DAVID L. JACKSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1997-01-10
No. 96-1043
PETERSON, C.J., and GRIFFIN and ANTOON, JJ., concur.
685 So. 2d 1386 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1997) Positive Treatment
Cited by 12 cases

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Synopsis

David Jackson appealed his guilty plea convictions and sentences across five criminal cases, challenging the probation conditions imposed. The Florida Court of Appeal affirmed his convictions and sentences but vacated and remanded portions of the probation order due to improper conditions not properly announced or lacking statutory authorization.


Holding

The court affirmed Jackson's judgments of guilt and sentences but vacated portions of the probation order. The requirement to pay for drug testing is a special condition requiring oral announcement, which was not properly made. The $50 processing fee lacks statutory authorization and must be stricken. The written probation order must be revised on remand to include the orally announced condition requiring Jackson to avoid contact with victim Jerome Williams and not come within two miles of his residence.


Headnotes

[1] A general condition of probation, such as random drug testing, need not be orally announced if it is a statutory condition.

[2] A special condition of probation, such as the cost of drug testing, must be orally announced to be valid.

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Key Quotes

“Condition seven of appellant's probation order requiring him to submit to random drug testing, as directed by his probation officer, is a general condition of probation, and therefore need not be orally announced... However, the additional requirement of having the appellant pay for the drug testing is a special condition which, to be valid, had to be orally announced.”

Establishes the distinction between general and special probation conditions and their respective requirements for oral announcement

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Facts & Procedural History

Jackson entered pleas of nolo contendere in five separate criminal cases. Following sentencing, a probation order was imposed containing multiple cond…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

David Lee Jackson appeals his judgments of guilt and sentences after he entered a plea of nolo contendere in five separate lower court cases. We affirm the judgments and sentences except those portions of the probation order set forth below.

Condition seven of appellant’s probation order requiring him to submit to random drug testing, as directed by his probation officer, is a general condition of probation, and therefore need not be orally announced. § 948.03(l)(k), Fla.Stat. (1995). However, the additional requirement of having the appellant pay for the drug testing is a special condition which, to be valid, had to be orally announced. Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d 123 (Fla.1996). A second cost which must be stricken from appellant’s order of probation is a $50 non-recurring processing fee, which was to be imposed on appellant in the event he obtained administrative probationary status after completing one-half of his probation. This cost must be stricken because there appears to be no statutory authorization for it. Madison v. State, 664 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). Finally, the appellant properly brings to this court’s attention an additional discrepancy between the conditions announced orally in court and the written order of probation. At the sentencing hearing the trial court orally pronounced that appellant should avoid all contact with one of his victims, Jerome Williams and that victim’s wife, and that further, he should not come within two miles of their residence. On remand the written order should be revised to include this orally announced condition. Avery v. State, 543 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 5th DCA), appeal dis’m, 553 So. 2d 1164 (Fla.1989).

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

PETERSON, C.J., and GRIFFIN and ANTOON, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Repoleon Porchia v. State, 705 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
    …d [*1051] not be orally announced. § 948.03(1)(k), Fla. Stat. (1995). However, the requirement that the defendant pay for the tests is a special condition which must be orally announced. Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d 123 (Fla.1996); Jackson v. State, 685 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). Because the trial court failed to do so, that provision is stricken and may not be reimposed. Justice. The state has pointed out that section 948.09(6), Florida Statutes (1995) appears to contain the requirement to pay for such…
  • Batts v. State, 693 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)
    …lude that two conditions of the appellant’s probation must be stricken because they were not orally pronounced by the trial court: (1) the portion of condition 11 which requires that the appellant pay for blood and other tests, see Jackson v. State, 685 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); and (2) condition 12, which confines the appellant to her residence with certain exceptions, see Welborn v. State, 687 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). PROBATION ORDER AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. COBB and HARRIS, JJ., concur. . A…
  • Harris v. State, 698 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)
    …ng fee and an accompanying 4%. surcharge in conjunction with administrative probation. Since none of these special conditions were orally pronounced, they must be stricken. See Gearhart v. State, 692 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Jackson v. State, 685 So. 2d 1386 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).1 See also Justice v. State, 674 So. 2d 123 (Fla.1996). AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED. DAUKSCH, COBB and ANTOON, JJ., concur. . We do, however, lake this opportunity to clarify the issue of the existence, ve…

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