WILLIAM R. OMASTA, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM "BILL" BEDINGFIELD, ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 5th DCA | 1997-03-07
No. 96-1078
DAUKSCH, J., concurs., GRIFFIN, J., dissents, without opinion.
689 So. 2d 409 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1997) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

An inmate filed civil rights claims against prison officials alleging age discrimination, retaliation for jailhouse lawyer activities, and inadequate medical accommodations. The trial court dismissed the complaints with prejudice based on qualified immunity, but the appellate court affirmed the dismissal while remanding to permit amendment of the complaints.


Holding

The trial court properly dismissed the complaints at the pleading stage because they failed to allege that the defendants were personally involved in any deprivation of constitutional rights or that any causal connection existed between the defendants' actions and any constitutional violation. However, Omasta should be afforded the opportunity to amend his complaints unless it appears the privilege to amend has been abused or the complaint is clearly untenable.


Headnotes

[1] Government officials performing discretionary functions are generally shielded from civil liability for damages if their conduct does not violate clearly established stat…

[2] Qualified immunity protects government officials from suit, not merely from liability.

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Key Quotes

“government officials performing discretion[ary] functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known”

Establishes the qualified immunity standard applicable to the defendants' conduct

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Facts & Procedural History

William Omasta, a self-proclaimed jailhouse lawyer, was an inmate at Sumter Correctional Facility. He claimed that older inmates were harassed by youn…

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Opinion of the Court
HARRIS, Judge.

HARRIS, Judge.

William R. Omasta, a self-proclaimed “jailhouse lawyer,” brings his own action against William Bedingfield, Superintendent of the Sumter Correctional Facility, Harry Single-tary, Jr., Secretary of the Department of Corrections, and Don Simpson, Chief of Classification at Sumter Correctional Institution claiming discrimination based on age. In this action, he claims that older inmates are put upon by younger inmates and that his medical needs were ignored when he was assigned to work in the kitchen while on medical restriction. This case was consolidated with his separate action claiming he was put on kitchen duty in retaliation for his efforts as a jailhouse lawyer. The trial court found that Omasta’s complaints failed to state a cause of action and that appellees were, “entitled to qualified immunity under the facts and circumstances alleged,” and dismissed the actions with prejudice. We affirm the dismissals but remand for the opportunity to amend.

Under the qualified immunity doctrine, “government officials performing discretion ary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The Florida Supreme Court has furthermore recognized that the qualified immunity of public officials involves “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Tucker v. Resha, 648 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Fla.1994) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)). However, while the Florida Supreme Court has made it clear that the issue of qualified immunity should be considered at the pleading stage, this does not mean that Omasta should not be permitted to plead his best case.

In order to adequately state a cause of action under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of rights protected by the United States Constitution or federal statutes. Rankin v. Colman, 476 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), rev. denied, 484 So. 2d 7 (Fla.1986). Omasta’s complaints contain a number of general allegations regarding appellees’ alleged indifference to his medical needs and restrictions, retaliation for his efforts as a jailhouse lawyer by assigning him to the kitchen detail, and failure to protect older inmates from younger inmates. But the complaints fail to allege that appellees were personally involved in any deprivation of his rights or that any causal connection existed between acts of appellees and any constitutional violation. It is within the Department’s discretion to assign or reassign inmates to work that it believes them best suited. There is no indication that any of the appellees believed that Omasta was physically incapable of performing the duties assigned. He complains that he was transferred out of an air-conditioning maintenance job into the kitchen. He is, after all, in prison. He is not entitled to make the decisions relating to job assignments. Further, short of segregating older inmates from younger inmates, he does not suggest how this alleged harassment can be avoided. What policy, statute or constitutional provision is he claiming was violated? Certainly every inmate regardless of age has the right not to be abused by other inmates if it can be avoided by prison officials but what did these officials do that they should not have done? Since Omasta’s complaints appear to be directed at the discretionary actions of appel-lees, they were properly dismissed.

We have previously held that unless it appears that the privilege to amend has been abused or that a complaint is clearly untenable, it is an abuse of discretion to dismiss with prejudice. Kovach v. McLellan, 564 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). This appears particularly true of civil rights complaints. Cruz v. Cardwell, 486 F. 2d 550 (8th Cir.1973). Omasta should be given the chance to amend.

DISMISSAL AFFIRMED; REMANDED with instructions to permit amendment to the complaints.

DAUKSCH, J., concurs.

GRIFFIN, J., dissents, without opinion.


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Citator

Cited By

  • State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Fleet Fin. Corp., 724 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
    …roperly addressed on the merits. See Pinellas County, Florida v. Southwest Florida Water Management, 718 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Golf Club of Plantation, Inc., v. City of Plantation, 717 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Omasta v. Bedingfield, 689 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). REVERSED and REMANDED. GOSHORN and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.…
  • Golf Club OF Plantation, Inc. v. City OF Plantation, 717 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)
    …dismissal should have been without prejudice, however, to allow Golf Club to amend its complaint to assert which particular application of the comprehensive plan amounts to an as-applied taking of the golf course property. See Omasta v. Bedingfield, 689 So. 2d 409, 410 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)(unless it appears that the privilege to amend has been abused or that a complaint is clearly untenable, it is an abuse of discretion to dismiss with prejudice.) In Taylor v. Village of North Palm Beach, 659 So. 2d 1167, 117…
  • Lawton v. Cochran, 695 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
    …se. In order to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that “a person acting under color of state law deprived him of rights protected by the United States Constitution or federal statutes.” Omasta v. Bedingfield, 689 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)(citing Rankin v. Colman, 476 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), rev. denied, 484 So. 2d 7 (Fla.1986)); Lambrix v. Singletary, 618 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)(a 1983 action will lie to challenge the denial of access to the courts)…

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