RAYMOND COOPER, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, DEFENDANT IN ERROR
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Raymond Cooper was convicted of petit larceny (stealing a hog valued under $20) after being indicted for grand larceny (stealing a hog valued over $20). The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence failed to establish the felonious intent (animo furandi) required for larceny conviction, as the taking was open, undeniable, and consistent with an honest property dispute.
The conviction was reversed because the evidence failed to establish larceny. Under Florida law, when a taking is open with no concealment and the defendant avows ownership, a strong presumption arises against felonious intent that must be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. The evidence here was consistent with an honest property dispute, not criminal theft.
“in larceny, it is essential to a conviction that the property was taken "animo furandi," and where it clearly appears that the taking was perfectly consistent with honest conduct, although the party charged with the crime may have been mistaken, he can not be convicted of larceny.”
Establishes the foundational requirement of felonious intent and the principle that taking consistent with honest conduct cannot support larceny conviction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCooper took a hog in broad daylight in the presence of multiple witnesses, including the property claimant. There was no concealment or denial of the …
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Taylor, J.
The plaintiff in error, hereinafter referred to as the defendant, on an indictment charging him with the larceny of one female hog of the value of more than $20.00 was tried in the Circuit Court of Santa Rosa County, and convicted of, and sentenced for, the misdemeanor of stealing a hog of.the value of less than $20.00.
Many errors are assigned, but from the conclusion we have reached it becomes unnecessary to consider but one of them, that is the denial of the defendant's motion for new trial made upon the ground that the verdict was not supported by the evidence. This, with other courts, have announced as settled law, that in larceny, it is essential to a conviction • that the property was taken “animo furandi/’ and where it clearly appears that the taking was perfectly consistent with honest conduct, although the party charged with the crime may have been mistaken, he can not be convicted of larceny. Bird v. State, 48 Fla. 3, 37 South. Rep. 525; Long v. State, 44 Fla. 134, 32 South. Rep. 870, and in Dean v. State, 41 Fla. 291, 26 South. Rep. 638, it is held by this court that: “In charges of larceny where the taking is open, and there is no subsequent attempt to conceal the property, and no denial, but an avowal of the taking, a strong presumption arises that there was no felonious intent, which must be repelled by clear and convincing evidence, before a conviction is authorized. ’ ’
Without discussing the evidence in detail, we are of the opinion that it wholly fails to make out a case of larceny under the rules of law above announced. On behalf of the State it shows that the taking of the hog alleged to have been stolen was openly done in broad daylight in the presence of several persons, one of whom was the prosecuting witness himself, who claimed the hog as being his property. That there was no denial of the taking, but an open avowal of the taking by the defendant, and a wordy dispute at the time of the taking.as to the ownership of the hog between the prosecuting witness and the defendant, the one persistently claiming it to be his property, the other as persistently asserting it to be owned by him. The defendant then telling the prosecuting claimant that if he would prove to him that the hog really belonged to him, the prosecutor, he the defendant would turn the hog loose, but to this proffer the prosecutor insisted that he, the defendant, should go ahead and take the hog to his, the defendant’s home with him.
There has been no concealment of the property, but since the alleged initial taking the hog in dispute has been alternately in the pen of the defendant at his home, and at different times in the pen of the prosecuting claimant, and at other times running at large on the range in the vicinity of the defendant’s house, and the defendant brought her to the court house in a crate to his trial to be used as an exhibit. From a threat made to the defendant by the prosecuting claimant to the effect, “that before the defendant, got through with the case he, the prosecutor, would cause him to think that it was a gold hog.” We think that the prosecuting witness, through harsh feelings toAvard the defendant, has mistakenly converted what would have formed the subject matter of a civil action at law of replevin into a criminal prosecution by indictment.
The judgment of the court beloAv is, therefore, hereby reversed at the cost of Santa Rosa County.
Browne, C. J., and Whitfield, Ellis and West, J. J., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (11 total)
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Rodriguez v. State, 396 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…aith belief be one which would be entertained by a reasonable and prudent man. Accord, Kilbee v. State, 53 So. 2d 533, 536 (Fla.1951); Maddox v. State, 38 So. 2d 58 (Fla.1948); Sass-nett v. State, 156 Fla. 490, 23 So. 2d 618 (1945); Cooper v. State, 82 Fla. 365, 90 So. 375 (1921); Tedder v. State, 73 Fla. 861, 75 So. 783 (1917); Uber v. State, 382 So. 2d 1321, 1322 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Board of Regents v. Videon, 313 So. 2d 433, 435 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975).3 [*800] The state contends that the defendants may no…1 / 2
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Jones v. State, 466 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)…empt to conceal the property, and no denial, but an avowal of the taking, a strong presumption arises that there was no felonious intent, which must be repelled by clear and convincing evidence, before a conviction is authorized.’’ Cooper v. State, 82 Fla. 365, 366, 90 So. 375, 375 (1921) (syllabus by court, para. 2) (emphasis added); see also Tedder v. State, 73 Fla. 861, 75 So. 783 (1917); Dean v. State, 41 Fla. 291, 26 So. 638 (1899). No such “clear and convincing evidence” was presented below to nega…
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Kemp v. State, 146 Fla. 101 (Fla. 1941)…o denial, but an avowal, of the taking a strong presumption arises that there was no felonious intent, which must be repelled by clear and convincing evidence before a conviction is authorized. Dean v. State, 41 Fla. 21, 26 So. 638; Cooper v. State, 82 Fla. 365. We find no errors in the conduct of the trial or in the charge of the court to the jury, but nevertheless, without further discussing the evidence, and applying the above enunciated principles to the facts as disclosed by the record in this case,…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Mose Dean v. State, 41 Fla. 291 (Fla. 1899)
- Long v. State, 44 Fla. 134 (Fla. 1902)
- Bird v. State, 48 Fla. 3 (Fla. 1904)