SYLVIA A. THOMPSON, APPELLANT,
v.
MARK D. PLOWMAKER, APPELLEE
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Thompson appeals a contempt order for failing to pay half of her ex-husband's transportation expenses for child visitation. The court affirmed the clarification of the final judgment establishing the mileage rate but reversed the premature contempt finding, holding that an indefinite or ambiguous order cannot be enforced by contempt.
The court affirmed the trial court's clarification of the final judgment establishing the mileage rates, but reversed the contempt order as premature. An order that is indefinite or ambiguous cannot be enforced by contempt; once reduced to a sum certain, future willful failure to comply may support a contempt proceeding.
[1] A trial court order that is indefinite or ambiguous may not be enforced by contempt.
[2] A trial court may enter an order clarifying the terms of a final judgment concerning financial obligations.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“An order that is indefinite or ambiguous may not be enforced by contempt.”
States the controlling legal principle that prohibits contempt enforcement when an order lacks clarity
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court entered a final judgment of dissolution requiring Thompson to pay one-half of Plowmaker's mileage expenses based on Florida transporta…
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ALTENBERND, Judge.
Sylvia A. Thompson (“former wife”) appeals the trial court’s order finding her in contempt for failing to pay one-half of Mark D. Plowmaker’s (“former husband”) transportation expenses incurred while visiting the parties’ child. Although it was appropriate for the trial court to enter an order clarifying the terms of the final judgment concerning transportation costs, we conclude that the order of contempt was premature.
In April 1994, the trial court entered a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. The judgment reflects the trial court’s misgivings concerning an award of primary residential custody of the parties’ minor child to either parent. Nevertheless, the trial court placed the child with the former wife, who resides in Miami. The final judgment requires that she “pay one-half (½) of the Hus band’s mileage expense computed based upon State of Florida transportation tables and the governing State of Florida mileage rate.” The parties did not appeal this judgment.
The former wife is a member of The Florida Bar and was previously employed as a public defender. The trial court assumed that the former wife would simply use the rates that applied to her prior position. The former wife failed to pay any of the former husband’s mileage expenses, and he moved to hold her in civil contempt. In response, she argued that several different rates could apply and that she needed clarification of the final judgment.
The trial court entered an order establishing that the mileage should be computed at 20 cents per mile prior to July 1,1994, and at 25 cents per mile thereafter. The court held her in civil contempt and ordered her to pay an unliquidated amount to be computed by her former husband. If the former wife failed to pay the former husband’s invoice within twenty days, the order stated that the court would issue a warrant for her arrest. The former wife appealed this order. While her appeal was pending, this court permitted the trial court to enter an order determining that the former wife owed $1,590.40 in mileage expenses for the period through June 13, 1995. See Fla.RApp.P. 9.600.
An order that is indefinite or ambiguous may not be enforced by contempt. Loury v. Loury, 431 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). Although it seems likely that the wife could have used her skills as a lawyer to resolve this matter without traveling to the Polk County Courthouse on several occasions and without paying the substantial filing fees associated with her appellate efforts, we conclude that the trial court erred by prematurely entering an order of civil contempt. We approve those portions of the first order clarifying the final judgment, as reduced to a sum certain in the second order. If the former wife willfully fails to comply with these orders, her conduct' may support a future contempt proceeding.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and QUINCE, J., concur.
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Efrain Areizaga v. Spicer, 841 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)…everse that part of the order that indicated Mr. Areizaga was in contempt of court for his failure to pay the travel expenses. The temporary support order was not clear and definite enough to support a finding of contempt. See Thompson v. Plowmaker, 681 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Moreover, because Ms. Spicer never provided documentation to Mr. Areizaga and never formally requested payment prior to filing her motion for contempt, there was no evidence Mr. Areizaga’s failure to pay the amounts due was willf…
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McMULLAN v. McMULLAN, 710 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)…Goosby, 614 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). We also note that an order which is not clear and definite is insufficient to support enforcement or contempt proceedings. Escribano v. Coviello, 698 So. 2d 934 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Thompson v. Plowmaker, 681 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). We therefore reverse the final judgment and the order denying the husband’s motion for a stay, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED and REMANDED. HARRIS and PETERSON, JJ.…
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Gerber v. Gerber, 153 So. 3d 304 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)…fication does not seek to change rights and obligations but to make a judgment more clear and precise”). Clarification of the PSA was appropriate because the PSA did not specifically enumerate the procedure for objections. See Thompson v. Plowmaker, 681 So. 2d 727, 727-28 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Crespo v. Crespo, 28 So. 3d 125, 128 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Fussell v. Fussell, 778 So. 2d 517, 518-19 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order as to the clarification of the PSA. The Former Husb…
Authorities Cited
- Loury v. Loury, 431 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)