CARLO GANT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Carlo Gant appealed his conviction for armed robbery and aggravated assault, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress and various conditions of probation, costs, and fees. The court affirmed the conviction and suppression ruling but struck certain special probation conditions and costs that were not properly announced at sentencing.
The court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress and the conviction. General probation conditions contained in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986(e) do not require oral pronouncement if the defendant had constructive notice. However, special probation conditions requiring the defendant to pay for testing, discretionary court costs, and attorney's fees must be individually announced at sentencing and are stricken if not properly announced, though the state may seek reimposition upon proper notice.
[1] A general condition of probation, as set forth in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986(e), does not need to be orally pronounced at sentencing if the defendant had co…
[2] A special condition of probation requiring a defendant to pay for random drug testing must be orally pronounced at sentencing.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We affirm the imposition of condition three since it is a general condition contained in the form probation order set forth in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986(e), of which appellant had constructive notice prior to sentencing.”
Establishes the rule that general probation conditions require only constructive notice and do not require oral pronouncement at sentencing.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Carlo Gant pled no contest to armed robbery and three counts of aggravated assault, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion t…
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CAMPBELL, Acting Chief Judge.
Appellant, Carlo Gant, pled no contest to armed robbery and three counts of aggravated assault, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm the denial of the motion to suppress and appellant’s conviction and sentence. We find error, however, in the imposition of certain special conditions of probation, costs and fees and remand for further proceedings.
Appellant contends that the following conditions of probation must be stricken because they were not orally pronounced at sentencing: “3. You will not possess, carry or own any weapons, firearms, or destructive devices _ 8. You will submit to and pay for random testing as directed by the supervising officer or professional staff of the treatment center where you are receiving treatment to determine the presence of alcohol or controlled substances.”
We affirm the imposition of condition three since it is a general condition contained in the form probation order set forth in Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.986(e), of which appellant had constructive notice prior to sentencing. State v. Hart, 668 So. 2d 589 (Fla.1996). The state concedes that the portion of probation condition eight which requires appellant to pay for random drug testing is a special condition of probation that must be orally pronounced at sentencing. Because it was not orally pronounced in this case, it is stricken. See Nank v. State, 646 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Malone v. State, 652 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
Appellant also challenges the imposition of $288 in court costs and a $2 cost imposed pursuant to section 943.25(13), Florida Statutes (1995). These costs are discretionary costs which must be individually announced in a manner sufficient for the defendant to know the legal basis for the cost imposed. Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Because these costs were not individually announced at sentencing, we strike these costs without prejudice to the state to seek reimposition upon proper notice.
Finally, appellant challenges the $1,000 in attorney’s fees assessed against him. Even though appellant was advised prior to entering his plea that he would be responsible for reasonable attorney’s fees, he was not advised at the sentencing hearing that he could challenge the amount of the assessment within thirty days. See Hayes v. State, 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1008, — So. 2d - [1996 WL 180206] (Fla. 2d DCA Apr. 10, 1996); Bull v. State, 548 So. 2d 1103 (Fla.1989); Jones v. State, 623 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). We, therefore, strike the $1,000 in attorney’s fees without prejudice to reimpose it on remand.
SCHOONOVER and LAZZARA, JJ., concur.
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ELY v. State, 719 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…mount of the fee. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.720(d)(1). See Washington v. State, 685 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Cruz v. State, 696 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). We reverse and remand this issue without prejudice to reimpose the fee. See Gant v. State, 682 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Peterson v. State, 706 So. 2d 930 [*13] (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Mr. Ely shall be given 30 days to file a written objection to the lien. If an objection is filed, the trial court shall strike the lien, and afford Mr. Ely notice and a…
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State v. Bynes, 784 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)…d to strike conditions 2, 12 and 19 from the order of probation. Because condition 19 was a discretionary cost that may be reimposed after notice and an opportunity to be heard, the striking of that condition is without prejudice. See Gant v. State, 682 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). ALTENBERND, A.C.J., and NORTHCUTT and CASANUEVA, JJ., concur. . Even though the State has conceded error, no order was entered on this motion in the circuit court within the allotted sixty days and, thus, the motion was deem…
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Gallo v. State, 691 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…claim of violation of double jeopardy. Appellant’s claim of violation of double jeopardy appears to have been properly rejected by the trial court. See United States v. Ursery, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 2135, 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996); Chillington v. State, 682 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); State v. Powelson, 680 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). His claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fail to satisfy the elements of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). However, his…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Abel Oliveros Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- State v. Hart, 668 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1996)
- Bull v. State, 548 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1989)
- Nank v. State, 646 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Guinn v. State, 652 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- Jones v. State, 623 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)