GREGORY SPENCER LOWE, A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH GREGORY S. LOWE AND PATRICIA S. LOWE, AS PARENTS AND NATURAL GUARDIANS, AND GREGORY S. LOWE AND PATRICIA S. LOWE, INDIVIDUALLY AND JOINTLY, PETITIONERS,
v.
JOSEPH R. PUGH, M.D., INDIVIDUALLY, AND JOSEPH R. PUGH, M.D., P.A., AND RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS
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In this medical malpractice case, the court denied a petition for certiorari challenging an order requiring plaintiffs to produce notices of intent to initiate litigation that were sent to original defendants but later sought by newly added defendants. The court held that statutory notices of intent are not protected from disclosure to parties who were added later in the lawsuit.
The notices of intent are not protected from disclosure to subsequently added defendants. If Dr. Pugh had been an original defendant, he would have been entitled to receive these notices by rule, and therefore they cannot be shielded from discovery when he is later added as a defendant.
[1] Notices of intent to initiate litigation mailed to original defendants are discoverable by subsequently added defendants.
[2] Notices of intent to initiate litigation are not protected from disclosure under the work product privilege for the presuit screening process.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“No statement, discussion, written document, report, or other work product generated by the presuit screening process is discoverable or admissible in any civil action for any purpose by the opposing party”
This is the statutory protection claimed by plaintiffs for the notices; the court interpreted it narrowly to exclude statutory notices of intent.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGregory Lowe allegedly suffered damages from medical treatment in summer 1991. His parents filed a medical malpractice action against several physicia…
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PER CURIAM.
• The plaintiffs, Gregory Spencer Lowe and his parents, seek certiorari review of an order that requires them to produce the notices of intent to initiate litigation pursuant to section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (1993), which they had earlier mailed to the initial defendants in this lawsuit. We deny relief because these documents are not protected from disclosure to the respondents, whom the plaintiff later added as defendants.
Gregory Lowe allegedly suffered damages as a result of medical treatment in the summer of 1991. His parents filed a medical malpractice action against several physicians and hospitals in 1993. In a third amended complaint filed in May 1995, they added Joseph R. Pugh, M.D., his professional association, and Radiology and Nuclear Medicine, Inc., as defendants. After Dr. Pugh answered the action, he requested that the plaintiffs produce copies of the earlier letters giving notice of intent to the original defendants.1 The plaintiffs objected, maintaining that the notices were protected from disclosure by section 766.106(5), which provides:
No statement, discussion, written document, report, or other work product generated by the presuit screening process is discoverable or admissible in any civil action for any purpose by the opposing party-
We agree with the trial court that the statutory notices of intent to initiate litigation that were mailed to an opposing party are not documents protected by subsection 5. If Dr. Pugh had been one of the original defendants, the plaintiffs would have been obligated to serve him with these notices. Fla. R.Civ.P. 1.650(b)(2).
Petition for writ of certiorari denied.
RYDER, A.C.J., and DANAHY and ALTENBERND, JJ., concur. . We are uncertain whether the original defendants continue to be parties in the circuit court. The plaintiffs did not name these defendants as respondents in this proceeding. If they are still parties in the circuit court, they should have been served with the petition and treated as respondents in this court. See Fla.R.App.P. 9.020(f). Dr. Pugh served his response on the attorneys who apparently represent the original defendants. None of the original defendants has filed an appearance in this proceeding.
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Michael J. Cohen, M.D. v. Dauphinee, 739 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1999)…to the corroborating opinion requirement in section 766.203. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant has satisfied the requirement of irreparable harm necessary to our common law certiorari jurisdiction. Id. (emphasis added).11 In Lowe v. Pugh, 682 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), plaintiffs sought review of an order requiring them to produce the notices of intent to initiate litigation, which had previously been mailed to the initial defendants, to the newly added defendants. In denying certiorari and hen…