DENISE C. AUE, APPELLANT,
v.
STEVEN J. AUE, APPELLEE
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In a dissolution of marriage case, the trial court denied the former wife's request for attorney's fees solely because she rejected the former husband's settlement offer. The appellate court reversed, holding that attorney's fees in dissolution cases cannot be denied based on rejection of a settlement offer, and remanded for reconsideration based on the parties' financial resources and ability to pay.
No. A trial court may not deny attorney's fees in dissolution cases based solely on the failure to accept a settlement offer. When considering attorney's fees under section 61.16, the trial court must consider the financial resources of both parties and may consider special circumstances, but rejection of a settlement offer is not a permissible basis for denial.
[1] A trial court may order a party to pay attorney's fees in a dissolution case after considering the financial resources of both parties.
[2] A trial court may consider special circumstances in addition to financial circumstances when determining entitlement to attorney's fees in a dissolution case.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“While the trial court may consider special circumstances in addition to the financial circumstance of the parties when considering the entitlement to attorney's fees, no such circumstances exist in the instant case.”
Establishes that attorney's fees determination must focus on financial resources and only special circumstances may be considered in addition.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDenise Aue, the former wife, was awarded $500 per month in rehabilitative alimony for three years and the former husband was ordered to pay $1,300 per…
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PER CURIAM.
Denise C. Aue, the former wife, appeals a final judgment of dissolution, arguing that the trial court erred in denying her request for an award of attorney’s fees based solely on the trial court’s finding that she unreasonably rejected her former husband’s offer of child support and alimony. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
By the final judgment, the former wife was awarded $500 per month in rehabilitative alimony for three years; Steven J. Aue, the former husband, the appellee, was further ordered to pay $1,300 per month in child support. Prior to entry of the final judgment the former husband offered to pay $958 per month for 42 months as rehabilitative alimony, child support in the amount of $1,342 per month as well as the former wife’s monthly COBRA insurance and other deductibles and co-payments. The former "wife rejected this offer. The total support amount awarded in the final judgment was obviously less than the settlement offer. In its order denying the former wife’s request for attorney’s fees, the trial court stated that its decision was not based upon the parties’ earnings, but on its finding that the former wife was “unreasonable” in declining the former husband’s support offer.
Section 61.16 provides that a trial court “may from time to time, after considering the financial resources of both parties, order a party to pay a reasonable amount for attorney’s fees....” While the trial court may consider special circumstances in addition to the financial circumstance of the parties when considering the entitlement to attorney’s fees, no such circumstances exist in the instant case. Cf. Mettler v. Mettler, 569 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Further, there is no authority for denying attorney’s fees in dissolution cases solely for the failure to accept an offer of settlement. See, Barnette v. Barnette, 658 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). In fact, section 45.061(4), Florida Statutes, specifically exempts dissolution proceedings from the offer of settlement statute.
Accordingly, we reverse the denial of the former wife’s request for fees. On remand, the trial court is directed to reconsider the former wife’s request in light of the parties’ respective needs and ability to pay. Walsh v. Walsh, 600 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Dresser v. Dresser, 350 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.
JOANOS, WOLF and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.
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Arizona L. Sumlar v. Sumlar, 827 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…’s fees, suit money, and costs to the noncompliant party.” Even in those cases raising issues of inappropriate conduct, the trial court still must consider the parties’ respective need for suit money and ability to pay. Rosen; St Pierre; Aue v. Aue, 685 So. 2d 1388 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Patterson. During the dissolution proceedings, Appellant argued that Appellee’s own conduct in allegedly hiding or squandering assets and refusing to disclose certain requested information during discovery prolonged the litigat…
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Jamilette Hallac v. Hallac, 88 So. 3d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)…ot a ground to deny all attorney’s fees, the refusal to accept settlement offers is a “relevant circumstance” that a court may properly take into consideration in determining Chapter 61 fees under Rosen v. Rosen. Decided prior to Rosen, Aue v. Aue, 685 So. 2d 1388, 1388 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), involved a trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees to the wife because she was “unreasonable” in refusing to accept an offer of settlement from the husband. In revers [*257] ing, the First District noted “there is no autho…
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Diosdado C. Diaz and Dennis Haber, Esq. v. Rina Cohan Diaz & Leinoff & Silvers, P.A., 727 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…1.16, Florida Statutes, is not intended to operate as an offer-of-judgment statute. Thus, the fact that the husband obtained a bad result in litigation does not, in and of itself, warrant an assessment of attorney’s fees against him. See Aue v. Aue, 685 So. 2d 1388 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). However, the award in this case is not based simply on the poor result. Instead, the trial court analyzed the issues in the ease as they should have reasonably appeared at the outset. The husband counters that at the outset of…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Walsh v. Walsh, 600 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Peavy v. State, 350 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- Dresser v. Dresser, 350 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
- Mettler v. Mettler, 569 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
- Yanks v. Amerifirst Bank, 569 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- Barnette v. Barnette, 658 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)