ALPHONSO MCRAE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Alphonso McRae appeals his sentence as a habitual violent felony offender, challenging the trial judge's initiation of habitual offender treatment following his guilty plea to aggravated assault and retail theft, and the imposition of a $60 First Step fee. The appellate court affirms, holding that judges may initiate habitual offender proceedings and that the $60 fee is authorized under Florida Statutes when probation is supervised by First Step.
Trial judges may initiate habitual offender treatment proceedings. The $60.00 First Step fee was proper because Florida Statutes section 948.03(1)(n) authorizes courts to impose up to $1 per month during probation (maximum $12 per year or $60 over a five-year period) to nonprofit organizations supplementing Department of Corrections rehabilitative efforts, and McRae's five-year probation sentence supported this charge.
[1] A judge may initiate habitual offender treatment after a defendant enters a guilty plea.
[2] A court may impose a $60.00 charge for a nonprofit organization supplementing rehabilitative efforts when a defendant is sentenced to five years of probation.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We have repeatedly held that a judge may initiate habitual offender treatment, and we adhere to that position again in this ease.”
Establishes the court's holding that trial judges retain authority to initiate habitual offender proceedings regardless of state attorney involvement.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMcRae entered a guilty plea to aggravated assault and retail theft in 1993. The trial judge initiated habitual offender treatment after the guilty ple…
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W. SHARP, Judge.
McRae appeals his sentence as a habitual violent felony offender because the trial judge initiated habitual offender treatment after McRae entered a guilty plea to aggravated assault,1 and retail theft in 1993.2 He also claims the imposition of $60.00 to First Step was error. We affirm.
We have repeatedly held that a judge may initiate habitual offender treatment, and we adhere to that position again in this ease.3 Dobson v. State, 665 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Young v. State, 663 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Kirk v. State, 663 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Santoro v. State, 644 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).
Although we have struck the imposition of payments to First Step in the past, section 948.03(1)(n), Florida Statutes, now provides that the court may include the following condition:
Pay not more than $1 per month during the term of probation or community control to a nonprofit organization established for the sole purpose of supplementing the rehabilitative efforts of the Department of Corrections, (emphasis supplied)
The foregoing provides for a maximum of $12 per year (or $60 over a five year period) in those cases where First Step supervises a defendant’s probation. However, the statutory language does not authorize an across-the-board $60 charge in all cases. In this case, McRae was sentenced to five years probation, and the $60.00 charge is proper. AFFIRMED.
GRIFFIN and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. . Section 784.021(1), Fla.Stat. (1993).
. Section 812.015, Fla.Stat. (1993).
. In Young v. State, 663 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), we held that the statute which imposes requirements on the state attorney, section 775.08401, seeking habitual offender sentencing did not, by implication, preclude a trial court from initiating habitual offender sentencing on its own initiative. Section 775.08401 requires the state attorney to formulate criteria to insure a fair and impartial application of the habitual offender statute. The amended statute does not preclude the trial judge from initiating a proceeding to sentence a person as a habitual felony offender. We thus concluded that the amendment left the power intact. Turcotte v. State, 617 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Toliver v. State, 605 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), rev. denied, 618 So. 2d 212 (Fla.1993).
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Citator
Cited By
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Jackson v. State, 902 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…03) (striking condition requiring payment of $1.00 to First Step, Inc., because it was not orally pronounced at sentencing, and authorizing the trial court to reimpose the fee after appropriate notice and an opportunity to be heard); McRae v. State, 679 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (allowing imposition of $1.00 fee to First Step, Inc.). Condition 11 requires Jackson to submit to warrantless searches of his person, residence and property. This condition is statutorily authorized and does not have to be oral…
Authorities Cited
- Toliver v. State, 605 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)
- Santoro v. State, 644 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- Kirk v. State, 663 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)
- Turcotte v. State, 617 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)
- Taurance Young v. State, 663 So. 2d 1376 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)
- Dobson v. State, 665 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)