STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
RICHARD EVANS, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed the suppression of statements made by a defendant during a DUI investigation following an automobile accident. The court affirmed suppression of statements made in response to accident investigation questions under the statutory accident reporting privilege, but reversed the denial of suppression for statements made during custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings.
The court held that statements made in response to accident investigation questions were properly suppressed under the statutory accident reporting privilege in Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes, with no exception for cases where driver identity is in question. However, statements made to Deputy Lahiff during the DUI investigation were also suppressible because Evans was in custody and subjected to custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings.
[1] Statements made by an individual questioned by officers conducting an accident investigation are privileged under Florida Statutes section 316.066(4), and this privilege…
[2] An accident reporting privilege is not waived by statements made to the "world at large" if the statements were made in response to questions by investigating officers.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1993), as amended in 1989, provides for a privilege to individuals who are questioned by officers conducting an accident investigation. Contrary to the state's contention, there is no longer an exception to the privilege for statements made if the identity of the driver is in question.”
Establishes the broad scope of the accident reporting privilege with no exception for driver identity issues
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRichard Evans was questioned by officers at the scene of an automobile accident. Officers initially questioned him about the accident, then Deputy Lah…
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WARNER, Judge.
We affirm the trial court’s order granting suppression of appellee’s statements made at the scene of an automobile accident. Section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1993), as amended in 1989, provides for a privilege to individuals who are questioned by officers conducting an accident investigation. Contrary to the state’s contention, there is no longer an exception to the privilege for statements made if the identity of the driver is in question. We also do not consider that the statements made by appellee were volunteered to the “world at large” such that the accident reporting privilege was waived. See Conner v. State, 398 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Here, the view of the evidence most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling shows that statements made by appel-lee were in response to questions by the officers.
Appellee challenges the court’s denial of his motion to suppress two other statements he made to other officers. As to the statements made to Deputy Lahiff at the scene of the accident, he claims that these too should have been suppressed because they fell within the accident report privilege. After Deputy Lahiff told appellee he was there to conduct a DUI investigation, the officer did not read appellee his Miranda rights before administering the roadside tests for DUI.
The state contends affirmance is required as to these statements, based on Duncan v. State, 659 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), which relies on State v. Burns, 661 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), dismissed, 676 So. 2d 1366 (Fla.1996). Those cases hold that a defendant subjected to a roadside testing for DUI during a routine traffic stop was not in custody for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. We find those cases to be distinguishable because appellee was in custody within the meaning of Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla.1992). Here, appellee had already been told not to leave the area. Deputy Lahiff took the appellee over to a nearby gas station, told him he was conducting a DUI investigation, and asked him questions, such as whether he had had anything to drink, whether he had been injured, etc., as well as administering roadside testing to him. We think that this amounted to a custodial interrogation which required Miranda warnings. See Allred v. State, 622 So. 2d 984 (Fla.1993). We therefore reverse the trial court’s order denying suppression of appellee’s statements to Deputy Lahiff.
We affirm the denial of the motion to suppress appellee’s statements to Detective Babcock.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.
DELL and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.
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Jump v. State, 983 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)…lstad, 470 U.S. at 309, 105 S.Ct. 1285. Turning to the facts in the case before us, DUI investigations are not immune from the requirement that Miranda warnings be given if police are conducting a custodial interrogation. See, e.g., State v. Evans, 692 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (distinguishing cases which hold that a defendant subject to a roadside testing for DUI during a routine traffic stop is not in custody for purposes of the Fifth Amendment and holding that custodial interrogation occurred when th…
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Vedner v. State, 849 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)…ent encounters associated with vehicular accidents, however, the usual rules and precepts associated with Miranda seem to apply. See, e.g., Cummings v. State, 780 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), rev. denied, 796 So. 2d 536 (Fla.2001); State v. Evans, 692 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS The statements given by Mr. Ved-ner to law enforcement officers at the initial interview were voluntarily made after he was advised of his Miranda rights and were, therefore, admissible against him.…
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State v. Jones (Fla. 2d DCA 2019)…ed by officers conducting an accident investigation, and the statute (after an amendment in 1989) does not provide an exception to this privilege for information given about identity if the identity of the driver is in question. State v. Evans, 692 So. 2d 305, 306 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). This passage seems to recognize that there is no constitutional self-incrimination problem with the admission of Mr. Jones's statement of identity under Byers and to hold that the statutory privilege under section 316.06…1 / 2
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1992)
- Allred v. State, 622 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1993)
- State v. Burns, 661 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)
- Burns v. State, 676 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 1996)
- Monahan v. State, 398 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)
- Duncan v. State, 659 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)