LUTHER PRATT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Luther Pratt appealed a trial court's denial of his postconviction motion claiming his trial counsel was ineffective and his plea was involuntary because neither counsel nor the court advised him that as a habitual offender he was ineligible for basic gain-time. The appellate court affirmed, holding that failure to advise about gain-time consequences does not render a plea involuntary when the court adequately addresses more critical aspects of habitualization such as mandatory minimums and longer maximum penalties.
The court affirmed the trial court's denial of relief, holding that counsel's failure to warn about reduced gain-time does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the court's oversight in advising about gain-time consequences does not render a plea involuntary when the trial judge methodically assured herself that more critical aspects of habitualization, including mandatory minimums and longer maximum penalties, were understood by the defendant.
[1] A defendant's expectation of receiving basic gain-time, if not attributed to any specific advice from counsel or the court, does not render a plea involuntary when those…
[2] A trial court's failure to advise a defendant about the specific impact of habitual offender status on prospective gain-time does not, in and of itself, render a plea inv…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[h]e has shown no more than that his expectations regarding gain-time — expectations not attributed to anyone other than himself — proved to be unrealistic.”
Establishes that counsel's failure to advise about gain-time does not constitute ineffective assistance when the unrealistic expectations are attributed only to the defendant himself, not to counsel
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLuther Pratt entered a plea with expectations that he would receive a habitual offender sentence. Neither his trial counsel nor the trial court advise…
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[*1334] PER CURIAM.
Luther Pratt challenges the trial court’s ruling on his postconviction motion which laid blame on trial counsel and the court for failing to advise him of his ineligibility for basic gain-time 1 because of his status as a habitual offender. Specifically he asserts that counsel’s representation was ineffective for this lapse in advice, and that his plea was involuntarily entered as a result of the court’s failure to address the subject during the plea colloquy. We affirm.
This court has. drawn the distinction between counsel’s provision of misinformation to a client and counsel’s failure to advise altogether about the consequences of a proposed plea. In denying relief to one aggrieved because counsel failed to warn him that basic gain-time would not be available as a habitual offender, we stated, “[h]e has shown no more than that his expectations regarding gain-time — expectations not attributed to anyone other than himself — -proved to be unrealistic.” Simmons v. State, 611 So. 2d 1250, 1253-54 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). The trial court correctly denied Pratt’s claim that counsel was ineffective.
The trial court is invested with the responsibility of assuring that a plea which is being entered with expectations that a habitual offender sentence will follow is done so with appreciation of the reasonable consequences of that sentence. Ashley v. State, 614 So. 2d 486 (Fla.1993). While the supreme court alluded to the desirability that defendants be made aware of the effect on gain-time when entering such a plea, Ashley, 614 So. 2d at 490, n. 8, that consequence is but one of many which should be examined to determine the voluntariness of a plea under attack. We have reviewed Pratt’s plea colloquy, and note that with the one exception he brings to our attention, the failure to be advised of the prospect of diminished gain-time, the trial judge methodically assured herself that the more critical aspects of ha-bitualization, including mandatory mínimums and longer maximum penalties, were understood by Pratt. We adopt the analysis of this issue in Horton v. State, 646 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), and hold that the court’s oversight in advising a defendant about the consequences of habitualization on prospective gain-time does not render a plea, in and of itself, involuntary.
The other claims advanced by Pratt are without merit.
Affirmed.
RYDER, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur. . See § 775.08.4(4)(e), Fla.Stat. (1993).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Ashley v. State, 614 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1993)
- Simmons v. State, 611 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- Horton v. State, 646 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)