MARK T. DAL PONTE, APPELLANT,
v.
KIM T. DAL PONTE, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that the trial court failed to make required findings of fact to support its awards of alimony and equitable distribution, necessitating reversal and remand.
[1] A trial court must make specific findings of fact supporting an award or denial of alimony, considering all statutory factors, to allow for meaningful appellate review.
[2] A party seeking special credit for mortgage or repair payments on a marital home held as tenants by the entireties bears the burden of proving the payments were from nonm…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court distributed assets and liabilities and awarded permanent periodic alimony. The former husband appealed, arguing the court made insuffi…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Dissipation Of Assets cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Former Husband appeals a final judgment of the trial court distributing the parties’ assets and liabilities and awarding Former Wife permanent periodic alimony. We reverse and remand as to each of the four issues raised.
In awarding Appellee permanent periodic alimony, the trial court merely found, “The Wife has met all the criteria set forth in Florida Statutes § 61.08 demonstrating a reasonable financial need established during the marriage of $1,500 per month.” This blanket finding does not meet the directive of section 61.08(1) that the court “include findings of fact relative to the factors enumerated in subsection (2) supporting an award or denial of alimony.” See, e.g., Collins v. Collins, 655 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)(without written findings to support the trial court’s decision regarding alimony, meaningful appellate review is not possible); Jacques v. Jacques, 609 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Moreno v. Moreno, 606 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).
Our review of the evidence presented at trial shows that the appropriateness of the award of permanent periodic alimony was a close question, i.e., the duration of the marriage was in the “gray area” for permanent alimony; there were no children born of the marriage; Former Wife made no contribution to Former Husband’s career; Former Wife is fairly young, in good health and employed; and Former Wife could possibly attain a level of self support reasonably commensurate with the parties’ standard of living. See, e.g., Kremer v. Kremer, 595 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)(reversing award of alimony), and Geddes v. Geddes, 530 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)(affirming rehabilitative alimony in lieu of permanent alimony); also Rojas v. Rojas, 656 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)(reversing award of permanent periodic alimony and remanding for consideration of rehabilitative alimony).
Without proper statutory findings, we cannot determine if Former Wife proved need for the alimony awarded.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for reconsideration and findings pursuant to section 61.08, Florida Statutes.
As part of the equitable distribution scheme, the trial court awarded Former Wife the marital home and a credit for one-half of the mortgage payments and repairs she made on the property during the parties’ separation. We have held that when a home is held in tenancy by the entireties, both parties are obligated for the debt and expenses on the property, and expenditures made during the marriage are presumed to be in furtherance of the marriage. Bean v. Bean, 641 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Taber v. Taber, 626 So. 2d 1089, 1090 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
A party seeking to show a special interest or special credit for contributions has the burden of showing that such payment was from nonmarital funds or as a result of special efforts, and did not constitute payment of marital expenses. Taber, 626 So. 2d at 1090. Although there was some evidence that the payment of the mortgage during the period of separation may have come from a nonmarital source, Former Wife’s mother, there was no finding in this regard. Further, there was no finding that the payments did not constitute payment of marital expenses. We therefore reverse and remand for further findings pursuant to Ta-ber.
The trial court awarded Former Husband the value of his nonvested marital pension in the amount of $20,562.
The trial court did not, however, calculate the present value of the plan, as required by DeLoach v. DeLoach, 590 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
Accordingly, the trial court could not have correctly accounted for the value of this asset in the equitable distribution scheme-.
We reverse and remand for further findings pursuant to DeLoach.
Finally, the trial court awarded Former Husband $7,800 in cash as part of his share of the equitable distribution. We suspect the award was an attempt to hold Former Husband accountable for an amount of cash withdrawn from a personal bank account. See § 61.075(l)(i), Fla.Stat. (the trial court may consider dissipation of assets in equitable distribution). The record, however, does not .support the distribution, as the uncontradicted testimony shows the account was funded by monies earned both before and after the parties’ separation date and that $5,000 of the $7,800 was used to pay a marital debt. We therefore reverse and remand for further findings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
BOOTH, WOLF and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Bush v. Bush, 824 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)…ts or sums that have been diminished or depleted during the dissolution proceedings. See Cummings v. Cummings, 719 So. 2d 948, 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)(citing Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So. 2d 883, 886 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)); see also Dal Ponte v. Dal Ponte, 692 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). For her part, the former wife suggests that the trial court’s attribution of the $43,138 in stock options to the husband can be sustained on the basis of the husband’s waste or depletion of marital assets on his new girlfriend.…
-
Alpha v. Alpha, 885 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)…DCA 1993). . See Bijlani v. Pioneer House Associates, 719 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Ferry v. Abrams, 679 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). . See § 61.075(7), Fla. Stat.; Robertson v. Robertson, 593 So. 2d 491 (Fla.1991); Dal Ponte v. Dal Ponte, 692 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Livingston v. Livingston, 633 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Howes v. Howes, 613 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). . The court expressly found Elizabeth's contributions were undisputed as to the marriage through her efforts of…
-
Gray v. Gray, 103 So. 3d 962 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)…upport the award, the alimony award must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Id.; see also Walker v. Walker, 85 So. 3d 553, 554 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); McCarty v. McCarty, 710 So. 2d 713 (Fla. [*967] 1st DCA 1998); Dal Ponte v. Dal Ponte, 692 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). Former Husband’s Ability To Pay $30,000.Per Month As with the trial court’s findings regarding the former wife’s need for the permanent alimony awarded, the final order lacks the requisite statutory findings regarding the form…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (12 total)
- DeLOACH v. Ruthie Mae DeLOACH, 590 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Kremer v. Kremer, 595 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)
- Brown v. State, 530 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Geddes v. Gudrun Margrit Geddes, 530 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
- Taber v. Taber, 626 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- Rojas v. Rojas, 656 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
- Sweet v. Fin. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Dade Cnty., 606 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)
- Moreno v. Moreno, 606 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)
- Jacques v. Jacques, 609 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
- Bean v. Bean, 641 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)