CYNTHIA M. PINDER, APPELLANT,
v.
PIER 1 IMPORTS (US), INC., AND FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION, APPELLEES
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Cynthia Pinder appeals an order requiring her to repay unemployment benefits after she quit her part-time job at Pier 1 Imports to accept a full-time legal secretary position that fell through. The court reverses, holding that Pinder's departure from part-time employment was not a voluntary quit disqualifying her from benefits, as it was motivated by an opportunity to resume full-time employment after being laid off from her primary job.
Pinder's resignation from her part-time job cannot be characterized as a disqualifying voluntary quit. When viewed practically and realistically, her departure was motivated by an opportunity to secure full-time employment, directly related to her initial layoff. The agency's narrow interpretation of the operative facts was improper under unemployment law.
[1] An employee who quits a part-time job to accept a full-time job offer is not considered to have voluntarily quit without good cause attributable to the employer, especial…
[2] An employee's decision to leave part-time employment to pursue a new full-time employment opportunity is a realistic and practical choice that should be encouraged under…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Pinder did exactly what the unemployment law should encourage: when promised full-time employment if she would give up part-time employment, Pinder chose full-time employment.”
Establishes the court's view that Pinder's conduct aligned with the purpose of unemployment law and should not be penalized as a voluntary quit.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePinder worked full-time as a legal secretary at a law firm and part-time at Pier 1 Imports. She was laid off from the law firm but continued her part-…
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COPE, Judge.
Cynthia M. Pinder appeals an order requiring her to repay unemployment benefits. We reverse.
Pinder had a full-time job as a legal secretary with a law firm (“law firm 1”) and a part-time job with appellee Pier 1 Imports U.S., Inc. She was laid off by the law firm. She continued to work part-time at Pier 1.
Pinder interviewed with another law firm (“law firm 2”) which was willing to offer her a job but told Pinder that the required law firm hours would conflict with the Pier 1 job. Pinder quit Pier 1. Law firm 2 then reneged on the job offer. Since this left Pinder with no job at all, she applied for unemployment benefits. Benefits were granted and paid. Pinder later found another full-time job as legal secretary, and unemployment benefits ceased.
The Division of Unemployment Compensation then decided that it had been wrong to grant Pinder any unemployment benefits at all. After the fact, the agency took the position that since Pinder voluntarily quit the part-time job, this was a voluntary departure not attributable to the part-time employer, Pier 1. The agency then brought a claim against Pinder, demanding that she repay all of the unemployment benefits that she had received. The appeals referee ordered her to repay the benefits and the Unemployment Appeals Commission affirmed. Pinder has appealed.
Under the circumstances of this case we do not think that Pinder’s quitting Pier 1 can be viewed as a “voluntary quit.” Pinder did exactly what the unemployment law should encourage: when promised full-time employment if she would give up part-time employment, Pinder chose full-time employment.
The present case was a two employer situation, one full-time and the other part-time. In determining whether Pinder left employment without good cause attributable to the employer, the agency took too narrow a view of the operative facts. Pinder was attempting to resume full-time employment on account of the loss of full-time employment at law firm 1. In our view the entire episode relates back to the layoff at firm l.1 The layoff was initiated by law firm 1; it was a mere happenstance that Pinder had an additional part-time job. The statute should be applied in a practical and realistic way.
This case also points out an issue which should be considered by the legislature. When Pinder applied for unemployment benefits, she disclosed the relevant facts to the agency employee. The agency ruled that she was entitled to benefits. After the benefits had already been paid, the agency changed its mind and demanded that Pinder repay the amounts she had received, amounting to $4,250.00.
Pinder complains, rightly in our view, that the ordinary citizen should be able to rely on decisions that are made by agency employees. Citizens are not experts on the unemployment law, and should be able to rely on agency determinations where, as here, the agency has been given all of the operative facts. It would, of course, be a different matter in cases of fraud or cases in which material facts are withheld from the agency, but those are not the facts here.
Unfortunately the Florida Supreme Court has held that the wording of paragraph 443.151(6)(c), Florida Statutes, does not allow the agency or the courts to make any equitable adjustment in cases of overpayment, subject to an exception not applicable here. See Unemployment Appeals Commission v. Comer, 504 So. 2d 760, 761 (Fla.1987). In our view Pinder’s complaint about the system is well founded, but any adjustment in the system will have to be made by the legislature.
In the present case, however, Pinder is entitled to relief under existing law. The order under review is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to enter a final order in favor of Pinder. Reversed and remanded.2
. Assuming that the agency has the discretion to do so, law firm l’s account should be charged.
. Assuming arguendo that Pinder was properly viewed as having voluntarily quit part-time employment, that would not disqualify her from all benefits but would only result in a pro rata reduction. Alderman v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 664 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Wright v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, 512 So. 2d 333, 334-35 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
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Mikolsky v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 721 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)…rger was followed more recently in Bomar v. Rolling in Dough Cookie Company, Inc. v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, 715 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). See also Pinder v. Pier 1 Imports (US), Inc. v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, 691 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). In view of these unanimous decisions from three different district courts of appeal, we have difficulty understanding why the Commission continues to adhere to its rejected interpretation of the statute. The result is delay and…
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Duby v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n & Staffmark Human Res., 765 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…ith StaffMark to take a permanent position with Neptune and had not established good cause for the separation. The Unemployment Appeals Commission affirmed the denial, prompting this appeal. This case is analogous to Pinder v. Pier 1 Imports, Inc., 691 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). In Pinder, the claimant was employed full-time at a law firm and part-time at Pier 1 Imports. She was eventually discharged from her position as a legal secretary and continued working part-time at Pier 1. After several interview…
Authorities Cited
- The City OF Coral Gables v. Mayol, 512 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Unemployment Appeals Comm'n v. Comer, 504 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 1987)
- Alderman v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 664 So. 2d 1160 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)