CAROL J. MUNIZ, APPELLANT,
v.
ALFONSO L. MUNIZ-BAERGA, APPELLEE
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Carol Muniz appealed a trial court's sua sponte modification of a final dissolution of marriage judgment that reversed an award of attorney's fees. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530(d) authorized the trial court's action taken within the prescribed time period for ruling on a motion for rehearing.
The trial court did not err. Rule 1.530(d) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a trial court to modify its judgment on its own initiative within the prescribed time period for ruling on a motion for rehearing.
[1] A trial court may sua sponte modify its ruling on attorney's fees within the time period provided by rule 1.530(d) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, provided the p…
[2] A trial court's sua sponte modification of a judgment is permissible under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.530(d) when undertaken within the time for ruling on a motion…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“rule 1.530(d), of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, authorizes the action taken within the time period provided by the rule”
The court's holding that the trial court's sua sponte modification was authorized by the applicable procedural rule.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn a dissolution of marriage proceeding, the trial court initially awarded attorney's fees to the appellant. On its own initiative and within the time…
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JOANOS, Judge.
This is an appeal from an order partially modifying a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, in which the court, on its own initiative, within the time for ruling on a timely filed motion for rehearing, changed its ruling on the issue of the award of attorney’s fees, based on a finding that the parties are left with equal income and neither has the ability to pay the other’s fees. Appellant alleges that the trial court erred by sua sponte reversing its judgment that the appellant was entitled to have her attorney’s fees paid. We affirm for the reason that rule 1.530(d), of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, authorizes the action taken within the time period provided by the rule.
Appellant has cited Chiafair v. Chiafair, 552 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Chiafair is clearly distinguishable. The Chiafair panel did not discuss the effect of the rule nor apparently consider it. More importantly, Chiafair involved a situation in which, unrequested, a trial court altered the manner of child custody to a non-traditional parental rotating custody arrangement, never sought by either party, and which was unfavored by both parties, without giving the parties a chance to be heard on the matter. In the present case, the parties did, at some point in the case, have an opportunity to be heard on the question of a fee award. The appellate court in Chiafair further determined that under Florida law, the system ordered by the trial court was not justified. The modification made by the court on its own initiative in the present case was not so far reaching in effect, and is supported by the record.
AFFIRMED.
BOOTH and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.
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Citator
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Whitehurst v. Camp, 699 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1997)…expressly applied to prospective judgments in the terms of the underlying contract itself, the contractual interest rate extinguishes2 when the cause of action based on that contract takes on new legal form as a judgment. Cf. Rubell v. Finkelstein, 679 So. 2d 888, 889-90 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (recognizing general rule that acceptance of deed in real estate transaction merges or extinguishes agreements in' underlying contract but finding merger doctrine inapplicable since contract expressly provided that seller’…
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Artemio Milares Bucsit v. Bucsit, 229 So. 3d 430 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017)…ndered and well within the tén days permitted” under rule 1.530(d), Id. at 113, Stated differently, the county “court [was] permitted to sua .sponte order rehearing ... within ten days after entry of a judgment.” Id.; see also Muniz v. Muniz-Baerga, 679 So. 2d 888, 888 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (“Appellant alleges' that the trial court erred by sua sponte reversing its judgment -that the appellant was entitled, to have her attorney’s fees paid. We affirm for the reason that rule 1.530(d) ... authorizes the action t…
Authorities Cited
- Ross v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 552 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)