DAVID STOLER, APPELLANT,
v.
ANNE B. STOLER, APPELLEE
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In this family law appeal, the husband challenges a judgment requiring him to pay all of the wife's attorney's fees and costs in a divorce proceeding. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed in part, holding that while the amount of fees was not an abuse of discretion, ordering the husband to pay all fees was an abuse of discretion given the wife's receipt of substantial alimony and assets.
The court held that while the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount of attorney's fees and costs, it was an abuse of discretion to order the husband to pay all such fees given the wife's financial resources including her alimony award and equal asset division. The court affirmed that interest on attorney's fees accrues from the date entitlement is fixed, regardless of whether the amount is determined.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by ordering one party to pay all of the other party's attorney's fees and costs when the recipient party has sufficient resources, inc…
[2] The overall relative financial position and resources of the parties must be examined when determining the allocation of attorney's fees and costs.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The overall relative financial position and resources of the parties must be examined and not simply the isolated factor of income and earning capacity.”
Establishes the standard for evaluating whether to award attorney's fees—requires holistic analysis of parties' financial situations, not just income comparison.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties were married for 21 years with no minor children and accumulated substantial assets. The husband is a physician earning $291,000 annually …
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WHATLEY, Judge.
The husband, David Stoler, appeals a final judgment awarding the wife, Anne B. Stoler, attorney’s fees and costs. We find merit only in his argument that it was error to order him to pay all of the wife’s attorney’s fees and costs and reverse.
First, we conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination of the amount of the wife’s attorney’s fees and costs, although some of the costs are not within the scope of the statewide uniform guidelines for the taxation of costs. See Payne v. Payne, 481 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). However, it was an abuse of discretion to order the husband to pay all of the wife’s attorney’s fees and costs.
The parties were married for twenty-one years and have accumulated many assets. They have no minor children. The husband earns $291,000 per year as a physician, while the wife has no discemable job skills. The marital assets were equally divided, and each party received approximately $700,000 in such assets. In addition, the wife was awarded $8,000 per month in permanent alimony.
At trial, the testimony established that the disposable income of the husband was $10,-927 per month, and the disposable income of the wife was $6,273 per month. Accordingly, the husband’s disposable income was $55,848 per year more than the wife’s disposable income.
The overall relative financial position and resources of the parties must be examined and not simply the isolated factor of income and earning capacity. In the present case, the wife was awarded permanent alimony of $8,000 per month. She will be able to use this sum to contribute to the payment of her own attorney’s fees and costs without significantly invading her assets. Based on the facts in this case, the wife should pay a portion of her own attorney’s fees and costs. We reverse and remand the ease to the trial court to set a more equitable attorney fee and cost award in which the husband pays a portion of the wife’s fees and costs but not all of them.
Finally, we affirm the trial court’s finding that interest on attorney’s fees and costs accrue from the date of entitlement, and postjudgment interest may accrue on the prejudgment amount. We note that the husband correctly concedes this point. In Quality Engineered Installation, Inc. v. Higley South, Inc., 670 So. 2d 929, 930-931 (Fla.1996), the Florida Supreme Court held that “interest accrues from the date the entitlement to attorney fees is fixed through agreement, arbitration award, or court determina tion, even though the amount of the award has not yet been determined.” The court further stated that “prejudgment interest becomes part of a single total sum adjudged to be due and owing. The amount awarded for prejudgment interest, like all other components of the ‘judgment,’ automatically bears interest as provided by section 55.03, Florida Statutes (1993).” 670 So. 2d at 931.
Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BLUE, A.C.J., and QUINCE, J., concur.
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Perez v. Perez, 100 So. 3d 769 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)…a consideration of the overall financial resources of each of the parties, not just income and earning capacity. See Crick v. Crick, 78 So. 3d 696, 699 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Pinder v. Pinder, 911 So. 2d 870, 873-74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Stoler v. Stolen 679 So. 2d 837, 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). In addition, a trial court may also consider “any factor necessary to provide justice and ensure equity between the parties.” Rosen, 696 So. 2d at 700. After considering these factors, the trial court must make specific fac…
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Ruberg v. Ruberg, 858 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…that Mrs. Ruberg has sufficient assets to pay her attorney’s fees-as this court previously found in an order issued on June 11, 2002, reversing a trial court order granting Mrs. Ruberg temporary appellate attorney’s fees. See also Stoler v. Stoler, 679 So. 2d 837, 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (reversing order requiring husband to pay all of wife’s attorney’s fees where record showed that wife had sufficient assets to pay a portion of her own fees and costs). We conclude that the trial court correctly determined th…
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Crick v. Robbin Vickery Crick, 78 So. 3d 696 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)…ey’s fees. See Martinez v. Abinader, 37 So. 3d 944, 947 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). “The overall relative financial position and resources of the parties must be examined and not simply the isolated factor of income and earning capacity.” Stoler v. Sto-ler, 679 So. 2d 837, 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). A trial court’s determination of the parties’ financial position should be made after considering the financial resources of the parties as affected by the final judgment. See Green v. Green, 646 So. 2d 210, 210 (Fla. 2d DCA…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Quality Engineered Installation, Inc. v. Higley S., Inc., 670 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 1996)
- Payne v. Payne, 481 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)