STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
T.W., A CHILD, APPELLEE
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Florida appeals a trial court's dismissal of a delinquency petition against a juvenile for violating speedy trial requirements. The court affirms, holding that the state cannot file charges after the mandatory 90-day speedy trial period has expired, even if it attempts to use a 15-day 'recapture' period under juvenile procedure rules.
The state cannot file charges after the 90-day speedy trial period has expired. The recapture period is not intended to permit the state to file or refile charges after the 90-day period has expired; it applies only to charges filed within the 90-day window. Therefore, dismissal of the petition was proper.
[1] A juvenile court rule governing speedy trial periods takes precedence over a conflicting statute.
[2] A state may not file a petition for delinquency after the mandatory speedy trial period has expired.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the applicable "speedy trial period" is the 90-day period expressly provided for in rule 8.090(a)(1). The recapture or window period provided for in rule 8.090(j) was not intended to permit the State to file, or to refile, charges against a defendant after the 90-day speedy trial time provided in the rule has expired, and then to bring the defendant to trial on the new charges in fifteen days or less.”
Establishes the controlling legal standard that the 90-day period is absolute and the recapture window cannot extend the filing deadline.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceT.W., a juvenile, was arrested on March 10, 1995, for battery. T.W. declined enrollment in a pre-intervention program. The state filed a petition for …
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RAMIREZ, JUAN, Jr., Associate Judge.
This is an appeal from an order granting a motion to dismiss a petition for delinquency based on a speedy trial violation. We affirm.
On March 10, 1995, T.W., a juvenile, was arrested on a charge of battery in violation of section 784.03(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1993). When T.W. declined an offer to enroll in a preintervention program for juveniles, the state filed a petition for delinquency on June 9, 1995, ninety-one days after the arrest.
T.W. promptly filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the state faded to hold an adjudicatory hearing within ninety days of T.W.’s arrest as required by section 39.048, Florida Statutes (1998). The issue presented here is whether the state is entitled to the fifteen-day “window of recapture” period as provided by Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.090(j), (m), where the petition was not even filed within the ninety-day speedy trial period mandated by both section 39.048 and rule 8.090.
Initially, the supreme court has already resolved any conflict between section 39.048 and rule 8.090. R.J.A. v. Foster, 603 So. 2d 1167, 1171 (Fla.1992), held that section 39.048 is procedural in nature and, therefore, rule 8.090 takes precedence over the statute.
But even under the rule, the state is not permitted to file a petition for delinquency after the ninety-day period has already expired. In P.S. v. State, 658 So. 2d 92 (Fla.1995), the state entered a nolle prosequi of the original petition for delinquency on the ninetieth day, and refiled the charges on the ninety-first day, one day after the expiration of the speedy trial period. In affirming the discharge of the juvenile, the supreme court held that the applicable “speedy trial period” is the 90-day period expressly provided for in rule 8.090(a)(1). The recapture or window period provided for in rule 8.090(j) was not intended to permit the State to file, or to refile, charges against a defendant after the 90-day speedy trial time provided in the rule has expired, and then to bring the defendant to trial on the new charges in fifteen days or less.
658 So. 2d at 94; accord State v. Agee, 622 So. 2d 473 (Fla.1993); Williams v. State, 622 So. 2d 477 (Fla.1993).
Similarly, the speedy trial period in this case expired one day before charges were filed against T.W. Therefore, the state is not entitled to file charges against T.W. beyond the ninety-day period and avail itself of the recapture period provided for by the rule.
AFFIRMED.
STONE and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
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C.D. v. State, 865 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)…v. State, 658 So. 2d 92, 94 (Fla.1995). We have also held that the State's failure to file a petition of delinquency against a juvenile within ninety days of arrest precluded the State from availing itself of the recapture period. See State v. T.W., 679 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); see also D.A.J. v. State, 754 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). However, in this case the State filed the petition within ninety days. . In 1991, Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.180 was renumbered as Florida Rule of Juvenile…
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In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge v. Wood, 720 So. 2d 506 (Fla. 1998)…tial. Upon a finding of probable cause and the filing of the Investigative Panel ... of such formal charges against a judge, such charges and all further proceedings before the Hearing Panel shall be public”). .See Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Wood, 679 So. 2d 69, 69 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). . See City of Altamonte Springs v. Kaplan, 701 So. 2d 659, 659-60 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).…
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D.A.J. v. State, 754 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)…0-day speedy trial time provided in the rule has expired.... Id. at 94. Because the speedy trial period expired before the State refiled charges, the court affirmed the dismissal of the petition and discharged P.S. Id. Similarly, in State v. T.W., 679 So. 2d 69, 70 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), the State filed its initial petition for delinquency 91 days after T.W. was arrested. In affirming the dismissal of the petition, the Fourth District held that under rule 8.090, the State is not permitted to file its initial…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Agee, 622 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1993)
- R.J.A. v. Foster, 603 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1992)
- P.S. v. State, 658 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1995)
- Ervin Eugene Williams v. State, 622 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1993)