STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
SANDRA KAY KINNANE, A/K/A SANDRA CRUZAN, APPELLEE
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Florida successfully appealed a trial court order suppressing evidence from a traffic stop of Sandra Kinnane's vehicle. The state argued that the stop was valid under the Supreme Court's Whren v. United States standard, and the appellate court reversed, holding that officers can validly stop a vehicle for a traffic violation even if they have mixed motives including a search warrant.
The court reversed the suppression order, holding that the stop was valid under Whren v. United States because any traffic violation provides a sufficient basis for a motorist stop regardless of officers' mixed motives or ulterior reasons.
[1] A traffic stop is permissible if the detaining officer has probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, regardless of the officer's subjective intent…
[2] A temporary detention of a motorist who has committed a traffic violation is permissible, even if the officer also has another reason for making the stop.
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Establishes the core holding that traffic violations justify stops even with mixed or ulterior motives
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn July 1, 1994, Officers Parks and Wuzinski were conducting surveillance of the Kinnanes' residence under an issued but unserved search warrant. When…
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PATTERSON, Judge.
The state challenges the trial court’s order granting Sandra Kinnane’s motion to suppress on the ground that the officers’ stop of Kinnane’s car was pretextual. The state argues that the stop for a traffic infraction was valid. We agree and reverse.
On July 1,1994, Officers Parks and Wuzin-ski were conducting a surveillance of Sandra and David Kinnane’s residence on which a search warrant had been issued, but not yet served. The Kinnanes left the residence in a Corvette which was registered to them. The officers radioed to other officers in a marked car to stop the Kinnanes’ car because the car was speeding and because it left the residence described in the search warrant. The officers stopped the car, and as they approached it, they observed the female passenger bending down, making “furtive movements” towards the floorboard. At that time, for their own safety, they asked the passenger and the driver to step out of the car. The officers found an open purse on the floorboard which contained a loaded semiautomatic handgun and a knife. Sandra Kin-nane was arrested and charged with two counts of carrying a concealed weapon.
Kinnane filed a motion to suppress in which she argued that her car was not speeding and that her ear was stopped solely because of the search warrant on her home. The trial court granted Kinnane’s motion on the ground that the stop for speeding was pretextual.
Under Whren v. United States, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), any temporary detention of a motorist who has committed a traffic violation is permissible, regardless of whether “a reasonable officer” would have made the stop. Officer Parks testified that he ordered the stop of the Kinnanes’ ear because it was speeding. This was sufficient to validate the stop even though the officers also had another reason for making the stop, i.e., they had a search warrant for Kinnane’s residence. See State v. Corvin, 677 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (temporary detention of motorist with im proper license tag was valid regardless of whether officer also had ulterior motives for stop).
Further, the officers testified that they saw Kinnane making “furtive movements” toward the floorboard of the ear. Thus, they were entitled to search the car for their own safety. See State v. Dilyerd, 467 So. 2d 301 (Fla.1985) (search of car justified where passenger made furtive movement reasonably appearing to be attempt to conceal weapon).
For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s order granting the motion to suppress and remand the case for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur.
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Dewberry v. State, 905 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)…79 L.Ed.2d 725 (1984); Brown v. State, 863 So. 2d 459, 461 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (“Furtive movements may give rise to a reasonable suspicion that someone is armed and dangerous.”); C.G. v. State, 689 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); State v. Kinnane, 689 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996); State v. Brown, 395 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 407 So. 2d 1102 (Fla.1981); see also State v. Dilyerd, 467 So. 2d 301, 302 (Fla.1985) (holding the search of a car was justified where the passenger made furtive movem…
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Enich v. State, 838 So. 2d 1216 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)…38 So. 2d 380 (Fla.l983)(holding that suspicious or furtive movement can justify pat-down search), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S.Ct. 1330, 79 L.Ed.2d 725 (1984); C.G. v. State, 689 So. 2d 1246, 1248 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (same); State v. Kinnane, 689 So. 2d 1088, 1089 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (same). Finally, when the police officer began to ask the defendant questions, the defendant “started stuttering and shaking all over the place.” Therefore, based on the totality of the circumstances, as observed by an exper…
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State v. Toussaint, 168 So. 3d 308 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)…). A suspect’s furtive movements inside a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop may give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous. E.G., Brown v. State, 863 So. 2d 459, 461 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); see also State v. Kinnane, 689 So. 2d 1088, 1089 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (holding the defendant’s furtive movements toward the floorboard of the car during a traffic stop justified the police officers’ protective search of the car). Here, the trial court erred when it concluded that the totality…
Authorities Cited
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1996)
- State v. Dilyerd, 467 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1985)
- State v. Corvin, 677 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)