ANTHONY DUNSHAY RANDALL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Anthony Dunshay Randall appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress statements he made after arrest for robbery. Although he was a minor (17), Randall admitted he received Miranda warnings and waived his rights, but argued the waiver should have been recorded on tape or evidenced by a signed card. The appellate court affirmed, finding no prejudice from the technical failure to obtain a written waiver.
The court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, holding that although a written waiver was not obtained, no prejudice resulted from this technical violation where the tape recording itself commenced with Detective Amott announcing the waiver, Randall swore to tell the truth without disputing his rights were explained, and Randall's prior adult prosecutions demonstrated his awareness of his rights.
[1] A waiver of the right to counsel made out of court must be in writing and signed by at least two attesting witnesses.
[2] Noncompliance with procedural rules does not require reversal unless the noncompliance resulted in prejudice or harm to the defendant such that fundamental rights are imp…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A waiver of counsel made in court shall be of record; a waiver made out of court shall be in writing with not less than 2 attesting witnesses.”
Establishes the procedural requirement under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111(d)(4) that out-of-court waivers must be in writing with attesting witnesses.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRandall, age 17, was arrested for robbery. Detective Amott read him his Miranda rights, and Randall waived both his right to remain silent and right t…
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HARRIS, Judge.
In this appeal from the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress the statements of Anthony Dunshay Randall, Randall admits that there was evidence before the court that his Miranda rights were given and that he waived both the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. He contends, however, that since he was only seventeen at the time he was arrested for the robbery, we should require that his waiver either be recorded on tape or, at the very least, be evidenced by his signature on a “waiver of rights” card. Rule 3.111(d)(4), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires:
(4) A waiver of counsel made in court shall be of record; a waiver made out of court shall be in writing with not less than 2 attesting witnesses. The witnesses shall attest the voluntary execution thereof.
In discussing this rule in Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla.1995), the supreme court held:
The rule states that an out-of-court waiver of the right to counsel must be in writing and signed by at least two attesting witnesses. Here, the written waiver contained only a single attesting witness. In gauging violations of rules of procedure, the courts of Florida generally have held that noncompliance does not require reversal unless it has resulted in prejudice or harm to the defendant such that fundamental rights are implicated. [Citation omitted.] This rule only applies with greater force to purely technical rules like rule 3.111(d)(4). In a highly analogous case, then-Judge Grimes noted that the complete failure to obtain the signed waiver would not require reversal in the absence of harm or prejudice. Hogan v. State, 330 So. 2d 557, 559 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).
Although a written waiver was not obtained in this case, and no waiver expressly appears on the taped statement, the tape does commence with the statement that Detective Amott announced he had read Randall his rights and Randall waived those rights. Randall then swore to tell the truth without any indication that his rights were not explained to him or that he had not waived them. Considering this fact together with Randall’s admission that he had been twice previously prosecuted as an adult and was well aware of his rights, we find that no prejudice resulted from the failure to obtain such written waiver in this case. We take this opportunity, however, to remind the Orlando Police Department of the requirement of this rule.
AFFIRMED.
GOSHORN and ANTOON, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Doyle v. State, 783 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)…Rule 3.111(d)(4). This, too, requires an examination of the prejudice to Doyle created by the failure to have the waivers properly witnessed. Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 637 (Fla.1995); Jordan v. State, 334 So. 2d 589 (Fla.1976); Randall v. State, 691 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Hogan v. State, 330 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). Determination of whether Doyle was prejudiced by the delays and by the failure to have the waivers of counsel properly witnessed will require an evidentiary proceeding before…
Authorities Cited
- Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1995)
- Gus David Hogan v. State, 330 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)