METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT, ANIMAL CARE & CONTROL DIVISION, PETITIONER,
v.
MARY ANN BROWD AND THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, APPELLATE DIVISION, RESPONDENTS
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida District Court of Appeal held that a county animal control officer's decision not to designate a dog as dangerous is a discretionary executive action not subject to judicial review. The court issued a writ of prohibition preventing the circuit court from exercising jurisdiction over an appeal of the animal control division's determination.
The judiciary lacks authority to intercede, superintend, or control the animal control officer's discretionary executive action, regardless of the mandatory language in the county code. The animal control officer's decision not to designate the dog as dangerous is not amenable to judicial review.
[1] A writ of prohibition is an appropriate remedy to prevent a court from exercising jurisdiction over discretionary executive actions.
[2] Judicial review is generally not available for discretionary executive actions of government agencies.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the judiciary may not intercede, superintend or control the executive actions of government, in this case, the Animal Care and Control Division”
Establishes the fundamental separation of powers principle that the judiciary cannot review executive agency decisions
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA neighbor's dog bit Mary Ann Browd's dog on two separate occasions. Browd complained to Dade County's Animal Care and Control Division, which investi…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Discretionary Action cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
A neighbor’s dog bit Mary Ann Browd’s dog on two separate occasions. Browd lodged a complaint with Dade County’s Animal Care and Control Division which investigated the matter through an animal control officer and concluded that the offending neighbor’s dog committed the attacks but was “not dangerous.” Browd appealed the agency action to the appellate division of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. The petitioner moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction which motion the court denied as it did the renewed motion on the same basis. The petitioner then sought the instant writ of prohibition on the basis that the judiciary may not intercede, superintend or control the executive actions of government, in this case, the Animal Care and Control Division.
Browd points to section 5-6.2 of the Dade County Code which provides that a dog shall be designated as dangerous if it severely injures another’s animal while away from its owner’s property. Also, Browd notes that the term “severe,” as above-used, means under section 4 — 6.2(4)(a)(4) any physical injury that results in multiple bite punctures. Browd argues that the word “shall” used in the above-described ordinance required the animal control officer to declare the neighbor’s offending dog dangerous which in turn would mandate that the dog be muzzled or subject to special confinement. Consequently, Browd asserts that if the appellate division does not retain jurisdiction the animal control officer’s failure to follow the Code’s mandatory provisions would be unreviewable and would deprive her of any remedy. We disagree.
First, she has a remedy of the ballot box. Secondly, she may maintain an action against the owner of the offending animal. Otherwise, we must agree with the county’s position that the animal control officer’s decision was a discretionary executive action not amenable to control, superintendence, or review by the judiciary. See Carter v. City of Stuart, 468 So. 2d 955, 957 (Fla.1985).
For this reason, we grant the county’s application for a writ of prohibition and assume it will not be necessary for us to issue our formal writ. It is so ordered.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Leila Carter v. City OF Stuart & Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 468 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1985)