Thin AIR, 809 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…e with Weisz that it was error to award punitive damages because the evidence does not support the awards. Record evidence may support an intentional tort, but not necessarily an award of punitive damages. See generally Potter v. S.A.K. Dev. Corp., 678 So. 2d 472, 473 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Proof of the elements of tortious interference may be established even though the evidence may not justify an award of punitive damages. See Designs for Vision, Inc. v. Amedas, Inc., 632 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 2d DCA), appeal dis…
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Kis Grp., LLC v. Moquin, 263 So. 3d 63 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019)…rs establishing a reasonable evidentiary basis for punitive damages. Id. at 371–72 (internal citation omitted). 5 In support of its holding, the Noack court relied on the Fifth District’s decision in Potter v. S.A.K. Development Corp., 678 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). In Potter, the court considered, and ultimately rejected, the argument that if a trial court has determined that there is a material issue of fact on a claim for fraud, then, ipso facto, the procedural requirements of secti…
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Solis v. Ingrid Calvo, 689 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…r dismiss the punitive damage claim and if the motion is denied, then brings a petition for certiorari review. In these cases, the appellate courts will grant the petition if the procedures have not been followed. Potter v. S.A.K. Development Corp., 678 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Walt Disney World Co. v. Noordhoek, 672 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 635 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 642 So. 2d 1363 (Fla.1994); Aerovias Nacionales De Colombia v. Tellez, 5…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Simeon, Inc. v. COX, 671 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1996)