ARLENE J. BLUM, APPELLANT,
v.
TAMARAC FAIRWAYS ASSOCIATION, INC., A FLORIDA NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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A condominium association sought injunctive relief against a unit owner for leasing his unit without approval, allegedly violating the condominium declaration. The court reversed the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss, holding that disputes over a unit owner's right to lease fall within the mandatory arbitration requirements of Florida Statute § 718.1255.
The court held that disputes over a unit owner's right to lease his unit to a third party fall within the mandatory arbitration requirements of § 718.1255 because such disputes involve disagreements over the association's authority to require an owner to take or not take an action involving his unit, and lease rights do not implicate the express exemption for disputes involving title.
[1] A disagreement between a condominium unit owner and an association regarding the owner's right to lease their unit, and the association's disapproval of such a lease, con…
[2] The plain meaning rule dictates that statutory language should be interpreted according to its ordinary and obvious meaning when it is clear and unambiguous.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“"[Dispute" means any disagreement between two or more parties that involves: (a) The authority of the board of directors, under this chapter or association document to: 1. Require any owner to take any action, or not to take any action, involving that owner's unit or the appurtenances thereto.”
The statutory definition of 'dispute' under § 718.1255(1), which the court applied to conclude the leasing dispute fell within mandatory arbitration
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTamarac Fairways Association, Inc. sought injunctive relief against Gabriel Glantz for leasing his condominium unit without prior approval from the as…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from a non-final order which denied a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. We reverse and remand with direction to stay this proceeding pending arbitration. See EMSA Limited Partnership v. Mason, 677 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 4th DCA1996).
Appellee, Tamarac Fairways Association, Inc. (Tamarac), sought injunctive relief against appellant, Gabriel Glantz (Glantz), alleging that Glantz had violated a provision of the Declaration and Rules for the condominium by leasing his condominium unit without prior approval of the association, appellee Tamarac. Tamarac disapproved the lease.
Appellant’s motion to dismiss alleged that the action involved a dispute required to be 'arbitrated first pursuant to section 718.1255, Florida Statutes (1995). The trial court concluded that the statute’s definition of “dispute” did not include the dispute over a unit owner’s right to lease his unit.
Section 718.1255(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), provides for mandatory nonbinding arbitration of “disputes” between condominium unit owners and associations prior to the institution of court litigation. What constitutes a “dispute” is the subject of section (1), which provides that:
“[Dispute” means any disagreement between two or more parties that involves:
(a) The authority of the board of directors, under this chapter or association document to:
1. Require any owner to take any action, or not to take any action, involving that owner’s unit or the appurtenances thereto.
“Dispute” does not include any disagreement that primarily involves title to any unit or common element; the interpretation or enforcement of any warranty; or the levy of a fee or assessment, or the collection of an assessment levied against a-party.
We conclude that the right of appellant to lease his unit to a third party, and the association’s apparent disapproval of that lease and the circumstances by which it was procured, qualifies as a disagreement involving the owner’s unit, which involves the association’s right to require the owner to take or not take an action (leasing) involving his unit. The dispute does not fall within the express exemption for disputes involving title. Lease is not the same as title. A lease is the right to use and enjoyment of the unit. It does not convey title. The complaint did not allege anything unique to the lease in this case which would suggest that it was a lease-option, or otherwise involved title. Accordingly, the above statute requires arbitration in this case.
The plain meaning of a statute will not be disturbed in the absence of ambiguity or conflict. See generally White v. Florida Birth Related Neurological, 655 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to rules of statutory interpretation and construction beyond the plain meaning rule. That rule provides that the statute itself must be given its plain and obvious meaning. See WFTV, Inc. v. Wilken, 675 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
The plain meaning interpretation of section 718.1255 and its definition of “disputes” subject to non-binding arbitration is consistent with the legislative findings set forth in section 718.1255(3), Florida Statutes (1995), showing that the statute is intended to help unit owners avoid the high cost and significant delay of circuit court litigation with condominium associations or related entities.
GLICKSTEIN, DELL and STONE, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (11 total)
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Ruffin v. Kingswood E. Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 719 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…e arbitrator as it did not involve the authority of the board of directors to require an o%mer to take or refrain from any action but instead directly ordered a third party not to come on the condominium property. Cf. Blum v. Tamarac Fairways Ass’n, 684 So. 2d 826, 827-28 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (“right of appellant to lease his unit to a third party, and the association’s apparent disapproval of that lease ... qualifies as a disagreement involving the owner’s unit, which involves the association’s right to requi…
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Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Milton, 707 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…to judicial construction, and in the absence of ambiguity the plain meaning of the statute prevails.” Martin County v. Edenfield, 609 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla.1992); accord Nicoll v. Baker, 668 So. 2d 989 (Fla.1996); Blum v. Tamarac Fairways Ass’n, Inc., 684 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Kelder v. ACT Corp., 650 So. 2d 647, 649 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 660 So. 2d 713 (Fla.1995). In this case, the statutory language is unambiguous, and the plain meaning of the statute must prevail. The plain language of sub…
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Neate v. Cypress Club Condo., Inc., 718 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…mportant, it provides that the decision of the arbitrators is final unless a party to the dispute files a complaint for a trial de novo within 30 days after the arbitration decision has been presented in writing.3 In Blum v. Tamarac Fairways Ass’n, 684 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), we reviewed a nonfinal order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. A condominium association had sued to enjoin a unit owner from violating a provision of the declaration of condominium. The unit owner sought to…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- WFTV, Inc. v. Wilken, 675 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- Emsa Ltd. P'ship v. Mason, 677 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
- White v. Florida Birth Related Neurological, 655 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)