KENNETH MOYE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1996-11-22
No. 95-1519
PETERSON, C.J., and COBB and ANTOON, JJ., concur.
683 So. 2d 624 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1996) Positive Treatment
Cited by 9 cases

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Holding

The court held that reclassification of a felony conviction for firearm use to a life felony does not make a defendant eligible for habitual offender sentencing under the statute in effect at the time of the offense. However, the sentence for Count I must be vacated and remanded for resentencing.


Facts & Procedural History

Kenneth Moye was convicted of attempted first degree murder and found to have personally possessed and used a firearm. The trial court sentenced him a…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Kenneth Moye was sentenced as an habitual offender after being convicted of attempted first degree murder. .Count I of the amended information alleged that Moye personally possessed a firearm and shot at the victim with a gun. The jury found Moye guilty of that charge.

Since Moye was both charged with and found guilty of perpetrating the crime with the use of a gun, the trial court was required by the language of section 775.087, Florida Statutes (1993), to reclassify this conviction of a first degree felony to a life felony. Walker v. State, 639 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). Reclassification is mandatory. See Kio v. State, 624 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), rev. denied, 634 So. 2d 627 (Fla.1994).

Reclassification of the conviction for first degree attempted murder with a firearm to a life felony does not make Moye eligible to be sentenced as an habitual offender. Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 435 (Fla.1992). This anomaly has since been corrected by the legislature, but the amendment is not applicable to Moye’s conviction.1 We affirm the judgment of conviction but vacate the sentence for Count I and remand for resentencing.

REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.

PETERSON, C.J., and COBB and ANTOON, JJ., concur. . Compare § 775.084(4)(a)(l), Fla. Stat. (1995) with § 775.084(4)(b)(l), Fla. Stat. (1993) and La-montv. State, 610 So. 2d 435 (Fla.1992).


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  • Antoine L. McBRIDE v. State, 810 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
    …icant [*1021] because the habitual felony offender statute in effect at that time did not include life felonies within the offenses that qualified for an enhanced sentence under the statute. Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 435 (Fla.1992); Moye v. State, 683 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). The statute has since been amended to include life felonies as qualifying offenses,1 and the courts have consistently held that individuals who committed life felonies prior to the effective date of the amendment did not qualify…
  • Kramer v. Kramer, 698 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
    …ligations as of March 25,1995, Ryan’s eighteenth birthday. See § 743.07(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). Federal legislation has preempted Florida law with respect to modification of child support orders rendered in another state. See Skladanuk v. Skladanuk, 683 So. 2d 624, 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Jorda v. Fleet, 679 So. 2d 326, 328 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). On October 10, 1994, Congress enacted the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act. Pub.L.No. 103-383, § 3(a), 108 Stat. 4064 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738B…
  • Trissler v. Trissler, 987 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)
    …per v. Gropper, 766 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); State, Dep’t of Rev. ex rel. Hylton v. Hylton, 703 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Kramer v. Kramer, 698 So. 2d 894 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); State, Dep’t of Rev. ex rel. Sklada [*211] nuk v. Skladanuk, 683 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); State, Dep’t of Rev. ex rel. Jorda v. Fleet, 679 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). In this case, it is undisputed that none of the parties or the children have resided in Pennsylvania since 2001. As a result, Pennsylvania lost “con…

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