GARY LENTZ, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Gary Lentz appealed his armed robbery conviction, challenging the trial court's denial of his peremptory challenge to strike an African-American juror. The Florida appellate court affirmed, holding that Lentz's refusal to provide any reason for the challenge, combined with the racial disparity between defendant and juror, justified the trial court's inference of discriminatory motivation and denial of the challenge.
The trial court did not commit reversible error in denying the peremptory challenge. The court was entitled to infer discriminatory motivation from Lentz's deliberate refusal to explain the challenge, particularly given the racial disparity between defendant and juror. Even if error occurred, Lentz cannot benefit from error caused by his own deliberate stonewalling.
[1] A defendant's refusal to provide a legitimate reason for a peremptory challenge, when prompted by the court during a Neil inquiry, may justify the court's conclusion that…
[2] A defendant cannot benefit from an error, if any, that was brought about by their own deliberate actions during jury selection.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[I]f it appeared from the prosecutor's explanation that his challenges were racially motivated, the trial judge would have been warranted in granting a mistrial despite not yet having ruled that the defense had made a prima facie showing.”
Establishes that the trial court may infer racial motivation from inadequate or evasive responses to Neil inquiries.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring jury selection in an armed robbery case, Lentz, a white male defendant, exercised a peremptory challenge against an African-American venire mem…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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FLETCHER, Judge.
Defendant Gary Lentz appeals his conviction and sentence for armed robbery with a firearm, alleging errors in jury selection, closing argument, and jury instructions. We find it necessary to discuss only Lentz’s contention that the trial court committed reversible error in denying his peremptory challenge to the seating of a juror. We find this contention to be without merit and affirm the conviction and sentence.
During jury selection, Lentz (a white male), through his counsel, peremptorily challenged an African-American venire member, at which time the State requested a Neil1 inquiry into Lentz’s reason for the attempted strike. Lentz contends that the State, in making the Neil inquiry request, failed to demonstrate any factual basis to overcome the initial presumption that Lentz’s attempted strike was exercised in a nondiscriminatory manner, thus there should have been no inquiry made. Nevertheless, the trial court inquired of Lentz’s counsel as to the reason for the challenge, at which time Lentz’s counsel simply responded: “Judge, I exercised a peremptory challenge at the request of my client.” When informed by the trial court that this was not a good enough explanation, Lentz’s counsel replied: “That’s my explanation, Judge.” The trial court found this to be an insufficient reason and denied the challenge.
We note, without deciding, that the State’s bare-bones request for a Neil inquiry appears to have met the requirements therefor.2 Assuming to the contrary, however, the fact is that the inquiry was made. Once that occurred, the trial court was entitled to take Lentz’s response into consideration pursuant to Reed v. State, 560 So. 2d 203, 206 (Fla.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 882, 111 S.Ct. 230, 112 L.Ed.2d 184 (1990): “[I]f it appeared from the prosecutor’s explanation that his challenges were racially motivated, the trial judge would have been warranted in granting a mistrial despite not yet having ruled that the defense had made a prima facie showing.”
The “information” provided to the trial court by Lentz’s counsel was not enlightening. The court already knew that the defense wanted to strike the venire member or the defense would not have made the attempt. The court’s inquiry was made to determine why the defense wished to exercise the peremptory challenge. The defense, however, deliberately declined to answer the court’s inquiry as to why. Under such a circumstance the court had to make a choice on its own. As Lentz is a white male and the juror an African-American, the court obviously believed that — in the absence of Lentz’s assistance — the better course was to conclude that Lentz’s refusal was made deliberately to avoid giving a pretextual response. Therefore, the trial court was justified in concluding that Lentz’s motive was diserimi-natoiy. Pursuant to Reed v. State, the court was then justified in denying Lentz’s peremptory challenge.
Further, assuming arguendo that error was made, the trial court was led into it by Lentz’s stonewall response. Lentz is not permitted to take advantage of error (if any) brought about by his deliberate actions. Pope v. State, 441 So. 2d 1073, 1076 (Fla.1983).
As the other issues raised by Lentz are without merit, we affirm.
. State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla.1984).
. See Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1996).
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Perez v. State, 717 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…nt him relief for errors which he failed to properly preserve, and which he, himself, invited. See Pope v. State, 441 So. 2d 1073, 1076 (Fla.1983)(“A party may not invite error and then be heard to complain of that error on appeal”); Lentz v. State, 679 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Buggs v. State, 640 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). For the reasons stated above, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence. . Williams V. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (FIa.1959). . The state also re-argues the propriety of th…
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Sheffield v. Superior Ins. Co., 741 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…ds was prejudicial, Ms. Sheffield invited the error now invoked as a reason for a new trial. See Pope v. State, 441 So. 2d 1073, 1076 (Fla.1983) (“A party may not invite error and then be heard to complain of that error on appeal.”); Lentz v. State, 679 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Buggs v. State, 640 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). In denying the motion for hew trial, moreover, the trial judge expressly found that admission of evidence of collateral sources had proven harmless, even if error. On appeal, Ms.…1 / 2
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Squire v. State, 681 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…d from in part by State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319 (Fla.1993). . Squire v. State, No. 95-2176 (Fla. 3d DCA Clerk’s Order Aug. 22, 1996). . Id., (Clerk’s Order Sept. 12, 1996). .This court affirmed codefendant Lentz's conviction in Lentz v. State, 679 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), on other grounds. Moreover, Lentz did not assert on appeal the issue raised by Morris and did not move to adopt Morris’s brief.…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984)
- Jeanie H. Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1996)
- Pope v. State, 441 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 1983)
- Grover Reed v. State, 560 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1990)