JOHNNY EALY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that special probation conditions not orally pronounced at sentencing must be stricken from the written order.
Appellant pleaded no contest and was sentenced to jail and probation. The written probation order contained three special conditions that were not ora…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant entered a plea of no contest and was sentenced to one year in jail followed by one year of drug offender probation. The written order of probation included three special probation conditions that were not orally pronounced at sentencing. We reverse the imposition of these three conditions not orally pronounced and remand.
Probation conditions that are not set out in sections 948.03-.034, Florida Statutes (1995), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986(e), are special conditions that must be pronounced during sentencing in open court. State v. Hart, 668 So. 2d 589, 591-93 (Fla.1996). If such conditions are not orally pronounced at sentencing, the trial court must strike the unannounced conditions. Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d 123, 125 (Fla.1996).
In the instant case, the written probation order included conditions requiring Appellant to observe a curfew, report daily to his probation officer if not employed, and enroll in a Drug Awareness Course. These three conditions were not orally pronounced at sentencing and are not among the general conditions set out in sections 948.03-034, Florida Statutes (1995), or Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986(e). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s probation order as it pertains to the three special written conditions not orally pronounced at sentencing and remand for the trial court to strike said conditions.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
GUNTHER, C.J., and POLEN and FARMER, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Traman D. Tory v. State, 686 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…wever, are neither statutorily imposed nor included within rule 3.986(e). Accordingly, these special conditions should have been orally pronounced and, therefore, must be stricken. See Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d 123, 125 (Fla.1996); Ealy v. State, 681 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Appellant next contends that section 948.01(13)(a), Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional on its face as an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to an administrative agency, the Department of Corrections, in violation o…
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Bunn v. State, 687 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…0] daily to his probation officer if not employed, undergo substance abuse treatment as directed by his probation officer and enter a drug awareness course, are also special conditions of probation which must be orally pronounced. See Ealy v. State, 681 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Because these conditions were not orally pronounced, they must be stricken. See Tory v. State, 686 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). As his third point on appeal, appellant challenges the constitutionality of section 948.01(13)(…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Hart, 668 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1996)
- Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 1996)