CLAUDE HATTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed Claude Hatton's convictions for possession and sale of cocaine but reversed and remanded his sentences because they improperly imposed simultaneous periods of incarceration and probation. The court held that under Florida law, all incarcerative portions of a sentence must be completed before any probationary portions begin.
It is reversible error to impose probation on one count to be served simultaneously with incarceration on another count. All incarcerative portions of a sentence must be completed before any probationary portions begin, as section 948.01(6), Florida Statutes, requires incarcerative portions to be completed before non-incarcerative portions commence.
[1] A sentence imposing simultaneous periods of incarceration and probation for different counts is erroneous.
[2] Statutory provisions requiring completion of the incarceration portion of a sentence before the non-incarceration portion begins apply to the entirety of a defendant's se…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it is error to order probation on one count to be served simultaneously with incarceration on another count”
Establishes the core legal principle that simultaneous incarceration and probation violates Florida law
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHatton was convicted on two counts related to cocaine offenses. He was sentenced to three months in county jail followed by two years probation on Cou…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Appeal Of Sentence cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
We affirm appellant’s convictions for possession and sale of cocaine but reverse his sentences to the extent that they impose simultaneous periods of incarceration and probation and remand for correction.
Appellant was sentenced to three months in the county jail followed by two years probation on Count I, and one year in the county jail followed by three years probation on Count II. The sentences were to run concurrently; therefore, nine months of the probation on Count I was to be served simultaneously with the inearcerative portion of Count II. The second and fifth districts have held that it is error to order probation on one count to be served simultaneously with incarceration on another count. Dewitt v. State, 639 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Hill v. State, 624 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). See also Barr v. State, 474 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (holding it is reversible error to impose concurrent terms of imprisonment and probation).
The Florida Supreme Court has also held that section 948.01(6), Florida Statutes (1995), requires the inearcerative portions of a sentence to be completed before the non-incarcerative portions begin. Horner v. State, 617 So. 2d 311 (Fla.1993). The issue in Homer was whether the statute, which prohibits a time gap in a probationary split sentence, prohibits a separation between incarceration and probation as to each ease of a multiple case sentence, or merely bars a period of freedom between portions on an individual’s overall sentence. Id. at 312. The court concluded the latter interpretation was correct, and affirmed consecutive probationary periods following an incarceration. Id. at 313. In reaching this holding, the court noted that the statute defines split sentencing with regard to the sentencing that the trial court is imposing for all cases against the defendant.
Since Homer holds that the statute requires the inearcerative portions of the sentencing be completed before the non-incar-cerative portions, and applies to sentencing on all counts as one “sentencing event,” it follows that the inearcerative portions of all counts must be completed before the probationary portion of any count begins. This conclusion is supported by the court’s prior statement that “[tjhe underlying concept of probation is rehabilitation rather than punishment and presupposes the fact that probationer is not in prison confinement.” Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490, 495 (Fla.1974).
GLICKSTEIN, DELL and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Foster v. State, 889 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…two sentences he received are illegal because they result in him serving incarceration and probation simultaneously. There is case law holding that the simultaneous imposition of incarceration and probation are illegal.1 See, e.g., Hatton v. State, 689 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Dewitt v. State, 639 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Here, however, Foster received separate sentences from different courts at different times. The case cited by the trial court in its order, Schurman v. State, 847 So. 2d 569 (…
-
Smith v. State, 147 So. 3d 1077 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)…d on count III because it is error to structure a sentence where probation on one count is ordered to be served simultaneously with incarceration on other related counts. Foster v. State, 889 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). See also Hatton v. State, 689 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (explaining that incarcerative portions of all counts of sentence must be completed before probationary portion of a related count begins); Dewitt v. State, 639 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (explaining that it is reversible err…
-
Renaldo J. Bell v. State, 216 So. 3d 751 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)…n on a variety of counts or cases, a probationary split sentence does not create [improper] gap time so long as” there is a single collective probationary period that immediately follows a single collective period of incarceration); Hatton v. State, 689 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (holding that “incarcerative portions of all counts must be completed before the probationary portion of any count begins”). Here, unlike in Turner, there is no gap or interruption between the incarcerative and non-incarcerative…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gideon Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1974)
- Barr v. State, 474 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Hampton Alonzo Corry v. State, 617 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1993)
- Hill v. State, 624 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Horner v. State, 617 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 1993)
- Dewitt v. State, 639 So. 2d 694 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)