JOHN W. DANIELS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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John Daniels appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to sell, challenging both his adjudication as a habitual offender and the imposition of a public defender lien without notice of his right to contest it. The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the 1993 habitual offender statute explicitly excludes drug possession violations from enhanced sentencing provisions, and that the trial court failed to comply with procedural requirements before imposing the public defender fee.
The court held that the 1993 habitual offender statute explicitly excludes violations of section 893.13 (controlled substance offenses) from enhanced sentencing provisions, making the habitual offender adjudication improper. The court also held that the trial court violated procedural requirements by imposing the public defender lien without advising Daniels of his right to contest it.
[1] A defendant convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell cannot be adjudicated an habitual offender under the 1993 version of section 775.084, Florida Statutes,…
[2] The 1991 version of the habitual offender statute, unlike the 1993 version, did not exclude violations of section 893.13 from consideration for enhanced habitual offender…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the statute specifically excludes those defendants who are being sentenced for violations of section 893.13, Florida Statutes, relating to the purchase or possession of a controlled substance. Thus, it was error to adjudicate the defendant to be an habitual offender for the instant offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell.”
Establishes the core holding that drug possession convictions cannot be enhanced under the habitual offender statute.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDaniels was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell under section 893.13(1)(a)1, Florida Statutes (1993). The trial court adjudicated h…
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ANTOON, Judge.
The defendant appeals Ms judgment and sentence for the crime of possession of cocaine with intent to sell.1 Specifically, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in adjudicating him to be an habitual offender pursuant to section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1993), and imposing a lien for the services of the public defender without advising him of his right to contest the amount of the lien. We reverse.
Section 775.084(1)(a)3 provides for enhanced sentences for those defendants qualifying as habitual offenders under the statute. However, the statute specifically excludes those defendants who are being sentenced for violations of section 893.13, Florida Statutes, relating to the purchase or possession of a controlled substance. Thus, it was error to adjudicate the defendant to be an habitual offender for the instant offense of possession of cocaine with intent to sell. Houser v. State, 666 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
The state acknowledges the holding in Hauser but urges this court to recede from that ruling in light of the supreme court’s ruling in Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla.1993), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 278; 130 L.Ed.2d 195 (1994). We conclude that Hauser is still viable. In approving an habitual offender sentence for the crime of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, the supreme court in Hale was construing the 1991 version of the habitual offender statute. TMs earlier version of the statute did not contain the provision excluding violations of section 893.13 from consideration for enhanced habitual offender sanctions. See § 775.084(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991). In contrast, the 1993 version of the statute was in effect when both the defendant in Hauser and the defendant in the instant case were sentenced.
The defendant also argues that he was not advised of Ms right to challenge the amount of the lien imposed for the services of the public defender. The record before us supports tMs claim, and, therefore, we must reverse. On remand, the trial court may reconsider the imposition of the fee after compliance with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.720(d)(1). See Allmond v. State, 668 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).
Accordingly, we vacate the habitual offender adjudication and the public defender’s hen and remand for reconsideration of these issues.
VACATED and REMANDED.
PETERSON, C.J., and GOSHORN, J., concur. . § 893.13(1)(a)1, Fla. Stat. (1993).
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Citator
Cited By
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Dougherty v. State, 33 So. 3d 732 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)…LAWSON, J., concurring specially. If we were not bound by this court’s prior panel decision in Daniels v. State, 679 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), I would affirm. Section 775.084(l)(a)3., Florida Statutes, is unambiguous. By its clear terms, it precludes habitual felony offender sentencing only where the “felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced, and one of the tw…1 / 2
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Strong v. State, 714 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)…trying to sacrifice herself for her husband, and that in fact he was the drug dealer in the family. We agree with Strong that he was not afforded an opportunity to contest the amount of the liens assessed for the public defender. Daniels v. State, 679 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Allmond v. State, 668 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Andrews v. State, 660 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). We accordingly strike the liens and remand this cause to the trial court for the opportunity to reimpose the liens afte…
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Owens v. State, 792 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)…-sentencing on count II, possession of cocaine, in case 98-4826. See Oliver v. State, 734 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Washington v. State, 750 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Pittman v. State, 733 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Daniels v. State, 679 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for re-sentencing on count II, possession of cocaine. We reverse and remand for an eviden-tiary hearing for appellant to prove prejudice on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim as to ca…
Authorities Cited
- Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1993)
- Houser v. State, 666 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)
- Allmond v. State, 668 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)