DAVID L. HORTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
David Horton appealed the denial of his Rule 3.850 postconviction relief motion, challenging his guilty plea to habitual felony offender charges. The court reversed and remanded on the Ashley claim, finding that subsequent Florida Supreme Court precedent (State v. Wilson) clarified that trial judges must inform defendants of ineligibility for gain time before accepting a habitual felony offender plea.
The court reversed the denial of postconviction relief on the Ashley claim and remanded for Horton to withdraw his plea. Although the law of the case doctrine ordinarily prevents reconsideration of issues decided on direct appeal, an exception applies where reliance on the previous decision would result in manifest injustice, particularly where subsequent controlling precedent clarifies that the earlier ruling was erroneous.
[1] A defendant must be informed of the collateral consequences of a habitual felony offender sentence, including ineligibility for certain early release programs, to ensure…
[2] An appellate court may reconsider a prior ruling, even if it has become the law of the case, in exceptional circumstances to prevent manifest injustice.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a trial judge erred in "fail[ing] to confirm that [the defendant] knew of the maximum habitual offender term for the charged offense and that he could be ineligible for certain programs affecting early release."”
Establishes the essential requirement that trial judges must inform defendants of gain time ineligibility before accepting habitual felony offender pleas
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHorton pleaded nolo contendere to two criminal offenses under an agreement for a ten-year habitual felony offender sentence. Before sentencing, he mov…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Manifest Injustice Exception cases and more on FLexlaw
ALLEN, Judge.
The appellant challenges an order by which his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion for postconviction relief was denied. Because we conclude that relief should be granted as to the claim that relies upon Ashley v. State, 614 So. 2d 486 (Fla.1993), we reverse the order to the extent that it reflects a denial of the Ashley claim. We conclude that we are precluded by Wild v. Dozier, 672 So. 2d 16 (Fla.1996), from addressing the trial judge’s ruling on the appellant’s claim that the trial judge, a county judge, was improperly assigned to the circuit court.
The appellant pled nolo contendere to two criminal offenses based upon an agreement that he would receive a ten year habitual felony offender sentence. Before sentencing, he moved to withdraw his plea because he had not been informed that he would be ineligible for certain gain time as a habitual felony offender. The trial judge denied the motion and imposed the ten year habitual felony offender sentence. The appellant argued on appeal that his plea had been involuntary because he had not been informed of the collateral gain time consequences of his plea, as specified in footnote eight of the Ashley opinion.
We rejected the appellant’s argument, reasoning that the footnote language was merely aspirational. Horton v. State, 646 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), rev. denied, 659 So. 2d 271 (Fla.1995). Subsequently, the supreme court clarified and reiterated its statements in the Ashley footnote, specifically holding that a trial judge erred in “fail[ing] to confirm that [the defendant] knew of the maximum habitual offender term for the charged offense and that he could be ineligible for certain programs affecting early release.” State v. Wilson, 658 So. 2d 521, 522 (Fla.1995) (emphasis supplied).
In light of Wilson, the appellant is entitled to relief as to the Ashley claim. Because the Ashley issue was decided against the appellant in his direct appeal, the holding in Horton would ordinarily be the law of the case and would bar consideration of the issue in a collateral proceeding. But there is an exception to this rule:
[A]n appellate court does have the power to reconsider and correct erroneous rulings notwithstanding that such rulings have become the law of the case. Reconsideration is warranted only in exceptional circumstances and where reliance on the previous decision would result in manifest injustice.
Preston v. State, 444 So. 2d 939, 942 (Fla.1984) (citation omitted).
This case warrants relief under the exception. The appellant promptly moved to withdraw his plea and made the correct arguments to the trial judge. He likewise made the correct arguments on appeal. And it is now apparent that Horton was wrongly decided. In Wilson, the supreme court made it clear that the Ashley footnote had expressed an essential prerequisite to acceptance of a habitual felony offender sentence. Under these circumstances it would be manifestly unfair to refuse to grant relief based upon the law of the case doctrine. See Preston; Harmon v. State, 547 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), rev. denied, 554 So. 2d 1168 (Fla.1989); Young v. State, 503 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
We accordingly reverse the order to the extent that it reflects a denial of the Ashley claim, and we remand this case to the trial court to allow the appellant to withdraw his plea. We do not address the appellant’s claim that the trial judge, a county judge, was not properly assigned to serve as a circuit judge. The supreme court has exclusive jurisdiction to review trial court rulings on such claims. See Wild v. Dozier. And, in light of our disposition of the Ashley claim, we do not address the trial court’s rulings on additional claims presented by the appellant.
WEBSTER and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Lemuel E. Isaac v. State, 911 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…ates Supreme Court made clear that the State of Florida’s post-Apprendi and pre-Blakely interpretation of the phrase “statutory maximum” violated the appellant’s sixth amendment right to a jury trial. See Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2537; Horton v. State, 682 So. 2d 647, 648 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (applying the exception to the law of the case doctrine in a collateral proceeding where this Court relied on an interpretation of case law that the Supreme Court later held erroneous). We therefore reverse the trial court’…
-
Golden v. State, 703 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)…nolo contendere would not be designated habitual offender, where sentencing court failed to confirm that he knew of maximum habitual offender term and that he knew of his ineligibility for certain programs affecting early release); Horton v. State, 682 So. 2d 647, 648 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); and Patterson v. State, 677 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), we are constrained to reverse the order as to Ground One. We remand the cause to the trial court for attachment of portions of the record that conclusively refute…
-
Freels v. State, 701 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)…the habitual offender context. See Horton v. State, 646 So. 2d at 256. But in State v. Wilson, 658 So. 2d 521 (Fla.1995), the supreme court unequivocally held that the above-quoted language from the Ashley footnote is mandatory. See Horton v. State, 682 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)(Horton II). As we wrote in Horton I, the Ashley transformation of special gain time and early release consequences to equal footing with direct consequences of a plea cannot logically be limited to the habitual offender context.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ashley v. State, 614 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1993)
- Preston v. State, 444 So. 2d 939 (Fla. 1984)
- State v. Wilson, 658 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1995)
- The Honorable Joe A. Wild v. Dozier, 672 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1996)
- Horton v. State, 646 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
- Young v. State, 503 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)
- Ira J. Harmon v. State, 547 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)