DAVID BARRY LAWLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court erred in imposing a fine based on trial costs and in the written probation order's restriction on driving. The conviction and sentence are affirmed, but the case is remanded for correction of sentencing errors.
Defendant was convicted of aggravated stalking. During sentencing, the trial court imposed a fine and special probation conditions. The defendant appe…
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PER CURIAM.
David Barry Lawley (Lawley) challenges his judgment and sentence for aggravated stalking, raising four issues on appeal. We affirm his conviction and sentence but reverse and remand for correction of two errors that occurred in sentencing.
First, the trial judge assessed a $1,000 fine against Lawley, stating she believed she was required to consider the cost of the trial and of Lawley’s legal representation. The State concedes error. The trial court lacks authority to impose costs in a criminal case unless specifically authorized by statute, and that statutory authority must be cited in the written order. While a fine may ordinarily be imposed within statutory limits, a fine may not be imposed because a defendant exercises his constitutional right to a jury trial. Gibson v. State, 577 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). We, therefore, vacate the fine and remand for reimposition without consideration of the cost of Lawley’s trial and legal representation.
Second, as one of the special conditions of his probation, the court ordered Lawley to not drive on that portion of Grace Avenue that runs past the victim’s house. The written order of probation, however, completely restricts him from driving on Grace Avenue. The State properly concedes error. We remand with instructions to correct the written probation order to reflect the probation condition the trial court orally pronounced at sentencing. We AFFIRM in part, and REVERSE and REMAND in part.
MINER, WEBSTER and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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J.S. v. State, 920 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…led that trial courts lack the authority to impose costs and fines in criminal cases unless such imposition is specifically authorized by statute and the statutory authority is cited in the defendant’s written disposition order. See Lawley v. State, 680 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); see also Fisher v. State, 697 So. 2d 1291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Williams v. State, 674 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Bradshaw v. State, 638 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). The trial court exceeded its authority by imposing the…
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V.D. v. State, 922 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…ent just because a person elects to go to trial has an unsavory scent that smacks of vindictive sentencing. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 750 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Womack v. State, 617 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); see also Lawley v. State, 680 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Gallucci v. State, 371 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), cert. denied, 383 So. 2d 1194 (Fla.1980). We do not think the trial judge in this case was being vindictive. The transcripts do not suggest that in any way. We think the i…
Authorities Cited
- Gibson v. State, 577 So. 2d 1001 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)