MARIA RAQUEL SANDOVAL, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Maria Sandoval appeals her conviction for trafficking in cocaine on three grounds: evidentiary ruling, jury instruction denial, and prosecutorial misconduct. The Florida Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, finding no reversible error, though it acknowledged that one prosecutorial comment about crack cocaine was improper but not so egregious as to constitute fundamental error.
The trial court properly sustained the evidentiary objection because testimony about a co-defendant's statements does not fall within the hearsay exception for proving the declarant's state of mind when offered to prove the defendant's state of mind. The trial court properly denied the 'mere presence' instruction because standard instructions covered the requested theory. Although the prosecutor's crack cocaine comments were improper argument, they did not rise to the level of fundamental error in the context of the entire closing argument and thus do not warrant reversal.
[1] A co-defendant's statement offered to prove the defendant's state of mind or explain the defendant's actions does not fall within the exception for a declarant's statemen…
[2] A trial court is not required to give a requested jury instruction when the standard instructions adequately cover the subject matter of the requested instruction.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“That section permits, inter alia, the admission of a declarant's statements to prove the declarant's state of mind or to explain or prove the declarant's subsequent conduct... The declarant here is the co-defendant and not Sandoval.”
Establishes that hearsay exception for state of mind statements applies only to prove the declarant's own state of mind, not a third party's
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSandoval was convicted of trafficking in cocaine. At trial, she sought to introduce testimony regarding her co-defendant's statements to show her own …
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SHEVIN, Judge.
Maria Sandoval appeals a judgment of conviction for trafficking in cocaine. We affirm.
First, the trial eourt did not err in sustaining the state’s objection to Sandoval’s testimony as to her co-defendant’s statements that allegedly would show Sandoval’s state of mind and explain her actions. Con trary to Sandoval’s contention, that testimony does not fall within the purview of section 90.803(3), Florida Statutes (1995). That section permits, inter alia, the admission of a declarant’s statements to prove the declarant’s state of mind or to explain or prove the declarant’s subsequent conduct. E.g., Jones v. State, 440 So. 2d 570, 577 (Fla.1983). The declarant here is the co-defendant and not Sandoval.
Second, the trial court properly denied Sandoval’s requested instruction on “mere presence.” It is not error to refuse to give a requested instruction, when, as here, the standard instructions given covered the requested instruction. See Cunningham v. State, 676 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).
Finally, Sandoval contends that the prosecutor’s closing argument contained improper remarks, requiring the trial court to grant a mistrial even absent a contemporaneous objection. The remarks concerning drug traffickers did not constitute improper argument. The prosecutor did not impermissibly refer to Sandoval as a drug trafficker. Cf. Perez v. State, 689 So. 2d 306, 307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (“[I]t is always wrong to call ... defendants names by citing them as examples of a criminal ‘type.’ ”); Lopez v. State, 555 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (repeated references to defendant as a drug dealer who was lying on the stand is improper argument).
As to the crack cocaine remark,1 we agree with Sandoval that the argument was irrelevant and amounted to improper argument concerning the interest of the people of Florida to be safe in their environment, see Kirtsey v. State, 649 So. 2d 946, 947 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Baker v. State, 578 So. 2d 37, 39 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Wingate v. State, 232 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 237 So. 2d 764 (Fla.1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 994, 91 S.Ct. 467, 27 L.Ed.2d 443 (1971), and to an inappropriate request that the jury “send the community a message.” See Crump v. State, 622 So. 2d 963 (Fla.1993); Harris v. State, 619 So. 2d 340, 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). However, in the context of the entire closing argument, this singular comment was not so egregious as to undermine Sandoval’s right to a fair trial. It does not rise to the level of fundamental error. See Crump, 622 So. 2d at 972; Hampton v. State, 680 So. 2d 581, 585 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Killings v. State, 583 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Therefore, we affirm Sandoval’s conviction.
We are compelled, however, to remind the prosecutor that this court does not take such comments lightly. As stated by Judge Cross in Kirk v. State, 227 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969):
The prosecuting attorney in a criminal case has an even greater responsibility than counsel for an individual client. For the purpose of the individual case [the prosecutor] represents the great authority of the State of Florida. [The prosecutor’s] duty is not to obtain convictions but to seek justice, and he [or she] must exercise that responsibility with the circumspection and dignity the occasion calls for.... Cases brought on behalf of the State of Florida should be conducted with a dignity worthy of the client. (Emphasis added.)
Accord Hampton, 680 So. 2d at 585; Rosso v. State, 505 So. 2d 611, 614-615 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); Peterson v. State, 376 So. 2d 1230, 1235 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979), cert. denied, 386 So. 2d 642 (Fla.1980).
Affirmed.
. The prosecutor stated:
The quantity is over twenty-eight grams, and the substance was cocaine. Obviously, we’re not talking about sugar here, and this substance does not make lemonade. This substance makes crack cocaine that we find out on the streets of our cities day in and day out. Crack cocaine that destroys people and their families. This is not lemonade.
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Brooks v. State, 787 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 2001)…or prove only the declarant’s subsequent conduct. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 440 So. 2d 570, 577 (Fla.1983); Bailey. Therefore, this rule also renders Davis’s statements inadmissible to prove Brooks’ intent and motive. See, e.g., Sandoval v. State, 689 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). In Sandoval, the defendant sought to introduce her codefendant’s statements to show the defendant’s state of mind and to explain her actions. The trial court sustained the State’s objection to the introduction of the evidence. On…
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Lewis v. State, 711 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…This is hot the law. We remind counsel that prosecutors, like all lawyers, have ethical responsibilities. Most significant among these is a duty to seek justice. See Kirk v. State, 227 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969); see also Sandoval v. State, 689 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Peterson v. State, 376 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). The attack upon defense counsel was. improper in Benton, is improper in this case, and will continue to be improper in all future cases. Counsel is not free to pursue these…
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Antonal Thornton v. State, 767 So. 2d 1286 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000)…mit the crime, although he was there — that others did it. She was asking the jury to determine his guilt, and show him that if he commits a crime, he must pay for it and cannot shift the burden and blame others for his crime. See Sandoval v. State, 689 So. 2d 1258, 1259 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). In addition, if any error occurred here, it was harmless. Joshua positively identified Thornton as one of the robbers, and Thornton admitted he was present. His sole defense was that even though he was there he had no idea…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (20 total)
- Crump v. State, 622 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1993)
- Jones v. State, 440 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 1983)
- Wingate v. State, 232 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)
- Rosso v. State, 505 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Tucker v. State, 555 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- R.G.B. v. State, 376 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Burkhead v. Dade Cnty. Bd. OF Pub. Instruction, 376 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Kirk v. State, 227 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)
- Peterson v. State, 680 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)
- Perez v. State, 689 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)