GEORGE KENNETH JOHNSON AND JACQUELINE M. JOHNSON, APPELLANTS,
v.
STANLEY WHITE INSURANCE AND STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEES
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The Johnsons appealed a summary judgment dismissing their underinsured motorist claim against State Farm Insurance, arguing they were entitled to stacked coverage on four vehicles totaling $75,000 rather than the $26,000 limit offered. The court reversed because the sparse record contained insufficient evidence to conclusively resolve whether the Johnsons knowingly rejected stacked coverage.
Summary judgment was improper because the sparse record does not conclusively establish that the Johnsons knowingly rejected stacked coverage. Although Florida law creates a conclusive presumption that a signature on an approved selection form indicates an informed choice, this presumption can be refuted in extraordinary cases involving fraud, forgery, or trickery, and State Farm failed to conclusively prove the Johnsons cannot prevail.
[1] Summary judgment is improper when material issues of fact remain unresolved.
[2] A signature on an uninsured motorist selection/rejection form can be refuted in cases involving fraud, forgery, or trickery.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 627.727(1), Florida Statutes (1993), purports to make the named insured's signature on an approved selection form a conclusive presumption that the selection of reduced uninsured motorist coverage was informed and knowing. Case law, however, holds that the signature on such a form can be refuted in extraordinary cases involving fraud, forgery, or trickery.”
Establishes the legal standard governing signatures on UM coverage selection forms and the circumstances under which the presumption can be overcome.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Johnsons were involved in a car accident on July 28, 1993, in which Mr. Johnson sustained injuries. The at-fault driver's liability insurer paid $…
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ALTENBERND, Acting Chief Judge.
George and Jacqueline Johnson appeal a summary final judgment in favor of State Farm Mutual Insurance Company and its agent, Stanley White Insurance. We reverse because the sparse record does not resolve all material issues of fact.
The Johnsons filed a claim with State Farm seeking underinsured motorist protection for an automobile accident that occurred on July 28,1993. In that accident, Mr. Johnson allegedly sustained injuries when his ear was struck by a car driven by Clarence Spencer. Mr. Spencer’s liability insurance company paid the Johnsons $10,000. State Farm was willing to pay $26,000, which is the limit of its uninsured motorist (UM) coverage for the one Johnson car involved in the accident. The Johnsons maintain that they did not reject stacked uninsured motorist eover-age and are entitled to an additional $75,000, which. is the policy limit for stacked UM coverage on their other three cars.
The record in this case is extremely limited. The Johnsons filed a complaint and amended complaint which identify the four insurance policies but do not have copies attached. The Johnsons allege that they do not have copies of the policies. They also allege that they were not informed of their right to select stacked UM coverage and did not sign or receive any selection/ rejection form concerning UM coverage.
State Farm never answered the complaints. It filed motions to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment on behalf of itself and Stanley White. State Farm’s attorney filed a document described as “a sample copy of the policy.” This document is not filed under oath, and it is not a certified copy of any one of the Johnsons’ four policies for any relevant period.
The record does not contain declaration pages for any of the policies. State Farm also filed an affidavit from one of its employees, attaching a selection/rejection form containing the Johnsons’ signatures. This form appears to select non-stacked coverage on four cars. In response to this affidavit, the Johnsons filed affidavits stating that they signed blank application forms and were told by the agent that he would fill in “everything else.” In their affidavits, they again state that no agent told them that they were selecting reduced coverage.
The Johnsons do not have a single policy with State Farm insuring four autos; instead, they have four separate policies. According to the allegations in the amended complaint, these policies were issued as early as August 1990, as recently as February 1994, and have different policy periods. The selection/rejeetion form State Farm filed is dated April 26,1993, and identifies four automobiles. Apparently, the Johnsons had standard UM coverage on the four vehicles prior to that date.
The record does not even explain why the Johnsons had a reason to sign the form on April 26, 1993. Their claim that no one explained the blank application form to them stands unrefnted at this time. Section 627.727(1), Florida Statutes (1993), purports to make the named insured’s signature on an approved selection form a conclusive presumption that the selection of reduced uninsured motorist coverage was informed and knowing. Case law, however, holds that the signature on such a form can be refuted in extraordinary cases involving fraud, forgery, or trickery. White v. Allstate Ins. Co., 530 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), review denied, 539 So. 2d 476 (Fla.1989); Rodriguez v. American United Ins. Co., 570 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
State Farm and Stanley White have not conclusively established on this record that the Johnsons cannot prevail on their claim. See Hervey v. Alfonso, 650 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
We express no opinion on the outcome in this case, but simply hold that the issue was not ripe for summary judgment at this time.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BLUE and FULMER, JJ., concur.
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Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Ledford, 691 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)…, the presumption cannot be used “to prevent the pleading and introduction of evidence of ex■traordinary circumstances such as forgery, fraud, or trickery in obtaining the signature[.]” White, 530 So. 2d at 969; accord Johnson v. Stanley White Ins., 684 So. 2d 248, 250 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); Rodriguez v. American United Ins. Co., 570 So. 2d 365, 366 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).4 [*1167] Against this backdrop, we turn to Liberty Mutual’s complaint regarding the trial court’s erroneous exclusion of relevant documentary evi…
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Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Ledford, 729 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…on in this case. Because the Ledfords did not challenge this presumption by establishing fraud, forgery, or trickery, we find that the trial court should have granted Liberty Mutual’s motion for a directed verdict. See Johnson v. Stanley White Ins., 684 So. 2d 248, 250 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (statutory presumption can be refuted by a showing of fraud, forgery, or trickery). Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court with instructions that a declaratory judgment be entered in favor of Liberty Mutual. R…
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Bessman v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 773 F. Supp. 2d 1270 (N.D. Fla. 2011)…half. Because Geisinger plainly had authority to act on Hope Lumber’s behalf in signing the UM/UIM selection form, a presumption arises that Hope Lumber made an informed, knowing rejection of UM/UIM coverage. See Johnson v. Stanley White Ins., 684 So.2d 248, 250 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). That presumption may be rebutted if the rejection was procured by fraud, forgery, or trickery. See id. The plaintiffs, however, did not plead fraud in their complaint, much less with the requisite particularity. See…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hervey v. Alfonso, 650 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- White v. Allstate Ins. Co., 530 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Rodriguez v. Am. United Ins. Co., 570 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)