SARFRAZ JANJUA AND DENNY MILIAN, APPELLANTS,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Two co-defendants were convicted of second-degree felony murder, robbery without a firearm, and trespass of an occupied structure. On appeal, they challenged the admission of statements made to the defendant's father at the police station, the validity of the traffic stop and arrest, and the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal. The court affirmed all convictions.
The court held that (1) the police did not violate Miranda by allowing Milian to speak with his father without questioning him, as no interrogation or functional equivalent occurred; (2) the police had probable cause based on the totality of circumstances known at the time of the stop and arrest; and (3) the state presented sufficient prima facie evidence of all charged offenses.
[1] Statements made by a defendant in custody to a family member, in the presence of an officer, do not constitute interrogation or its functional equivalent under Miranda wh…
[2] Probable cause to stop a vehicle and arrest its occupants exists when the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the police at the time supports a belief that t…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the police's conduct in this case did not rise to the level of interrogation or the functional equivalent thereof, within the meaning of Miranda, where it was undisputed that Milian was not questioned by the police nor did the police send Milian's father to see him for purposes of eliciting incriminating statements”
Establishes that Miranda protections do not apply when there is no custodial interrogation or functional equivalent, even when defendant is in custody and unwarned.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMilian and Janjua were arrested for second-degree felony murder, robbery, and trespass. At the police station, Milian's father voluntarily came to see…
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PER CURIAM.
Sarfraz Janjua and Denny Milian, co-defendants below, appeal their respective convictions and sentences for second-degree felony murder, robbery without a firearm and trespass of an occupied structure after a jury trial. They raise three points as reversible error. First, they assert that the trial court erred when it denied Milian’s motion to suppress his post arrest inculpatory statements made to his father at the police station in the presence of a police officer without the benefit of Miranda
warnings. Milian’s father had voluntarily come to the police station to see Milian. Upon his arrival, Milian’s father requested that he be permitted to speak to Milian. He was permitted to do so, but only in the presence of a police officer.2 Although Milian was in custody and had not been Mirandized at the time, the police’s conduct in this case did not rise to the level of interrogation or the functional equivalent thereof, within the meaning of Miranda, where it was undisputed that Milian was not questioned by the police nor did the police send Milian’s father to see him for purposes of eliciting incriminating statements. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 107 S.Ct. 1931, 95 L.Ed.2d 458 (1987); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980).
Next, the appellants assert that their motion to suppress was improperly denied where the police lacked probable cause to stop their vehicle and arrest them. We disagree. Based upon our review of the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the police at the time they effectuated the stop and arrest of appellants, we find that the police had probable cause to believe that the subject crimes had been committed by appel-lees. State v. Scott, 641 So. 2d 517, 519 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); State v. Maya, 529 So. 2d 1282, 1285 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (quoting Skelton v. State, 349 So. 2d 193, 194 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)); Cross v. State, 432 So. 2d 780, 782-783 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).
Lastly, we find no merit to appellants’ final argument that the motion for judgment of acquittal was improperly denied where our review of the record reveals that the state made a prima facie showing of the charged offenses during its case in chief.
Affirmed.
. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
. The police officer testified below that this was done out of their concern for Milian’s safety because his father was visibly upset that his other son, Milian’s brother, was the victim killed in this incident.
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State v. M.R., 100 So. 3d 272 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012)…" was a significant factor in determining the existence of probable cause). . As indicated earlier, no evidence was presented as to the final Ray factor (history of previous multiple arrests from that site). . The State also cites Janjua v. State, 688 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) in support of its position. However, the defendant in Jan-jua was never questioned by police at all. [*281] Following the defendant’s arrest, his father came to the police station on his own and requested to speak with his son. Th…
Authorities Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966)
- Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (U.S. 1980)
- Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (U.S. 1987)
- Skelton v. State, 349 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- State v. Maya, 529 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)
- Mizell v. Lawson Lamar, 432 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)
- Railey Cross v. State, 432 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- State v. Scott, 641 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)