JOHN BRENNAN CRUTCHLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
BREVARD COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, APPELLEE
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Crutchley appealed a summary judgment dismissing his replevin action to recover property seized during his criminal arrest. The court affirmed, holding that Crutchley's claim was barred because title to the property vested in the sheriff's office more than four years before he filed the replevin action.
The court affirmed summary judgment for the sheriff. Title to the seized property vested in the sheriff's office 60 days after the conclusion of Crutchley's criminal proceeding, which occurred by April 1989 at the latest. Because Crutchley did not file his replevin action until 1993, well beyond the four-year statute of limitations, his claim was time-barred.
[1] A replevin action to recover property seized by law enforcement is barred by the four-year statute of limitations if not filed within that period after the conclusion of…
[2] Title to unclaimed property seized by a law enforcement agency vests permanently in the agency sixty days after the conclusion of the related criminal proceeding.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Title to unclaimed evidence or unclaimed tangible personal property lawfully seized pursuant to a lawful investigation in the custody of the court or clerk of the court from a criminal proceeding or seized as evidence by and in the custody of a law enforcement agency shall vest permanently in the law enforcement agency 60 days after the conclusion of the proceeding.”
Establishes the statutory basis for vesting title in the sheriff and the triggering event (60 days after conclusion of proceeding)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFollowing Crutchley's arrest for sexual battery and kidnapping, the sheriff seized his property pursuant to a search warrant. Crutchley pled guilty an…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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THOMPSON, Judge.
John Brennan Crutchley appeals from a summary judgment in favor of the Brevard County Sheriffs Office. Crutchley filed a statement of claim in replevin, by which he sought to recover property seized by the sheriff pursuant to his felony arrest and the execution of a search warrant. The sheriff responded that the replevin action was barred by the four year statute of limitation in section 95.11(3)(i), Florida Statutes. We affirm.
The sheriff seized property from Crutchley following his arrest for sexual battery and two counts of kidnapping. Crutchley pled guilty and was sentenced on 23 June 1986 to the Department of Corrections. He appealed and his conviction was affirmed by this court on 28 April 1987. Crutchley v. State, 506 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). Six years later on 17 December 1993, Crutehley’s filed his replevin action. Section 705.105, Florida Statutes, vested title in the sheriffs office to unclaimed property 60 days after the conclusion of Crutchley’s proceeding.1
The statute does not define the term “conclusion of the proceeding,” but Crutchley’s criminal proceeding ended at least two years after the affirmance of his judgment and conviction, which this court issued on 28 April 1987. Compare, Coon v. State, 585 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding defendant’s motion for return of property not used as evidence against him timely where it was filed 59 days after defendant entered plea of guilty); Glendale Montessori School, Inc. v. State, 645 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (trial court directed to return to third party owner records seized pursuant to warrant where one defendant served sentence and where other defendant’s time to file 3.850 motion had expired).
In the instant case, because the record shows that ownership of the property seized pursuant to the warrant vested in the sheriffs department at least by April 1989, and because Cratchley did not file the replevin action until 1993, Crutchley has demonstrated no error in the judgment in favor of the sheriff.
AFFIRMED.
W. SHARP and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. . Section 705.105, Florida Statutes reads in pertinent part:
705.105. Procedure regarding unclaimed evidence.
(1) Title to unclaimed evidence or unclaimed tangible personal property lawfully seized pursuant to a lawful investigation in the custody of the court or clerk of the court from a criminal proceeding or seized as evidence by and in the custody of a law enforcement agency shall vest permanently in the law enforcement agency 60 days after the conclusion of the proceeding.
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Sarmiento v. State, 816 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…filed within sixty (60) days after the conclusion of the criminal proceeding as is required by section 705.105(1), Fla. Stat. (1997); see Romero-Saavedra v. State, 735 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) and Crutchley v. Brevard County Sheriff’s Office, 688 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); and where civil forfeiture proceedings against the property were pending at the time of the filing of the petition. See City of Miami v. Barclay, 563 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (owner not entitled to return of property during…
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Authorities Cited
- Coon v. State, 585 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Greenspoon v. Lewin, 645 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
- Glendale Montessori Sch., Inc. v. State, 645 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)