STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
PERRY WOODS, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1996-10-16
No. 96-1363
GUNTHER, C.J., and GLICKSTEIN and GROSS, JJ., concur.
680 So. 2d 630 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1996) Positive Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Florida appeals a trial court's order suppressing evidence in a drug and weapons case. The court reverses, holding that the defendant's act of dropping contraband while fleeing—before submitting to police authority—does not constitute an unlawful seizure under the "drop then stop" doctrine established in California v. Hodari.


Holding

The court holds that no unlawful seizure occurred because the defendant never yielded to or submitted to police authority before dropping the contraband. An unlawful seizure under federal law requires either willing obedience or physical force to compel obedience; a "drop then stop" scenario involves no seizure even if the drop occurs after an order to stop.


Headnotes

[1] A seizure occurs when a suspect either willingly submits to a police officer's show of authority or is physically forced to submit.

[2] An unlawful seizure does not occur when a suspect drops contraband after being ordered to stop but before submitting to the officer's authority.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“an unlawful seizure (stop) has not occurred where the person does not stop when requested to do so. Rather, an unlawful seizure takes place only if the person either willingly obeys or is physically forced to obey the police request.”

Establishes the legal standard from Hodari for when a seizure occurs; central to the court's reversal of the suppression order.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Police received a complaint about a black male selling crack cocaine at a specified address. Detective Kinsey and four other officers arrived and obse…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a trial court’s order granting defendani/appellee’s motion to suppress. We reverse and remand.

Detective Steven Kinsey was the sole witness at the suppression hearing. On the day of appellee’s arrest, the police received a complaint that there was a black male subject at a specified address selling crack cocaine. Kinsey testified that when he and four other officers arrived at the location they saw appellee and another black male. Appellee was sitting in a chair facing towards the street. Kinsey was wearing both a black t-shirt with the word “police” in white letters on front and back, and his utility belt which contained his gun and police radio.

When Kinsey and the others exited the vehicle, appellee rose from his chair and proceeded to walk away from Kinsey. Kinsey testified that at this point he was not looking to arrest appellee. However, appellee “turned away from our direction and began walking, ran towards an apartment that had an open door to it.” Kinsey followed appel-lee, attempting unsuccessfully to contact him. Although Kinsey yelled for appellee to stop, appellee kept walking towards an apartment.

Kinsey, chasing appellee, was approximately three to four feet behind him when appellee turned and dropped onto the floor two baggies of crack cocaine and a handgun. Immediately after dropping the items, appel-lee said something to Kinsey to the effect of “what’s going on.”

Both parties characterize this case as involving the distinction between “stop then drop” or “drop then stop.” See Johnson v. State, 640 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). In Johnson, this court noted that in California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991), the Court held that an unlawful seizure (stop) has not occurred where the person does not stop when requested to do so. Rather, an unlawful seizure takes place only if the person either willingly obeys or is physically forced to obey the police request. As such, there is no unlawful seizure when the person “drops then stops,” even where the drop occurs after an order to stop.

We hold that the trial court erred in its apparent finding that the stop preceded the drop. The sole testimony was that the defendant did not yield to Kinsey’s request to stop nor in any way did the defendant submit to Kinsey’s authority. We do not see any evidence of submission to authority. See State v. Bartee, 623 So. 2d 458 (Fla.1993); State v. Wright, 662 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Compare Lang v. State, 671 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (where defendant submitted to the deputy’s authority by beginning to comply with the deputy’s instruction to get into the patrol car).

GUNTHER, C.J., and GLICKSTEIN and GROSS, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Keydrum Blue v. State, 837 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)
    …olice or submits to an officer’s show of authority. The determinative issue in the instant case is whether Blue abandoned the crate prior to the seizure/submission to authority or after the seizure. This court addressed this issue in State v. Woods, 680 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). In Woods, the police officer approached the defendant who proceeded to walk away. Id. at 631. The officer yelled for the defendant to stop, but the defendant did not stop. The officer began to chase the defendant who dropped two…
  • Alphonso Clemons v. State, 747 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
    …he defendant from opposite directions. However, both officers testified that Clemons continued to walk and did not stop when they approached and spoke to him. Instead, he moved to the side where he dropped the cocaine. As we noted in State v. Woods, 680 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), there is no seizure if the defendant does not stop in submission to the show of authority. Here, the defendant did not stop, and the trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress. Affirmed. POLEN and GROSS, JJ., con…
  • State v. A.M., 788 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)
    …a v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991); Perez v. State, 620 So. 2d 1256 (Fla.1993). There is “no unlawful seizure if the individual ‘drops then stops,’ even where the drop occurs after an order to stop.” State v. Woods, 680 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Here, the respondent discarded the drugs without having acquiesced to the officer’s request to stop and before the officer ever touched him. Accordingly, the drugs could not have been the fruit of an unlawful seizure and t…

Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw