ROBERT LANE AND KARI LANE, APPELLANTS,
v.
THE INTER VIVOS ESTATE OF LAWRENCE MORTON, APPELLEE
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Robert Lane was criminally attacked while trespassing on private property owned by the Estate of Lawrence Morton. Lane sued for negligence, claiming the Estate failed to warn him of or provide security against crime in a high-crime area. The court affirmed summary judgment for the Estate, holding that the danger of criminal assault is open and obvious as a matter of law.
The Estate owed Lane only a duty to refrain from wanton negligence or willful misconduct, and to warn of known dangerous conditions not open to ordinary observation. The danger of criminal assault is open and obvious as a matter of law, so the Estate breached no duty in failing to warn Lane of crime or provide security.
[1] A landowner owes a known trespasser or uninvited licensee a duty to refrain from wanton negligence or willful misconduct, to refrain from intentionally exposing them to d…
[2] A landowner has no duty to warn a licensee of the general danger of crime or criminal assaults in an adjacent high-crime area when such danger is open and obvious.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a duty to refrain from wanton negligence or willful misconduct which would injure him, to refrain from intentionally exposing him to danger, and to warn him of a defect or condition known to the landowners to be dangerous when such danger is not open to ordinary observation by the licensee.”
Establishes the limited duty owed by a landowner to an uninvited licensee or known trespasser
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRobert Lane was riding his recreational vehicle on private property owned by the Inter Vivos Estate of Lawrence Morton when he was criminally attacked…
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PER CURIAM.
Robert and Karl Lane, plaintiffs below, appeal a final summary judgment entered in favor of the landowner, appellee Inter Vivos Estate of Lawrence Morton (“Estate”) in their premise liability action below. The basis of this lawsuit is that Mr. Lane was criminally attacked by unknown assailants while riding his recreational vehicle on private property owned by the estate. He alleges that the Estate was negligent in failing to warn him of or provide adequate security against criminal attacks where its property was located adjacent to a known high crime area. We affirm the entry of summary judgment in the Estate’s favor. Based upon our review of the undisputed record, we first find Mr. Lane’s status on the Estate’s property at the time of the attack to be that of a “known trespasser,” which essentially is the legal equivalent of an “uninvited licensee.” Bishop v. First Nat’l Bank, Inc., 609 So. 2d 722, 725 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Savignac v. Department of Transp., 406 So. 2d 1143, 1146 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), rev. denied, 413 So. 2d 875 (Fla.1982). As such, the duty owed by the Estate to Mr. Lane was:
a duty to refrain from wanton negligence or willful misconduct which would injure him, to refrain from intentionally exposing him to danger, and to warn him of a defect or condition known to the landowners to be dangerous when such danger is not open to ordinary observation by the licensee.
Bishop, 609 So. 2d at 725 (citing Post v. Lunney, 261 So. 2d 146 (Fla.1972)).
As to the issue of whether the landowner breached this duty, we find that the record contains no evidence to create a triable issue as to whether the Estate committed any willful or wanton negligent act which facilitated the attack on Mr. Lane or whether the Estate intentionally exposed Mr. Lane to danger. There is no record evidence of any prior violent criminal attacks occurring on the Estate’s property or that the Estate had reason to suspect the likelihood of this particular attack. See Bishop, 609 So. 2d at 725-26; Drake v. Sun Bank & Trust Co., 377 So. 2d 1013, 1015-16 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Nor was there any special relationship between the Estate and Mr. Lane. E.g., Drake, 377 So. 2d at 1014.
Rather, the Lanes assert solely that this property was located adjacent to a known “high crime” area and as such, the Estate had a general duty to warn of this fact and/or provide adequate security on its premises. This argument, we think, brings this case squarely within this court’s decision in Davis v. City of Miami, 568 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) wherein we held as a matter of law that the danger of crime or criminal assaults is open and obvious, therefore, the City breached no duty to a licensee assaulted at its park when it failed to warn of the same. See also Smith v. Markowitz, 486 So. 2d 11, 12 (Fla. 3d DCA) (no duty to warn licensee of open and obvious above-ground water pipe), rev. denied, 494 So. 2d 1153 (Fla.1986); Nolan v. Roberts, 383 So. 2d 945, 946 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (no duty to warn child of sharp spines of a plant which is in plain view in the landowner’s yard), rev. denied, 401 So. 2d 1338 (Fla.1981).
Affirmed.
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Noraida N. Barrio v. City OF Miami Beach, 698 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…injure [her], to refrain from intentionally exposing [her] to danger, and to warn [her] of a defect or condition known to the landowners to be dangerous when such danger is not open to ordinary observation by the licensee. Lane v. Estate of Morton, 687 So. 2d 53, 54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). Here, the gravamen of Ms. Barrio’s complaint was that the City breached its duty by failing to warn her of the known prior criminal attacks on other areas of the beach. With regards to uninvited licensees, however, we have sa…
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Nicholson v. Stonybrook Apts., LLC, 154 So. 3d 490 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015)…ds of premises liability or ordinary negligence. However, there is a substantial body of case law supporting the conclusion that negligent security cases fall under the umbrella of premises liability. The strongest ease is Lane v. Estate of Morton, 687 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). There, the plaintiff was attacked by an unknown third-party while riding a recreational vehicle on private property owned by the defendant. Id. at 54. The plaintiff sued the property owner for negligent security, and the property…
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Zenaide Porto v. Carlyle Plaza, Inc., 971 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)…o an uninvited licensee is to refrain from willful misconduct or wanton negligence, to warn of known dangers not open to ordinary observation, and to refrain from intentionally exposing the uninvited licensee to danger. See Lane v. Estate of Morton, 687 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); see also Barrio v. City of Miami Beach, 698 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (holding where material facts are not in dispute it is appropriate to determine legal status of visitor on property as a matter of law). See generally Res…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Post v. Lunney, 261 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1972)
- Savignac v. Dep't OF Transp., 406 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981)
- Nolan v. Roberts, 383 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Fryc v. State, 377 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Drake v. SUN Bank & Tr. Co. OF ST. Petersburg, 377 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Bishop v. First Nat'l Bank OF Fla., Inc., 609 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)
- Smith v. Markowitz, 486 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Davis v. City OF Miami, 568 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- Roberts v. Nolan, 401 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 1981)
- State v. Russell, 401 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. 1981)