A.C., A CHILD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A.C., a juvenile, challenged his adjudication of delinquency for battery and his level six commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice. The court affirmed the delinquency adjudication but reversed and remanded the sentencing portion, finding that the total commitment and post-commitment community control terms exceeded the maximum one-year sentence allowable for battery under Florida law.
The court affirmed the adjudication of delinquency because the trial court's reasoning, though not explicitly stated in the written order, was evident from the transcript and satisfied statutory requirements. However, the court reversed the sentencing because the total term of commitment and post-commitment community control (728 days) exceeded the maximum one-year sentence allowable for battery under Florida law.
[1] A trial court satisfies statutory requirements for adjudicating a juvenile delinquent when the transcript reveals specific reasons supporting the adjudication and commitm…
[2] A juvenile's commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice and community control is limited to the maximum adult term for the offense or the juvenile's twenty-first bi…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“While the order is silent as to the reasons the trial court decided to adjudicate and commit appellant at level six, the transcript reveals the court's reasoning. The court stressed appellant's need for structure, the skill and sophistication in which the crime was committed, the effort of concealment by appellant, and his immaturity.”
Establishes that courts may rely on trial transcript to demonstrate compliance with statutory requirement to state reasons for adjudication, even if written order is silent.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA.C. pled guilty to a petition alleging delinquency for committing battery. The trial court adjudicated him delinquent and committed him to level six …
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CAMPBELL, Acting Chief Judge.
Appellant challenges his adjudication of delinquency and level six commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice. Appellant pled guilty to the petition alleging his delinquency due to the commission of a battery. However, he argues that the court erred in adjudicating him delinquent because the court failed to state specific reasons supporting its decision to adjudicate and commit. We disagree and affirm appellant’s delinquency adjudication. We do, however, find merit in appellant’s argument regarding sentencing and reverse on only that issue.
While the order is silent as to the reasons the trial court decided to adjudicate and commit appellant at level six, the transcript reveals the court’s reasoning. The court stressed appellant’s need for structure, the skill and sophistication in which the crime was committed, the effort of concealment by appellant, and his immaturity. We conclude that this satisfies the requirements of section 39.052(4)(e)(3), Florida Statutes (1995). See R.G.S. v. State, 597 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 601 So. 2d 553 (Fla.1992); I.H. v. State, 584 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).
The next issue regards sentencing. The order in this case states that appellant is sentenced to commitment not to exceed 364 days followed by post commitment community control not to exceed 364 days. In addition to the sentence received in the instant case, however, appellant was also sentenced in case 95-3174, a second degree felony, to commitment not to exceed his nineteenth birthday, and in case 95-3382, a third degree felony, to commitment not to exceed sixty days.
Commitment to the Department and community service is limited to the maximum adult term or to the date of the juvenile’s twenty-first birthday, whichever occurs first. See C.P. v. State, 674 So. 2d 183 ( Fla. 2d DCA 1996); S.P. v. State, 664 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Since the maximum term for battery that appellant could have received as an adult for the instant offense is one year, the sentence he received was not a legal sentence. See §§ 775.082(4)(a) and 784.08, Fla. Stat. (1995). We, therefore, vacate the order with instructions that appellant’s total term of commitment to the Department and community control not exceed one year pursuant to the above statutes.
LAZZARA and WHATLEY, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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T.J. v. State, 743 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…ance. This court has repeatedly held that community control may not last longer than the comparable adult sanction and has reversed cases in which the adult sanction would expire prior to the juvenile’s nineteenth birthday. See, e.g., A.C. v. State, 688 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); C.P., 674 So. 2d 183. We do not recede from this requirement. But see C.F. v. State, 603 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). Affirmed. PATTERSON, C.J., CAMPBELL, THREADGILL, PARKER, BLUE, FULMER, WHATLEY, NORTHCUTT, GREEN, CASANUEVA…1 / 2
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D.S. v. State, 727 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…indeterminate term of community control. We affirm her adjudication of delinquency but remand for modification of the community control sanction to reflect a term of no longer than one year, the maximum adult sentence for battery. See A.C. v. State, 688 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Affirmed but remanded for modification. PARKER, C.J., and DANAHY, PAUL W., Senior Judge, Concur.…
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D.L.J. v. State, 765 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…the disposition imposed is limited to the maximum sentence which could be imposed upon an adult for the same offense. See D.P. v. State, 730 So. 2d 414, 415 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); M.G. v. State, 696 So. 2d 1340, 1341 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); A.C. v. State, 688 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). The maximum permissible period of incarceration for a second degree misdemeanor is 60 days. See § 775.082(4)(b), Fla.Stat. (1999). This court has joined with the Second and Fifth District Courts of Appeal to require that a separ…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- C.P. v. State, 674 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- R.G.S. v. State, 597 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- I.H. v. State, 584 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)
- Buchy v. State, 664 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
- S.P. v. State, 664 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)