MAXINE BURTMAN, AS TRUSTEE, APPELLANT,
v.
PORCHESTER HOLDINGS, INC., JOHN H. FARO, P.A., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, JOHN H. FARO, INDIVIDUALLY, AND ROBERT V. ROMANI, ET AL., APPELLEES
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In this interpleader action, the court reversed the lower court's denial of attorney's fees and costs based on an offer of judgment, holding that section 768.79, Florida Statutes, applies to interpleader actions involving competing claims to funds, even when the funds constitute a refund of attorney's fees.
Section 768.79 applies to interpleader actions where the essential issue involves competing claims to funds constituting money, and the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings to apply section 768.79 for fees and section 57.041 for costs.
[1] An interpleader action may be subject to Florida's offer of judgment statute, section 768.79, Florida Statutes, when the essential issue involves competing claims to fund…
[2] Florida's offer of judgment statute applies to interpleader actions where the dispute centers on which party is entitled to interpleaded funds.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is undisputed that section 768.79, Florida Statutes, applies only to actions for money damages.”
Establishes the statutory framework at issue.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFunds were deposited in the court registry in an interpleader action. Porchester Holdings, a judgment creditor of John H. Faro, competed with Burtman,…
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STONE, Judge.
We reverse an order in this interpleader action denying Appellant’s claims for fees and costs based on an offer of judgment. It is undisputed that section 768.79, Florida Statutes, applies only to actions for money damages. The essential issue in this ease involved the competing claims to funds deposited in the court registry between Appel-lee-Porchester Holdings, a judgment creditor of John Faro, and Burtman, the trustee under a family trust to whom Faro had assigned his claims to the interplead funds. The fund constitutes a refund of attorney’s fees owed Faro by the interpleading attorney.
In V.I.P. Real Estate Corp. v. Florida Executive Realty Management Corp., 650 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), we recognized that section 768.79 applies to an inter-pleader action where the issue is which of competing brokers is entitled to the inter-pleaded funds. See also Coast to Coast Real Estate, Inc. v. Waterfront Properties, Inc., 668 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Similarly, the Third District affirmed an award of fees under section 768.79 where there were competing claims by a buyer and seller. Press v. Jordan, 670 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). Although the connection between the specific interplead funds and the competing claims is more tenuous in this case, there is no basis to conclude that the legislature did not intend the statute to apply to competing creditor’s claims against a fund where the essential issue is clearly a dispute over money.
We recognize that this case also involved a cross-claim to set aside a fraudulent transfer, which does not qualify under the statute as a claim for civil damages. However, it is clear that the fraudulent transfer issue is raised for the purpose of defeating Appellant’s claim for monetary relief and does not preclude our recognizing that this action essentially involves conflicting claims for money.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings applying section 768.79, as to fees, and section 57.041, as to costs. Any other issues raised on appeal are moot as we have not considered the question of entitlement on the merits upon applying the offer of judgment statute.
FARMER and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
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Palm Beach Polo Holdings, Inc. v. Equestrian Club Ests. Prop. Owners Ass'n, Inc., 22 So. 3d 140 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)…Corp. v. Fla. Executive Realty Mgmt. Corp., 650 So. 2d 199, 201 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), this court applied the statute to an interpleader action, since the real issue there was entitlement to a real estate commission. Finally, in Burtman v. Porchester, 680 So. 2d 631, 632 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), the court applied the statute to an interpleader action despite the existence of a cross-claim to set aside a fraudulent transfer, which does not qualify under the statute as a claim for civil damages. This court clarified…
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Nichols v. State Farm Mut., 851 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…and all damages flowing from the breach that were reasonably foreseeable by the breaching party). Moreover, “[i]t is undisputed that section 768.79, Florida Statutes, applies only to actions for money damages.” Burtman v. Porchester Holdings, Inc., 680 So. 2d 631, 632 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).5 Thus, the provision “action [*753] for damages” in section 768.69 applies “where the essential issue is clearly a dispute over money.” Id. Accordingly, the plain and ordinary meaning of “any civil action for damages” is a…
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Duncan v. The Prudential Ins. Co., 690 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)…interpleader action because it was an equitable action, the offer was not made in good faith, and Carmen was not the prevailing party. We disagree. The statute applies to any civil action for damages, see, e.g., Burtman v. Porchester Holdings, Inc., 680 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)(essential issue clearly a dispute over money), insofar as this record shows, the good faith issue was not raised below, and Carmen was the prevailing party in that action. The orders appealed are AFFIRMED in all respects. JOA…
Authorities Cited
- V.I.P. Real Est. Corp. v. Fla. Executive Realty Mgmt. Corp., 650 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)
- Inger Press and Lisa Sanders v. Jordan, 670 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
- Coast TO Coast Real Est., Inc. v. Waterfront Props., Inc., 668 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)