CANDYCE E. HUTCHINSON, N/K/A CANDYCE E. SERAFIN, APPELLANT,
v.
RICHARD J. HUTCHINSON, APPELLEE
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The trial court erred by failing to award attorney's fees to a prevailing party when the contract provided for such fees.
The parties' property settlement agreement allowed for attorney's fees to a party enforcing its terms. The wife claimed arrearages, and the husband cl…
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PER CURIAM.
Candyce Serafín appeals a judgment for child support and alimony arrearages owed by her former husband, Richard Hutchinson. We reverse in part and remand for reconsideration of the award of attorney’s fees.
The parties’ property settlement agreement provides for the recovery of attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses to any party forced to bring an action to enforce the terms of the agreement. Serafín claimed $40,531.92 in child support and alimony arrearages, and the husband claimed various set-offs and laches. The trial court awarded Serafín a total of $24,620.00. The court declined to award attorney’s fees to Serafín, reasoning that both parties had won some issues, since the husband had substantial success in his set-off and laches affirmative defenses.
The trial court erred by failing to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing party. Where a contract provides attorney’s fees for a prevailing party, the trial judge is without discretion to decline to enforce the provision. Rose v. Rose, 615 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). The test for determining the prevailing party is to determine which party prevailed on significant issues tried before the court. Moritz v. Hoyt Enters., Inc., 604 So. 2d 807, 810 (Fla.1992). See also Prosperi v. Code, Inc., 626 So. 2d 1360 (Fla.1993). We recognize that deference is owed a trial court’s discretion in determining who is the prevailing party. However, in a breach of contract action, one party must prevail, absent compelling circumstances. See Lucite Ctr., Inc. v. Mercede, 606 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); KCIN, Inc. v. Canpro Invs., Ltd., 675 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
On remand, the trial court shall reconsider its findings, basing its award on who prevailed on the significant issues in the suit.
As to all other issues raised, we affirm on the authority of Applegate v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 377 So. 2d 1150 (Fla.1979).
DELL, STONE and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
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Trytek v. Gale Indus., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1194 (Fla. 2009)…gation. See Brevard County Fair Ass’n v. Cocoa Expo, Inc., 832 So. 2d 147, 151 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (where both parties prevail on significant issues, the trial judge has the discretion to determine neither party prevailed); Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 687 So. 2d 912, 913 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (recognizing that there can be "compelling circumstances” in which a trial court can determine that neither party prevailed in a contract case); KCIN, Inc. v. Canpro Investments, Ltd., 675 So. 2d 222, 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…
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Dale R. Landry and wife v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 731 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…to the trial court’s ability to award a prevailing party attorney’s fee. However, we believe the discretion granted by use of “may” pertains to the determination of a prevailing party in an action founded on a contract. See Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 687 So. 2d 912, 913 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Once the prevailing party determination has been made, we believe section 57.105(2) “now mandates that contractual attorney’s fees provisions be reciprocal obligations.” See Jakobi v. Kings Creek Village Townhouse Ass’n, 66…
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Lasco Enters., Inc. v. Kohlbrand, 819 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)…2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). Although generally the law in Florida is that where a contract provides for an award of prevailing party attorney’s fees, the trial court is without discretion to decline to enforce that provision, in Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 687 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), the Fourth District recognized that in certain limited contract cases, no prevailing party may exist. In so ruling, the Fourth District cited to KCIN wherein the Second District held: Prevailing party attorney’s fees are just a…
Previewing 3 of 21 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Pitcher v. Schneider (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)
- Albert v. Applegate et ux., 377 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 1979)
- Moritz v. Hoyt Enters., Inc., 604 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 1992)
- Prosperi v. Code, Inc., 626 So. 2d 1360 (Fla. 1993)
- Kcin, Inc. v. Canpro Invs., Ltd., 675 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Lucite Ctr., Inc. v. Mercede, 606 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)
- Rose v. Rose, 615 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)