KEVIN CRYSTAL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Resentencing cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
In Crystal v. State, 672 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), we vacated the appellant’s seven and one-half year sentence and remanded for resentencing. Upon remand, the trial court imposed a sentence of ten years. We vacate the ten year sentence because it violates the appellant’s right to due process under North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969).
The only reason advanced by the trial court for the increased sentence was that the original sentence was “actually an insufficient sentence and not commensurate with the crime that was committed.” But the facts of the crime were known to the trial court at the time of the original sentence, and the trial court failed to identify any circumstance occurring since the original sentencing to justify the increased sentence. Because the court’s asserted reason for the increased sentence therefore does not satisfy the requirements of Pearce, we vacate the sentence and remand this case to the trial court for resentencing.
ALLEN and MICKLE, JJ., concur. MINER, J., concurs with written opinion.
MINER, Judge,
concurring.
While I agree that North Carolina v. Pearce, requires reversal and remand for resentencing in the instant case, I do so because the record does not reflect affirmative reason(s) for the increased sentence based upon objective information concerning “identifiable conduct” on appellant’s part “occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding.” I do not attribute the sentence on appeal to be the product of vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing judge.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Everett v. State, 824 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…dant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding.” North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). Thus, the trial court’s sentence violates Everett’s [*213] due process rights. Crystal v. State, 689 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). The state correctly conceded at the hearing on Everett’s motion to correct illegal sentence and on appeal that the sentence imposed at the 1999 resentencing was illegal. The state also correctly argued, and the trial court foun…
-
Griffith v. State, 763 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…remand after a successful appeal violates the due process clause of Article I, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution and of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Blackshear v. State, 531 So. 2d 956 (Fla.1988); Crystal v. State, 689 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). At the sentencing below, the court did not refer to any intervening events or other circumstances concerning “identifiable conduct” on appellant’s part, occurring after the time of the original sentencing pro [*368] ceeding, as…
Authorities Cited
- North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (U.S. 1969)
- Crystal v. State, 672 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)