RONALD WALKER, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court upheld a plea agreement sentence imposing a hybrid split sentence (incarceration under sentencing guidelines followed by probation) for a cocaine delivery conviction, holding that such sentences are permissible when agreed to as part of a valid plea bargain and do not exceed statutory maximums.
A hybrid split sentence is permissible when agreed to as part of an otherwise valid plea agreement, the defendant understands the consequences, and the negotiated sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum for the offense.
[1] An habitual offender sentence may not be imposed upon revocation of probation where the trial judge, in imposing the original sentence, made a finding that the defendant…
[2] A hybrid split sentence, not authorized by statute or rule, is not an illegal sentence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an habitual offender sentence may not be imposed upon revocation of probation where the trial judge, in imposing the original sentence, made a finding that the defendant was an habitual felony offender but imposed sentence under the guidelines”
Establishes the rule from King v. State regarding when habitual offender sentences cannot be imposed on probation revocation
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRonald Walker was charged with delivery of cocaine and the State filed notice of intent to declare him a habitual felony offender. Walker pled guilty …
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HARDING, Justice.
We review Walker v. State, 661 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). The basis for our jurisdiction lies in the fact that the Fourth District Court of Appeal rendered a per cu-riam decision in reliance upon King v. State, 648 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), of which this Court granted review. 659 So. 2d 1087 (Fla.1995). Thus, we have jurisdiction in the instant ease based upon article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. See also Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418 (Fla.1981).
The record in the instant case reveals that Ronald Walker was informed against for delivery of cocaine and the State filed notice of its intent to declare Walker an habitual felony offender. Walker subsequently pled guilty to the crime charged, with the understanding that he would be sentenced to five and one-half years’ incarceration to be followed by nine and one-half years’ probation and that he would be treated as an habitual offender if he violated probation. Prior to sentencing, Walker moved to withdraw his plea on the basis that he had maintained his innocence and only agreed to take the plea under duress. After the court conducted a hearing on the motion and heard testimony from Walker’s original trial counsel, the court denied the motion and sentenced Walker according to the plea agreement. On appeal, the district court affirmed Walker’s conviction and sentence in a per curiam opinion with citation to King. 661 So. 2d at 954.
We quashed the district court’s decision in King because we determined that an habitual offender sentence may not be imposed upon revocation of probation where the trial judge, in imposing the original sentence, made a finding that the defendant was an habitual felony offender but imposed sentence under the guidelines. King v. State, 681 So. 2d 1136 (Fla.1996). In reaching that decision, we also noted that while such a hybrid split sentence is not authorized by statute or rule it is not an “illegal” sentence. King, at 1140. Thus, where a defendant agrees to such a sentence as part of an otherwise valid plea agreement and the negotiated sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum for the particular offense involved, the court may impose incarceration under the guidelines followed by probation as an habitual offender. Id. at 1140-41.
In the instant case, the record reveals that Walker’s sentence was part of a plea bargain, that he understood the consequences of the sentence, and that the negotiated sentence did not exceed the maximum allowed by law for the offense of delivery of cocaine. Thus, while we do not approve the district court’s reasoning, we agree with the court’s conclusion that Walker’s sentence was proper. Accordingly, we approve the result reached below.
It is so ordered.
KOGAN, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, GRIMES, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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Mack v. State, 823 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 2002)…iated plea, was placed on probation as a habitual offender and had notice that he would be treated as such if probation was revoked. See, e.g., Terry v. State, 808 So. 2d 1249 (Fla.2002); Dunham v. State, 686 So. 2d 1356 (Fla.1997); Walker v. State, 682 So. 2d 555 (Fla.1996).…
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Terry v. State, 808 So. 2d 1249 (Fla. 2002)…ce. Therefore, he argues, it is contrary to law to impose an enhanced sentence for the first time after violation of probation. The State replies that Terry’s sentence is proper pursuant to King v. State, 681 So. 2d 1136 (Fla.1996), Walker v. State, 682 So. 2d 555 (Fla.1996), and Dunham v. State, 686 So. 2d 1356 (Fla.1997). We agree with the State. In King, the defendant was convicted by a jury. At sentencing, the trial judge found that King qualified as an habitual offender, but imposed a guidelines sentenc…
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Trotter v. State, 774 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…lthough Trotter’s sentence falls within the window period, neither Heggs nor Trapp are applicable [*925] because Trotter’s original sentence did not exceed the 30 year maximum available for a first degree felony.2 The State cites to Walker v. State, 682 So. 2d 555 (Fla.1996) to support this argument. The State also argues that if Trotter is entitled to re-sentencing based on Heggs, the trial court can enter a departure sentence up to the statutory maximum because the plea called for a recommendation only from…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1981)
- King v. State, 681 So. 2d 1136 (Fla. 1996)
- King v. State, 648 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Walker v. State, 661 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)