THOMAS M. CHAMBERS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Chambers was convicted of felony DUI and appealed, challenging the trial court's rejection of a peremptory strike against a juror whose husband was a retired police officer. The appellate court held that a juror's spouse's law enforcement background is a neutral reason for a peremptory challenge and reversed for a new trial because the trial court failed to properly analyze whether the prosecution showed purposeful discrimination.
A juror's spouse's law enforcement background is a properly neutral reason for a peremptory challenge. Once a party provides such a neutral explanation, the trial court must determine whether the opposing party has shown purposeful, invidious discrimination. The trial court's refusal to allow the strike without stating reasons and without considering whether discrimination was shown constitutes reversible error.
[1] A juror's spouse's law enforcement background constitutes a facially neutral reason for a peremptory challenge.
[2] Upon objection to a peremptory challenge, the party seeking to excuse the juror must provide a facially neutral explanation with some support in the record.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Florida law presumes that a peremptory challenge has been exercised without invidious discrimination.”
Establishes the foundational presumption governing peremptory challenge analysis
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDuring jury selection in a felony DUI case, Chambers attempted to peremptorily strike juror Anita Lavalley because her husband is a retired firefighte…
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FARMER, Judge.
Chambers appeals from his conviction and sentence on one count of felony DUI. During the voir dire examination of jurors, Chambers peremptorily struck juror Laval-ley because her husband is a retired firefighter, police officer and paramedic. The following exchange occurred:
DEFENSE: We’ll strike Anita Lavalley, Your Honor. PROSECUTOR: Ask counsel to state a gender-neutral reason for striking Ms. La-valley. She’s a woman.
DEFENSE: She said her husband was a cop, Your Honor. The trial court sustained the State’s objection. Defendant contends that the trial court’s denial of his motion to peremptorily strike Lavalley constituted a reversible error. Florida law presumes that a peremptory challenge has been exercised without invidious discrimination. Windom v. State, 656 So. 2d 432 (Fla.1995). In Czaja v. State, 674 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), the second district recognized that the law enforcement background of a juror’s spouse is a properly neutral reason for a peremptory challenge, invoking the trial court’s duty to determine whether the State’s objection to the strike has been supported by evidence of purposeful, invidious discrimination. In Gonzalez v. State, 569 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), we held that, upon an objection to an exercise of a peremptory challenge, the party seeking to excuse the prospective juror is required to provide only a facially neutral explanation for the challenge having some support in the record. In this case, Chambers attempted to excuse juror Lavalley because her husband is a retired police officer. Although Chambers gave the neutral explanation that the strike was based on the background of the juror’s spouse, the trial judge refused to permit the challenge, without stating any reasons. The record indicates that the peremptory strike in this case was constitutionally permissible. Once a party gives a neutral reason for a strike, as in this case, the trial court then has the duty to determine whether the party opposing the challenge has shown purposeful, invidious discrimination. There is nothing in the record to show that the trial court considered this issue.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.
STONE and POLEN, JJ., concur.
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Hayes v. State, 94 So. 3d 452 (Fla. 2012)…ell v. State, 879 So. 2d 1261, 1263 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (stating that a potential juror having a relative in law enforcement “has been repeatedly found to be a valid, race neutral or gender neutral reason for a peremptory strike”); Chambers v. State, 682 So. 2d 615, 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (“[T]he law enforcement background of a juror’s spouse is a properly neutral reason for a peremptory challenge-”); Czaja v. State, 674 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (“A close relationship between the juror and a law enf…
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Landis v. State, 143 So. 3d 974 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014)…ell v. State, 879 So. 2d 1261, 1263 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) (stating that a potential juror having a relative in law enforcement "has been repeatedly found to be a valid, race neutral or gender neutral reason for a peremptory strike"); Chambers v. State, 682 So. 2d 615, 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (”[T]he law enforcement background of a juror's spouse is a properly neutral reason for a peremptory challenge .... ”); Czaja v. State, 674 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) ("A close relationship between the juror and a la…
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Lavell Keith Porter v. State, 708 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…natoiy manner, see Windom v. State, 656 So. 2d 432 (Fla.1995), “or to justify a finding of discriminatory intent.” Smith v. State, 662 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). See also Hernandez v. State, 686 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Chambers v. State, 682 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Morris v. State, 680 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Rivera v. State, 670 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Santiago v. State, 652 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Betancourt v. State, 650 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). The Defen…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Windom v. State, 656 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1995)
- Gonzalez v. State, 569 So. 2d 782 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- Czaja v. State, 674 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)