WALT DISNEY WORLD CO., APPELLANT,
v.
GAIL DIAZ AND PETER DIAZ, APPELLEES
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Florida appellate court reversed denial of venue transfer, holding that independent travel agents are not per se agents or representatives of resort operators for purposes of venue jurisdiction under section 47.051.
Independent travel agents who make reservations at a traveler's request are not per se agents or representatives of the resort owner or operator for venue purposes under section 47.051, Florida Statutes, even if they receive compensation from the facility.
[1] Independent travel agents who solicit reservations at the request of travelers are not per se agents or representatives of resort operators for venue jurisdiction purpose…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGail Diaz was injured while a guest at Fort Wilderness Park, a Disney facility in Orange County. The Diazes sued in Monroe County, relying on a travel…
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FLETCHER, Judge.
Walt Disney World Co. [WDWC] appeals the denial of its motion to dismiss or transfer venue from Monroe County to Orange County (where Gail Diaz was injured while a guest at Fort Wilderness Park). The circuit court denied the motion after concluding that a travel agent located in Monroe County was an agent or representative of WDWC, thus (further concluding) Gail Diaz and Peter Diaz properly brought suit in Monroe County pursuant to section 47.051, Florida Statutes (1995).1 We conclude, however, that, for the purposes of section 47.051, independent travel agents who make reservations at the request of travellers are not per se agents or representatives of the entity owning or operating the resort, airline, hotel or other facility for which the reservation was made, even though the travel agent may receive (or withhold from the traveler’s funds) a payment from the facility’s owner or operator. Accordingly, we reverse the order and instruct the trial court to transfer venue to Orange County. See Ruiz v. Walt Disney World Co., 677 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Walt Disney World Co. v. Leff, 323 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
Reversed and remanded.
. Which provides as to foreign corporations:
“Actions against foreign corporations doing business in this state shall be brought in a county where such corporation has an agent or representative, where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is located.”
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NEW Commodore Cruise Lines v. Sabio, 724 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)…rating the resort, airline, hotel or other facility for which the reservation was made, even though the travel agent may receive (or withhold from the traveler’s funds) a payment from the facility’s owner or operator. Walt Disney World Co. v. Diaz, 691 So. 2d 1150, 1151 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). In the instant case, there was no per se agency relationship, and Sabio failed to present sufficient evidence to show that an agency relationship existed between NCCL and the travel agents in question. Further, we decline…
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Magical Cruise Co. Ltd. v. Renata Lohinski, 829 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002)…o. 2d 149, 150 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)(owner’s sale of tickets through travel agents in county in which action was filed was insufficient to establish it had an agent or representative for purposes of venue in Dade County); Walt Disney World Co. v. Diaz, 691 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)(for venue purposes, independent travel agents who made reservations at the request of travelers are not per se agents of the entity operating the facility for which the reservation was made). If “doing business” was sufficient to…
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United Shipping Co. (Nassau) Ltd. v. Witmer, 724 So. 2d 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)…s subjecting them to Florida jurisdiction in an action for the drowning of a Carnival Cruise line passenger while on the tour at Paradise Island. Specifically, neither section 48.193(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), see Walt Disney World Co. v. Diaz, 691 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); see also State v. American Tobacco Co., 707 So. 2d 851, 854-55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); compare Universal Caribbean Establishment v. Bard, 543 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), nor section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes (1997), see Spanie…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Walt Disney World Co. & Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Leff, 323 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- Chester v. Keys Hosp. Found., Inc., 677 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
- Ruiz v. Walt Disney World Co., 677 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)