G. L. GROOVER, APPELLANT,
v.
KENNETH W. STAFFORD, ET AL., APPELLEES
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The Florida Supreme Court held that a grantee named in a warranty deed from a tax deed holder cannot bring a suit to foreclose the tax deed under Chapter 14572, Acts of 1929. The court interpreted the statute's use of "holder" to exclude transferees who received title through a warranty deed from the original tax deed holder.
A grantee under a warranty deed from a tax deed holder may not bring a suit to foreclose the tax deed. The statute authorizes only a "holder" of a tax certificate or tax deed to foreclose, and the word "holder" does not include grantees who received title through a warranty deed from the original holder.
“Any holder of a certificate of tax sale or a tax deed therefor, whether heretofore or hereafter issued, including the State of Florida, is hereby authorized on and after January 1st, 1930, to file a bill in chancery to foreclose the lien of such certificate or deed”
The statutory language that the court interprets to authorize only "holders" to foreclose tax deeds
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceG. L. Groover received a warranty deed from Kenneth W. Stafford, who held a tax deed. Groover attempted to file a bill in chancery to foreclose the li…
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The sole question presented by the record in this case is whether or not the grantee named in a warranty deed from a tax deed holder may bring a suit to foreclose the tax deed as provided by Chapter 14572, Acts of 1929. The lower court decided the question in *411the negative by sustaining a motion to dismiss appellant’s bill for want of equity. The present appeal is from that order.
The statute involved in the present case is Section 13 of Chapter 14572, Acts of 1929, and reads as follows:
“Any holder of a certificate of tax sale or a tax deed therefor, whether heretofore or hereafter issued, including the State of Florida, is hereby authorized on and after January 1st, 1930, to file a bill in chancery to foreclose the lien of such'certificate or deed, and the practice, pleading and procedure for foreclosure shall be in accordance with the practice, pleading and procedure for foreclosure of mortgages' on real estate, except as herein otherwise provided and except that no personal judgment shall be given. No suit shall be brought on any tax sale certificate until after expiration of two years from the date of the certificate nor shall the State commence any such suit before the time hereinafter provided for such suit by the State.”
The outstanding purpose of our present system of tax enforcement procedure is to give purchasers of tax certificates and holders of tax deeds procured thereon, every reasonable assurance that can be given by State law to support the validity of that which the State has undertaken in good faith to convey to tax certificate purchasers as a means of raising ready cash through attracting buyers at tax sales, and in o^der that essential revenue for the State may be realized from such sales in cases where the property taxes imposed by the State on lands are allowed to become and have remained delinquent past the statutory period of redemption.
Under the statute any “holder” of either a tax certificate or of a tax deed, may foreclose it. But the word “holder” is not the equivalent of the word “grantee” and therefore does not embrace the grantee under a warranty deed from the holder of a tax deed.
Affirmed.
*412Whitfield, P.J., and Terrell, J., concur.
Buford, C.J., and Ellis and Brown, J.J., concur in the opinion and judgment.
On Petition for Rehearing.
The precise language of Section 13 o'f Chapter 14572, Acts of 1929, is that: "Any holder of a certificate of tax sale or a tax deed therefor” is authorized to file a bill in chancery to foreclose the same. The latter phrase "Tax deed therefor,” when read in connection with what precedes it in the statute, should be construed to have the same meaning as if the statute had said: "Any holder of a certificate of tax sale or any holder of a tax deed issued to the holder of a certificate of tax sale, etc.” since the word "therefor” appearing after the words "tax deed” must be given some significance.
Assuming, but not deciding in this case, that the equitable rights of the "holder” of a tax deed that has been issued to the holder of a tax certificate, may be assigned by an appropriate instrument and vested in an assignee as such, so as to authorize the assignee to exercise the same right of foreclosure that could have been exercised by the tax deed holder, no such case is presented by this appeal.
This case was brought by the grcmtee suo jure, not as an assignee. Nor did he take the status of a mere assignee when he accepted a warranty deed from the tax deed grantee presumptively as an attempted conveyance of the legal title. To authorize foreclosure of a tax deed, it must be dealt with not as a muniment of title, but as evidence of an unsatisfied lien for unpaid taxes. Chapter 14572 permits a tax deed holder to so deal with a tax deed at his option.
Rehearing denied.
Buford, C.J., and Whitfield, Terrell and Davis, J.J., concur.
On Petition for Rehearing.
Per Curiam.
The precise language of Section 13 o'f Chapter 14572, Acts of 1929, is that: "Any holder of a certificate of tax sale or a tax deed therefor” is authorized to file a bill in chancery to foreclose the same. The latter phrase "Tax deed therefor,” when read in connection with what precedes it in the statute, should be construed to have the same meaning as if the statute had said: "Any holder of a certificate of tax sale or any holder of a tax deed issued to the holder of a certificate of tax sale, etc.” since the word "therefor” appearing after the words "tax deed” must be given some significance.
Assuming, but not deciding in this case, that the equitable rights of the "holder” of a tax deed that has been issued to the holder of a tax certificate, may be assigned by an appropriate instrument and vested in an assignee as such, so as to authorize the assignee to exercise the same right of foreclosure that could have been exercised by the tax deed holder, no such case is presented by this appeal.
This case was brought by the grcmtee suo jure, not as an assignee. Nor did he take the status of a mere assignee when he accepted a warranty deed from the tax deed grantee presumptively as an attempted conveyance of the legal title. To authorize foreclosure of a tax deed, it must be dealt with not as a muniment of title, but as evidence of an unsatisfied lien for unpaid taxes. Chapter 14572 permits a tax deed holder to so deal with a tax deed at his option.
Rehearing denied.
Buford, C.J., and Whitfield, Terrell and Davis, J.J., concur.
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Williams v. Robineau, 124 Fla. 422 (Fla. 1936)…he reason that when Williams Brothers filed the cross bill and prayed foreclosure of their tax deeds under Chapter 14572, Acts of 1929, they elected between inconsistent remedies and are now bound by their election. They rely on Groover v. Stafford, 107 Fla. 410, 145 So. 252; Campbell v. Kauffman Milling Co., 42 Fla. 328, 29 So. 435; Ziegler v. Brown, 112 Fla. 421, 150 So. 608; McCormick v. Bodeker, 119 Fla. 20, 160 So. 483; and Intertype Corporation v. Pulver, 2 Fed. Supp. 4, to support their contention.…
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Katharine S. Bauman v. Healy, 141 Fla. 478 (Fla. 1939)…. 383. When the holder of a tax deed conveys the property bona fide to a third person by sufficient deed such third person is not a tax deed holder, but becomes a holder of title deraigned from a new and independent source. See Groover v. Stafford, 107 Fla. 410, 145 Sou. 252. It is not contended that Searing ever became the holder of the tax certificate or of the tax deed. The contention is that he became the equitable owner under the deed from the tax deed holder to Mrs. Bauman. The issuance of the tax…