ALEXANDER G. RITCHIE A/K/A GEORGE RITCHIE, APPELLANT,
v.
DONNA B. RITCHIE, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 1997-02-12
No. 96-0027
POLEN and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
687 So. 2d 1358 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (1997) Caution
Cited by 16 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

In this family law appeal, the husband challenged the trial court's dissolution of marriage judgment, including an award of attorney's fees to the wife. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on all issues, using the case primarily to clarify when appellate courts have jurisdiction to review attorney's fee awards in dissolution cases.


Holding

The appellate court has jurisdiction to review the attorney's fee award because entitlement was part of the final judgment and the amount has been determined and is now final. The trial court did not abuse its discretion on any of the three issues raised, including the attorney's fee determination.


Headnotes

[1] An award of attorney's fees is ripe for appellate review when entitlement has been determined in the final judgment, the amount has been subsequently determined in a sepa…

[2] Where the determination of entitlement to attorney's fees is part of the final judgment of dissolution, an appellate court has jurisdiction to review the award once the a…

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“Because no issues on attorney's fees remain in the trial court, the propriety of the trial court's attorney's fee award is ripe for review.”

Establishes the ripeness doctrine for appellate review of attorney's fee awards

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

The trial court issued a final judgment dissolving the marriage and determining the wife's entitlement to attorney's fees, but reserved jurisdiction t…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PARIENTE, Judge.

PARIENTE, Judge.

The husband appeals from a final judgment raising three issues. We affirm on all issues raised, including the award of attorney’s fees to the wife. We write only to address the propriety of our reviewing the award of attorney’s fees because apparently, based on the wife’s representations, there may be confusion in this area.

In this ease, the trial court determined entitlement to attorney’s fees in its final judgment, which adjudicated all other issues related to the dissolution of marriage. It reserved jurisdiction to determine the reasonable amount of fees to be awarded. Subsequent to the final judgment of dissolution, the trial court entered a final judgment on attorney’s fees, which the husband did not appeal. Because no issues on attorney’s fees remain in the trial court, the propriety of the trial court’s attorney’s fee award is ripe for review. See Widom v. Widom, 679 So. 2d 74, 75 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Easley, McCaleb & Stallings, Ltd. v. Gibbons, 667 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); see also Patsy v. Patsy, 670 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).

Widow, Easley and Patsy do not represent a change of law in this district. We distinguish this ease, as well as Widow, Eas-ley and Patsy, from cases where this court has declined, based on ripeness, to exercise its jurisdiction to address the propriety of awarding attorney’s fees. See Moreno v. Moreno, 674 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); see also Hurtado v. Hurtado, 407 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). In Moreno and Hurtar do, the entitlement award was part of the final judgment on appeal but there had not yet been a determination of the amount of fees.

All of these cases contrast with Winkelman v. Toll, 632 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). In Winkelman, we concluded we did not have appellate jurisdiction to review a non-final order entered after final judgment because the non-final order determined only entitlement and not the amount of attorney’s fees. In that case, the determination of entitlement was in a separate postjudgment order, and we held that we did not have jurisdiction to review the controversy under either Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv) or 9.130(a)(4). Id. at 131-32.

Where the determination of entitlement is part of the final judgment, we have jurisdiction pursuant to rule 9.030(b)(1)(A) to review the award; however, we have generally declined to exercise our jurisdiction based on the doctrine of ripeness until the amount has been determined. See Hurtado. We review it here because the amount has been determined, has not been appealed, and entitlement is thus ripe.

Having concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion on any of the issues raised on appeal, including the determination of entitlement to attorney’s fees, we affirm the final judgment.

POLEN and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Anglia Jacs & Co., Inc. v. Dubin, 783 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
    …ed to attorney’s fees, but reserving jurisdiction to determine the amount of the fees, we dismiss the appeal without prejudice. Appellant may file a new notice of appeál upon the trial court’s setting the amount of such fees. See Ritchie v. Ritchie, 687 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). POLEN, TAYLOR, JJ., and DAMOORGIAN, DORIAN K, Associate Judge, concur.…
  • Miller v. Miller, 801 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
    …risdiction as to the former wife’s entitlement to attorney’s fees because the judgment does not set the amount of fees and thus, the issue is not ripe for our review. Carlson v. Carlson, 696 So. 2d 1332, 1333 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Ritchie v. Ritchie, 687 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Ritter v. Ritter, 690 So. 2d 1372, 1376 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Accordingly, we dismiss that portion of the appeal directed to entitlement. AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART. DAVIS, BENTON and BROWNING, JJ., concur.…
  • Carlson v. Andree Carlson, 696 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
    …court. As to the second point on appeal — entitlement to attorney’s fees — we decline to exercise our jurisdiction because the amount of attorney’s fees has not been determined and thus the issue is not ripe for our review. See Ritchie v. Ritchie, 687 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Unlike Ritchie and eases cited in Ritchie, such as Easley, McCaleb & Stallings, Ltd. v. Gibbons, 667 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), it has not been brought to our attention that the issue of entitlement has been determined subs…

Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw